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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines in detail, the organisation, training and operations of 
the 27 th and 30th American Divisions during the period of Summer 1917 to the 
announcement of an armistice in November 1918. Particular emphasis is placed 
on the two divisions after they were attached to the 11 American Corps. especiallý 
their experience with the British Expeditionary Force in 1918, and the training 
received under the supervision of British officers. 
The 11 American Corps was unique in that it spent its entire service in France in 
the British sector. Originally it was composed of 10 divisions, but eight of these 
were removed by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen. 
John. J. Pershing. The divisions were transferred to the First American Army and 
operated entirely independent of 11 American Corps. The týýo American divisions h, oth that remained with the British, the 27t and -3 , relied 
heavily upon their coalition 
partners for advice in training, supplies, equipment, food and more importantly, 
tactical leadership. Although General Pershing forbade American divisions from 
th -, oth being amalgamated into Allied armies, in reality, the 27 and -) Divisions became part of the BEF, especially the Fourth Arrný during the final campaigns of 
the war. Despite its attachment to arguably the best fighting force on the Western 
Front in 1918, the 11 American Corps suffered heavý casualties during its limited 
operational experience and. in many ways. failed to take advantage of lessons 
learned by the British Army during its campaigns of 1916-1917. 
This dissertation concludes that the relationship between the two American 
divisions and their British ally was in the end result a success. By allowing the 
27 th and 30'hDivisions to remain behind with the BEF, Pershing provided the 
British with more than 50,000 able American troops to use at the front. Thus the 
tNN, o allies became Brothers-in-Arms. 
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Introduction 
The relationship between the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF)l divisions serving 
with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1918 offers an opportunity for a much- 
neglected case study of the Anglo-American battlefield alliance. Although the 
commander-in-chief of the AEF, Gen. John J. Pershing, rejected demands for full-scale 
amalgamation by insisting upon an independent army, two of his divisions, the 27 th and 
30 th , spent their entire service on the Western Front with the British Anny. These 
borrowed units were among the 10 AEF divisions (the others were the 4 
th 28 th 33 rd ý 35 
th 
77 th 78 lh 8 Oth and 82 
nd) 
sent by Pershing to the British sector for training .2 In order to 
retain administrative control of his units under British command, he organised them into 
the 11 American Corps. The British supervised the training of their English- speaking 
comrades, transported them overseas, and in many instances, provided them with the 
necessary equipment, arms and food. 
The British Tommies 3 took the American doughboYS4 under their wing when they arrived 
in June 1918, but the two never developed a strong camaraderie. One reason may have 
been the cultural differences existing between the two Allies, while another explanation 
is that recently arrived American soldiers could in no way relate to the hardships and 
sacrifices already made by the veteran British soldiers, whose exhaustion from battle 
contrasted with the eagerness and high spirits displayed by the fresh-faced Yanks. 5 
Regardless of the disparity and the complex partnership that evolved, the Americans and 
the British were fighting together to achieve a common goal, the defeat of the Gennan 
Army. The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, enthusiastically proclaimed the 
two AlliesBrothers in Anns ., 
6 Together the BEF and the two attached AEF divisions 
attacked the German Hindenburg Line on 29 September 1918, during the Hundred Days 
Campaign and the following month pursued the German forces to the Selle River. This 
was a defining moment for both armies as this offensive hastened the end of the war. 
Despite the significance of the American-British relationship, the training and operations 
of 11 American Corps are rarely mentioned in the historiography of World War 1. While 
this alone is sufficient reason to undertake a full-length study of its attachment to the 
BEF, there is another significant rationale. The present military relationship between the 
United States and Great Britain can trace its origins to the Western Front in 1918.7 This 
relationship deepened in World War 11 and has grown steadily since then. For historians, 
the 1918 alliance is an important, but overlooked, aspect of both the U. S. and British 
Arrny's heritage. This study fills that void. It emphasises the formation of the 27 th and 
3 Oth Divisions and their training in the United States, then examines the training and 
tactical co-operation with the British in the summer and autumn of 1918. 
The 11 American Corps was in the line on only three occasions, but made a valuable 
contribution to the operations in which it participated, despite losing a disproportionate 
number of officers and men. This study examines these operations in some detail with an 
emphasis on the battlefield performance of the American divisions. Tangential to the 
training and operations was the issue of amalgamation and General Pershing's struggle to 
compromise with the British to meet the strategic needs of both the AEF and BEF. This 
thesis draws heavily on a wide range of primary and secondary sources that were 
2 
consulted over the course of the research. The following is a select annotated 
bibliography of the more significant published works and manuscript and archival 
collections that helped provide the foundation for this study. 
Secondary Sources (BEF) 
The historiography of the BEF far outnumbers that published on the AEF. It began 
shortly after the war ended and has continued to grow at a steady pace in recent years as 
result of a renewed interest in the First World War. A focal point of the research 
scrutinises the leadership of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and the BEF's performance 
during the last two years of the war. Haig has been the subject of more than a dozen 
biographies since his death in 1928. He himself is partially responsible for the 
interpretation of his legacy. He made his diaries available to the Official Historian, and 
as a result the publication of the Official History of the Great War: Military Operations, 
France and Belgium (1937-1947) stand as a lasting legacy to Haig. 8 Despite its flaws 
and proven bias, this reference work is a remarkable publication for its detail of the 
operations of 1914-1918. One of the first to utilise Haig's diary was Duff Cooper, whose 
two-volume biography, Haig (1935-1936) is very sympathetic to its subject. 9 
Although Haig did not publish his memoirs, a portion of his diary was edited and made 
public four decades after his death. Ae Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919 
(1952), 10 by Robert Blake, offers scholars a glimpse into his personality through a 
selection of his correspondence to staff officers and his wife. In 2005, John Boume and 
Gary Sheffield published a more comprehensive collection of Haig's diaries and letters, 
3 
Douglas Haig. - War Diaries and Letters: 1914-1918 (2005). " Despite the extraordinary 
efforts of Blake, Bourne and Sheffield, I found it necessary to examine the original 
papers at the National Library of Scotland for specific references to the Americans that 
were understandably overlooked in the edited collections. 
Ten years after Haig's death, David Lloyd George published his two-volume War 
Memoirs (1938) 12 which not only attacked the fonner BEF commander-in-chief, but also 
one of his staunchest supporters, Maj. Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice. The former prime 
minister's accusations were based around Haig's conduct on the Western Front, 
particularly the Third Ypres Campaign. ' 3 Lloyd George's comments were not surprising 
since he often clashed with Haig over command decisions. 
The bashing of Haig and his subordinate BEF officers continued through the publication 
of books by popular historians, such as Alan Clark's The Donkeys (1961), and British 
Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (1988), by John Laffin. 14 Both books, and 
many others like them, suggest that the senior and middle-level officers were 
incompetent, and that thousands of British lives were lost because of their obstinacy. 
'From the time of his appointment as Commander of British Armies in France, ' suggests 
one historian, 'Haig has been a central, controversial figure of the First World War. ' 15 
One of the first to restore Haig's reputation was John Terraine. His books, Douglas 
Haig. - The Educated Soldier (1963) and 1918: To Win a War (1978) 16 came to the BEF 
commander's defence by suggesting that he was indeed a professional with an offensive 
strategy during the 1916-1917 offensives, which formed the only possible course of 
4 
action that the circumstances would allow. By 1918, Terraine argues, the BEF was Nvell 
prepared to finish off the wom-down German Anny. 
Taking an opposing view is Tim Travers. He counters that Haig's military doctrine did 
not shift much throughout the war to adapt to changes in technology. In his two 
important and controversial works, The Killing Ground (1987) and How the War lVas 
Won (1992), Travers insists that based upon what Haig learned at the Staff College, and 
as a cavalry officer, he was too conservative and narrow-minded on the battlefield. BEF 
success in 1918, Travers contends, was based upon German An-ny tactical errors and high 
casualties. 17 Influenced by this same analysis, Gerard DeGroot proposes in his book, 
Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (1988), that 'although it was impossible to deny that in the end 
Haig won the war, his victory should not be interpreted as a vindication of his methods or 
an exoneration of his character. ' 18 This analysis reached its climax with the publication 
of Haig's Command: A Reassessment (1991), 19 by Denis Winter. The historical 
community has dismissed this controversial book, and identified Winter as the self- 
appointed 'Witchfinder General of the Great War. ' 20 
During the past decade historians have started to revise these interpretations. The recent 
studies of the BEF, as condensed by one historian, essentially conclude 'the years 1914 to 
1918 saw the British Army change from a small force of riflemen backed by insubstantial 
artillery to a large group of five annies, with a force of artillery which could enable it to 
break through any defensive position it wished. ' -) IA more balanced biographical study 
5 
on Haig is Andrew W. Weist's Haig: The Evolution of a Commander (2005 )22, which 
incorporates much of the preceding scholarship. 
Another example is Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realties 
(200 )ý23 by Gary Sheffield. He describes how 'a reference to the First World War is 
often used as shorthand for stupidity, blind obedience, failures of leadership, appalling 
physical conditions and deadlock. 924 Through a careful investigation of the recent 
historiography along with primary research, Sheffield does much to correct this 
misconception of the BEF. He concludes that the British Army benefited from a steep 
learning curve after the Somme offensive of 1916, and had indeed adapted to the new 
technology of the war. As a result, it became the most effective army by autumn 1918. 
The learning curve was initiated with the fresh, inexperienced troops, as documented in 
an earlier work, Kitchener's Army: The Raising ofNew Armies, 1941-1916 (1988), 25 by 
Peter Simkins. It should be noted that similarities exist between these men and the 
American soldiers of 1917-1918. 
A breakthrough study of the BEF on the Western Front is Command on the Western 
Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1914-1918 (1992), 26 co-authored by 
historians Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson. Their book is not a typical biography of the 
Fourth British An-ny commander, but a treatment of the BEF's effective command and 
control coordination of the new battlefield technology that utilised available manpower. 
Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days'Campaign, 8 August-November 
1918 (1998)2 ', by Paul Hams and Niall Barr, is a detailed insight into the final campaigns 
6 
of the war in the British sector. The authors make a case that the final months of the war 
were the most significant to understanding the BEF since it had become the dominant 
anny on the Western Front in 1918. 
Also of great importance to this study are the Dominion divisions serving with the BEF 
on the Western Front, in particular, the Australian Corps under the command of 
Lieutenant General Sir John Monash. The relationship between Australian and American 
soldiers was in some ways a stronger bond then that between the British and American 
soldiers as my research will show. Ten years after the war, Monash published his 
account of the Hundred Days campaign. As the title indicates, The Australian Victories 
in France, 1918 (1920)28, largely credits his own troops for the successful final 
campaigns of the war, while criticising the Americans and British. An impartial view is 
Peter Pedersen's biography, Monash as Military Commander (1985). 29 It is a thoroughly 
researched insight into the Australian Corps commander's intellect, as well as his 
stubbornness on the battlefield. 
In the volumes of The Official History ofAustralia in the War (1929-1942) written by 
C. E. W. Bean, 30 the author perpetuated the popular interpretation of the Australian 
Digger. He helped develop the stereotype that the Diggers were undisciplined, hard- 
drinking and hard fighting soldiers from the rural areas of Australia. Historian Peter 
Simkins credits Bean 'as the creator and greatest exponent of the 'everyman at war 
approach, with his emphasis on the tactical side of operations and the inclusion of 
personal details about individual participants. ý31 
7 
Eric M. Andrews, in The ANZAC Illusion (1993), and Dale Blair. in Dinkum Diggers 
(1998)32 
, do much to dispel these stereotypes. Andrews' book is study of the military, 
political, economic and psychological relationship between Britain and Australia, and the 
author goes to great lengths to suggest that the myth of the ANZAC suited both countries 
for their own purposes. Blair, on the other hand, examines the experiences of one 
ANZAC unit, the First Battalion, at Gallipoli and on the Western Front through their 
diaries and letters. His conclusions are much the same as Andrews in that the legend of 
the Australian Digger was in some ways accurate, while in other instances contradictory 
to the truth. 
Although the Canadian Corps had little actual interaction with the 11 American Corps, 
itsexperiences under British command are, in some ways, similar to those of its North 
American neighbours. The Canadians did briefly train some American units, but the two 
Allies did not fight side by side. The British Anny had provided supplies and artillery to 
the Canadian Corps as it did to 11 American Corps. The Canadians were also not 
responsible to the British government, but to the government of the Dominion of Canada. 
Through political pressure its divisions were not split up, but served together in their o"'n 
corps. Most useful to this study was the Shock Army of the British Empire: The 
Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War, by Shane Schreiber. The author 
concludes that the success of the four Canadian divisions during the 100 Days Campaign 
was due to its ability to 'develop its own doctrine, training schools, organization, and 
operational procedures. ' 13 
8 
Secondary Sources (AEF) 
In the 1930s, the most important book on the AEF was published, General Pershing's Jýv 
Experiences in the World War (193 1). Pershing waited more than 13 years after the U. S. 
entered the Great War to write his memoirs. They are based upon diaries that he and his 
aide maintained on a daily basis during the period of 1917-1919. Although the two- 
volume work was highly anticipated by those who served with him in the military and the 
general public, My Experiences in the World War was poorly received after its 
publication. 
Much like Haig, Pershing remains one of the most controversial figures of the war. One 
of his biographers, Frank Vandiver, suggests that 'Haig and Pershing were wrapped in 
the veil of command on a lonely peak of their own. ' 34 The main criticism of Pershing's 
memoirs is that he failed to confront the real difficulties encountered by the AEF and 
how they were addressed. Also, the volumes lacked deep analysis when it came to the 
fighting ability of the U. S. Army. What especially bother his critics of My Experiences in 
the World War, particularly those in the military, was that Pershing rarely acknowledged 
the assistance and hard work of his staff officers and corps and army commanders. His 
memoirs gave the impression that he alone conducted the war on behalf of the United 
States. Pershing did, however, try to give equal recognition to all of the combat units in 
France. In the case of II Corps, there are eight pages devoted to its operations with the 
British. 35 Despite its inadequacies, Pershing's diary entries and personal revelations 
provide insights into the allied relationship that cannot be found elsewhere. 36 
9 
The publication of My Experiences in the World War touched off a minor battle of 
memoirs. Firing the next shot was General Peyton C. March, who often clashed with 
Pershing when he was the Army Chief of Staff during the war. It took March only a year 
to write The Nation at War (1932), which tells the War Department's version of the war, 
while taking a number of terse shots at Pershing. Specifically, March charged that 
Pershing lacked the ability to command a large army and was insubordinate on numei-ous 
occasions. While Pershing never directly responded to the accusations, his close friend, 
General James Harbord, answered March in The American Army in France, 1917-1919 
(1936). Harbord refuted much of what March claimed and went to great lengths to 
restore Pershing's reputation. 37 
General histories of the AEF are largely absent among the historiography of the First 
World War. Immediately after the war, journalists produced a number of forgettable 
single-volume histories for a mass audience. They highlighted the heroic deeds of the 
American Army through newspaper accounts and General Pershing's Final Report of the 
AEF (1919). Not until the fiftieth anniversary of the final campaigns of the war were the 
first true scholarly works on the AEF published for a general audience. Still the most 
significant is The War to End All Wars (1968), by Edward M. Coffman. 38 His research 
utilised many of the available AEF records, along with other primary records, such as 
interviews with former World War I veterans. Coffman devotes an entire chapter to the 
training and operations of the Americans in the British Sector, more than any other 
general study of the AEF. 
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Also published in 1968 was President Wilson Fights His War: World War I and the 
American Intervention, by Harvey DeWeerd . 
39 The title is misleading since only half the 
book focuses entirely on the American participation. DeWeerd also made use of the 
primary AEF records, but not to the same extent as Coffman, and he also ignores the 11 
American Corps. Both historians accept General's Pershing's view that the AEF was the 
deciding force by the fall of 1918, and the U. S. was correct in insisting upon fighting as 
an independent army. Since the publication of the DeWeerd and Coffinan books, there 
have been a number of articles and full-length studies that revise their analysis. 
The most noteworthy are Pershing: General of the Armies (1986), by Donald Smythe; 
Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign 
(1987), by Paul Braim and The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (1993), by 
David Trask . 
40 All three books suggest that the AEF was poorly trained and inadequately 
led during much of the final offensive of the war. Smythe goes as far as to suggest that 
Pershing might have been relieved of his command had the war continued past the 
autumn 1918 offensives, while Brairn argues that plans generated at higher AEF staff 
levels were too simplistic to manage and support a modem army in the offensive. Trask 
concurs with each thesis and insists that the AEF would have been better utilised had it 
been amalgamated into the British and French armies. In his concluding chapter, the 
author makes an intriguing suggestion that 'the performance of the American First Army, 
created only three months before the armistice, was less impressive than those of the 
amalgamated divisions. 41 This statement is not supported with analysis or 
documentation. It alone helps make the case for a comprehensive study of 11 Corps. 
Not nearly as critical as Smythe, Braim, or Trask is James J. Cooke in Pershing and His 
Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF (1997). 42 He suggests that the AEF had come 
a long way in 18 months from a poorly trained and led army to a competent fighting force 
that successfully resolved its command problems. Cooke also firmly believes that 
Pershing was the ideal commander-in-chief, and would have remained with the AFF, no 
matter how long the war dragged on. Since one third of the AEF consisted of National 
Guard divisions, two particular works on this subject are notable: The History of the 
Militia and the National Guard (1983) by John Mahon, and Jerry Cooper's Ae Rise of 
the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920 (1997). 43 Both 
contend that the National Guard units were an integral part of the AEF and contributed 
significantly on the battlefield. 
Recent scholarship that relates directly to the American/British relationship includes very 
little that concerns the 11 American Corps. There is one scholarly article, 'Maconochie's 
Stew: Logistical Support of American Forces with the BEF, 1917-1918, ' 44 which focuses 
upon the American Army's reliance on the British supply system. Addressing the 
strategic relationship of the British and Americans at the highest level, that of Woodrow 
Wilson and David Lloyd George, are David Woodward's three books: Trial by 
Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (1993), Lloyd George and his 
Generals (1983) and Field Marshal Sir William Robertson: Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff in the Great War (1998). 45 In these studies, the author asserts that because both 
political leaders had a different strategic objective for their respective nation, the Anglo- 
American relationship was doomed from the start. 
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A fresh addition to the scholarship on Allied relations is A Fraternity qfArms. -America 
46 & France in the Great War, by Robert Bruce . It concludes the Americans and French 
had the more significant alliance. Although his is not an entirely original thesis, the 
author makes a persuasive argument by showing that the French trained, supplied, armed, 
and even commanded a greater proportion of American units then the British. The 
French commanders encouraged an independent sector for the AEF, while the British 
were more insistent upon amalgamation. This, however, in no way diminishes the 
contributions of the 27 th and 3 Oth Divisions and their service with the British Anny. 
Unlike the other allied armies, the United States Army never published an official history 
of its operations in the First World War. Instead, the War Department produced several 
useful monographs and publications to highlight various achievements of the AEF. 
Among these are the Operations of the 2d American Corps in the Somme Offensive 
d 47 (1921) and Field Orders: 2" Army Corps (1920). They are essentially a verbatim 
duplication of the Corps unit histories, operations reports and orders, with a brief 
introduction. 
During the Second World War, the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) 
produced a Sunimary of Operations in the World War (1944) for each of the AEF combat 
divisions, which complements its revised American Armies and Battlefields in Europe 
(1937). 48 After the war, the U. S. Army expanded on this work by compiling the United 
States Ariny in the World War, 1917-1919 (1947). 49 This 19 volume collection consists 
of AEF and allied records relating to all facets of the American participation in World 
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War 1, and of course includes many significant 11 American Corps training and operations 
documents. 
The first two decades after the war saw the publication of unit histones. The most useful 
for 11 Corps is The Story of the 27hDivision, written in 1921 by its commanding officer, 
Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan. This is a first-person account that provides great insight into 
the division's experiences in the British sector, and also responds to critics of the 
American battle performance of September 27-29,1918.50 The 30 th Division's history, 
The Thirtieth Division in the World War (1936)51, is not as detailed as O'Ryan's work, 
but offers some useful analysis of the American/British relationship. But this history is 
based mostly on the official records and lacks the personal feel of the 27 th Division 
history. Almost all of the two division's infantry regiments and machine gun battalioiis 
published a unit history in one form or another soon after the war. Most recent is an 
excellent history of the 107 th Infantry Regiment, Duty, Honor, Privilege: New York's Silk 
Stocking Regiment and the Breaking of the Hindenburg Line (2001). Its author, Stephen 
L. Harris, successfully revises the regiment's tarnished image through the use of 
contemporary letters and diaries. 52 
Primary Sources 
Despite the paucity of secondary works specific to 11 American Corps, there is no 
shortage of primary documentation. The main repository of AEF records, the National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA), has among its holdings a significant body 
of unit histories, operations reports, orders and casualty files, among other documents 
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generated by 11 Corps and its attached divisions. This includes the documents contained 
in The United States Army in the World War, as well as numerous other operations 
reports, correspondence. Also, NARA holds an important collection of BEF training 
memorandums, war diaries and operations reports reproduced from the British War 
Records Office during the inter-war period by historians representing the United States 
Army War College. The Library of Congress Manuscript Division holds the personal 
papers of many important First World War figures. Among them are John J. Pershing, 
James G. Harbord, Newton D. Baker, Tasker Bliss and George S. Simonds. Sadly, the 
personal papers of II Corps general officers such as George W. Read, Edward M. Lewis 
and John F. O'Ryan are no longer extant. 
Another pertinent Federal Government repository for the study of the First World War is 
the United States Army Military History Institute. Among its holdings are more than 80 
questionnaires answered by veterans of the 27ffi and 3 Oth Divisions. The questionnaires 
are supplemented, in some cases, by personal diaries submitted by the respondents. 53 
When used in conjunction with the official records at the NARA, they offer the 
researcher a valuable first-person primary source. At the local level are the state 
repositories in New York, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee. Since the 27 th 
and 3 Oth Divisions were composed of National Guard regiments from these states, letters, 
diaries and newspapers were found in the various state archives. 
Research for the British aspect of my dissertation required visits to several repositories in 
the United Kingdom. Among the resources I have identified are the personal letters, 
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diaries and unpublished manuscripts written by British officers and enlisted men housed 
in the Department of Documents at the Imperial War Museum. The official War Office 
correspondence, diaries and reports, not duplicated at NARA, are held at the National 
Archives (formally the PRO) of Great Britain. The diaries and private papers of Sir 
Douglas Haig are at the National Library of Scotland. Other important repositories for 
personal papers are the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at Kings College, 
London and the National Arrny Museum. For the Australian Corps aspect of my 
dissertation, I mostly relied upon the operational records and personnel papers at the 
Australian War Memorial in Canberra. 
Although the above-mentioned sources are only a selection of the primary documents, 
they serve, along with the growing literature on the First World War, as an analytical 
framework for the study of American training and operations under the British. While 
the task assigned to the 11 American Corps to break the Hindenburg Line was clearly the 
most significant event in the organisation's history, this achievement was only one aspect 
of its experience on the Western Front. In order to understand the 27 th and 3 Oth 
Division's as a successful combat organisation, there are several factors to consider and 
they are addressed in the following chapters. 
Chapter 1: The Sunny South discusses the background, organisation, and training of the 
American Army in 1917, especially the National Guard units that made up 27 th and 3 Oth 
Divisions. It also provides insight into the fragile relationship between the Regular Army 
and the National Guard by looking at the federalisation of the latter during the Mexican 
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Punitive Expedition and shortly after America's entrance into the First World War. The 
chapter also commences discussing the issue of amalgamating the American soldiers into 
Allied armies and the pressure placed upon General Pershing to use his troops as 
replacements. Within this chapter is an overview of the American tactical doctrine, 
particularly the controversial open warfare that Pershing insisted upon. This is contrasted 
with the doctrine used by the British Army and introduced to the Americans by officers 
of the British Mission, who lectured at the training camps in 1917-1918. 
Chapter 2: Waiting to Go Over continues to look at the training of the 27 th and 3 oth 
Divisions up to their departure overseas in spring 1918. This includes inspections of the 
training by the War Department and the efforts to keep the divisions at full strength 
through voluntary recruitment and conscription. The amalgamation issue is further 
discussed in much greater detail, as well as the agreements made between the Americans 
and British to train certain AEF units. These matters are examined as they related to the 
German spring offensive of 1918. 
Chapter 3: Carried Over takes the 27 th and 30th overseas to France and cover their 
assignment to the British sector, and the organisation of the 11 American Corps. This 
chapter begins to examine the interpersonal relationships that developed between the 
American and British officers and enlisted men, as well as the American and Australian 
camaraderie. 
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Chapter 4: We Have Found Each Other at Last delves further into the training of the 
two divisions with the British and the first experience of combat in Belgium. Also, the 
controversial Hamel Operation of 4 July 1918 is discussed in some detail. Although 
neither the 27 th nor 3 Oth Divisions were involved, it provides an interesting example of 
the struggle between the AEF and the BEF on how to utilise the American troops. This 
chapter shows how II American Corps became an almost separate entity of the AEF, 
particularly after the U. S. First Army was organised in August 1918. 
Chapter 5: Alone with the British discusses the planning for the Hindenburg Line 
attack on 29 September 1918, which was spearheaded by the two American divisions. It 
provides an opportunity to discuss the American and Australian relationship since the 
Australian Corps operated alongside the Americans and helped prepare them for the 
assault. 
Chapter 6: The Air Was a Hell of Torturing Sound is an operational analysis of the 
Hindenburg Line operation from the 11 American Corps perspective, including an 
assessment of the American combat performance in its first major operation. Research in 
this area shows that the Americans performed much better than was previously thought 
and that a flawed battle plan was the main reason for the difficulties experienced by the 
Americans. 
Chapter 7: Back to the Front discusses the use of the Americans for the next Fourth 
British Army offensi-v, c, which was to drive the German Army away from the Hindenburg 
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Line. The Americans and British would eventually fight in the vicinity of the Selle River. 
This was the final operation in which 11 Corps took part and afterward it returned to the 
rear for additional training, which concluded shortly after the armistice 
Chapter 8: Conclusion: The Brothers-in-Arms offers an assessment of the American- 
British relations on the Western Front in 1918 through the eyes of the American officers, 
who were surveyed after the armistice. Among the sources used for this chapter will be a 
collection of questionnaires completed by officers of 11 American Corps. These were 
ordered by the AEF G. H. Q. to analyse the relationship with the Allies. The questions 
were intended to gauge the success of the coalition. In 1942, the U. S. Army 
commissioned a monograph on American-British relations during World War 1, which is 
based almost exclusively on these surveys. 54 Central to understanding the combat 
capability of the 11 American Corps is how the officers and enlisted men from both 
armies were able to relate not just as soldiers, but as human beings with the same focus 
and common goals. This concluding chapter reviews the entire First World War 
experiences of the 27hand 30'hDivisions in the United States and on the Western Front 
and places their contribution within the larger context of the AEF successes and failures 
in 1918. 
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Chapter 1: The Sunny South 
Mobilisation of the National Guard 
When the 27 th and 30thU. S. Army Divisions entered the British line in 1918. they 
were a far cry from the military force that the nation mustered in the first months after 
it entered the war on 6 April 1917. At that time. the Regular Army numbered a paltry 
5,791 officers and 121,707 enlisted men. Three months later. President Wilson called 
up the National Guard, which added I 10,000 officers and men. Even with the 
National Guard and the tens of thousands of young men who enlisted at the outset. 
this would not be enough to field a fighting force. I The Western Front in France had 
already consumed hundreds of thousands of young men; the armies of the Allies and 
Central Powers comprised, for each nation, millions. After three years the war in 
Europe was complex. It was breathtaking in its detailed ways of fighting. and in the 
equipment necessary to fight effectively. 2 
The Selective Service Act of 3 May 1917 gave Wilson the authority to mobilise the 
National Guard, this was the second time in a year he had called it into federal 
service. The first was in June 1916, when he sent National Guard units to the 
Mexican border during the punitive expedition against the bandit Pancho Villa. The 
I 10,000 National Guard troops sent to the southwestern United States (Texas, 
Arizona and New Mexico) were. by many accounts, ineffective. They arrived under- 
strength, poorly trained. and lacking equipment and arms. Some units had only wool 
uniforms and sweltered in the heat of the region, which sometimes reached I 10 
degrees Fahrenheit. One unhappy National Guardsman called the environment 'the 
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most forsaken country the Lord ever made. ' Furthermore. he said. *We ought to clean 
up Mexico, and, for punishment, make them take back this part of Texas. .3 
Expecting to participate in the chase of Villa, the National Guardsmen instead fought 
the brutal heat and annoying scorpions, and spent their days drilling and marching on 
long-distance manoeuvres. The War Department did not intend to send the National 
Guard into Mexico to join Gen. John J. Pershing and the Regulars. 4 For five months. 
it served as a police force under the watchful eye of the General Staff, whose officers 
considered the state troops more of a liability than an asset. 'It is a pity the militia 
could not have been called out two months ago, ' the disgusted Pershing wrote, "so 
that its hopeless deficiencies might have been shown up to Congress in their true 
light. To attempt to put dependence upon the militia is absolutely absurd and 
ridiculous. ' 5 
One National Guard formation,, however, did impress the Regulars - the New York 
Division. Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan's 19,000-strong 6 th New York Division. 
Stationed in McAllen, Texas., from 6 July to 14 December 1916, it was the only 
National Guard division on the border. Arguably, it was the pride of the National 
Guard because of thorough training and efficiency. The professional demeanour of 
the 6"' Division ranked with the best units of the Regular Army. It represented the 
entire state of New York and included members of New York City's most prominent 
amilies, who served alongside farmers and labourers from the more remote northern 
and central areas. Despite their disparate economic and ethnic backgrounds, the men 
bonded well. Discipline was rarely an issue because O'Ryan kept them busy vvith 
constant training and physical fitness. 
Lt. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard, later an AEF divisional and army commander. met 
O'Ryan on the Mexican border and was enormously impressed. A 'trim. \N ell- 
proportioned athletic man, ' remembered Bullard, *who xvas supple. springy. and 
energetic in his movement. punctiliously neat, and up to the mark in his dress and 
personal appearance. ' 6 During a second encounter in 1917. Bullard obsenýed 'frot-n 
the training period at Spartanburg, South Carolina. O'Ryan's thoughts seemed turned 
very much upon his men... and this feeling of comradeship continued and (-TrexN. 
O'Ryan held himself approachable to his men, showed himself ever thoughtful of 
them, not only for their comfort, supply and training, but for their personal interests. 7 
At an early age, he had prepared himself for a career as an an-ny officer. Allegedly, 
he signed some of his schoolbooks: *John F. O'Ryan, Major General. U. S. Army. ' 8 
Although he attended law school as a fallback career, in 1899, O'Ryan accepted a 
commission in the New York Guard. His connections with the now famous Rough 
Riders, Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood 9 helped him rise through the ranks 
and receive attention from the War Department in Washington. Wood nominated him 
for the Army War College, which O'Ryan attended in 1914, and. in subsequent years, 
he participated in Regular Army camps and manoeuvres. Also in 1914, he published 
his first book, The Modern Arm in Action, which warned of the dangers of military Y 
un-preparedness. It was O'Ryan's belief that the National Guard would play an 
important role in the next conflict. 
The National Guard had a Iong military tradition that dated to the colonial period. 
when militia units \Ncre called to put down uprisings by Native American tribes. 
Miring tile Civil War. militia units served alongside regular volunteer regiments in 
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both the Union and Confederate armies. A decade after this conflict. the militia had 
evolved into the National Guard, which meant it received financial assistance from 
state governments. Along with money came some standardisation and control 
enforced by governors and legislatures. From 1877 to 190-33, governors called upon 
the National Guard 700 times to preserve order in industrial disputes. In half these 
cases, it performed strike police duty. 10 
Unhappy with its role as a law enforcement agency, the National Guard sought to 
evolve as a volunteer reserve. It was given this opportunity during the Spanish- 
American War, but state units failed to impress the Regular Army. Most units 
reported to camps grossly unprepared, and, as a result, only a few went overseas. 
During the next five years, congressional legislation brought the National Guard 
under tighter Federal control. Although state units were happy to have federal aid, the 
preference was to remain under the states, where the National Guard could select its 
officers and set the size of regiments. However. the General Staff insisted that the 
National Guard comply with Regular Army tables of organisation. This meant 
balanced divisions of infantry, cavalry, artillery and auxiliary units. II 
The state units and the War Department were at an impasse. State adjutant generals 
were reluctant to increase the size of their National Guard regiments unless the 
General Staff provided additional funding, and the War Department would not do so 
unless it could have greater control. In an effort to resolve the dilemma, the 'Dick 
A of 190-, 
12 
ct' -1 established the 
Division of Militia Affairs (Militia Bureau) as a branch 
of the General Staff. Among its provisions were increased funds for the militia and 
tederal pay when the militia participated in manoeuvres with the Regular Army. It 
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also attempted to standardise requirements for National Guard officers. The most 
noteworthy components of this law were that the organised militia was no\A,, 
designated as the National Guard, and its officers would have to meet more stringent 
obligations. Despite its best efforts, the Militia Bureau could not prevent a tug of ýý ar 
between the National Guard and the War Department. It took the National Defence 
Act of 1916 to allow the War Department to force the National Guard to comply xvith 
its mandates. 
13 
The National Defence Act ensured that the Guard would be the country's main 
reserve force. Four hundred thousand men were to be raised over a unspecified 
number of years, and the law authorised the U. S. Government to provide financial 
support. The law was not one-sided; National Guardsmen would have to take a dual 
oath upon enlistment. They were in the service of the U. S. Army and the state Guard. 
In summarising the new law, an historian of the National Guard claims it'settled the 
issue of War Department authority to organise the National Guard according to 
General Staff dictates, and, at the same time, the National Guardsmen lost the ability 
to shape their units or select officers according to their own interests, while the 
Secretary of War could refuse federal funds if states failed to comply with the law. ' 14 
An example of the animosity Regulars had towards the National Guard appeared in an 
unflattering newspaper article shown to O"Ryan. It quoted three unnamed Regular 
officers, who referred to the militia as 'little better than 'Kitchener's Mob'-, O"Ryan 
took offence to such talk and responded xvith a letter berating the editor for *the 
hostile matter that is being, circulated by the press... a xvilful attempt to discredit the 
service. ' Although the article did not mention the New York Division. O'Rvan 
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bolstered his response with statistics revealing the infrequencý of venereal disease 
among his men and bragged that they had the lowest sick rate on the border. 
As previously indicated, on 15 July 1917,100,000 National Guard troops were 
included in the President's troop call-up order, far more than the ill-prepared War 
Department could handle. To ease the problem, the National Guard was mobilised in 
two increments. The first call-up, on 25 July, affected units in II states. and the 
remaining units were mobilised more than a week later. Among those called up in the 
first wave were regiments from New York, Tennessee, and North and South 
Carolina. 16 
Eventually one-third of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) was composed of 
National Guard divisions. Owing to lack of training camps, it would be three months 
before National Guard units could begin training as part of the Army. To keep state 
regiments busy and out of trouble until the War Department was ready, the President 
ordered that they watch over the vital bridges, waterways and munitions factories 
susceptible to sabotage. 
17 
The Quartermaster Corps was the War Department agency charged with constructing 
and supplying the camps. It was woefully unprepared when war was declared. In 
circumstances reminiscent of the transportation and supply problems during the 
Span i sh-American War in 1898, the agency was under-strength and under-funded to 
contend with a rapidly expanding army. An immediate concern was the construction 
of cantonnients for the National Guard units. A Cantonment Division was created. 
and with the assistance of an advisory organisation. The Committee on Emergency 
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Construction. its board selected I September 1917 as the target date to have camps 
ready. 18 Among other difficulties facing the Quartermaster Corps was finding, enough 
clothing for the troops. It blamed the General Staff with failing to provide troop 
schedules so that sufficient uniforms and supplies could be on hand. To remedy the 
situation, factories in the east worked around the clock to reach the quotas, but many 
troops waited weeks before being issued uniforms. 19 
The Amalgamation Issue, Part 1 
Three thousand miles across the Atlantic Ocean, the British Government observed the 
growing pains of the U. S. Army, the same process its own army had gone through 
over the previous three years. In 1914, the British Army entered the war with a small 
standing force of 247,432, supplemented by 300,000 reserves and territorials. 20 In 
January 1916, the British Government introduced conscription with the Military 
Service Act. Unmarried men between 18 and 41 were required to register, and in 
May 1917, the act was amended to include married men. Then in April 1918, a 
second Military Service Act raised the age limit to 50. The drafted troops were 
necessary to supplement a successful volunteer enlistment campaign organised by 
Secretary of State for War Field Marshal Lord Kitchener. Over 54 million recruiting 
posters were distributed throughout Great Britain. and by 1916, over two million men 
had volunteered for military service. 21 
With the U. S. declaration of war, the main interest in the British War Office was to 
convince the Americans to send troops to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The 
British Army General Staff addressed this issue ý, vheii drawing up plans for 1917. 
American troops 'could best be employed xvith the British Armies. ' they determined. 
*and so fight with men of the same language and temperament. "" 
Maj. Gen. Tom Bridges, who travelled to Washington with Sir Arthur Balfour's 
British Mission, hoped to outflank the French. NA-ho had representatives pressuring the I 
White House to amalgamate American troops into their army. Bridges told U. S. 
Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh Scott, 'If you ask me how your force could most 
quickly make itself felt in Europe, I would say by sending 500,000 untrained men at 
once to our depots in England to be trained there. and drafted into our armies in 
France. ' 23 
Although Scott's response is not recorded, he clearly ignored the suggestion. The 
newly appointed commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), Maj. Geii. 
John J. Pershing, was under orders from President Wilson and Secretary of War 
Newton D. Baker that his troops would fight independently . 
24 * It was necessary at all 
times to preserve the independence and identity of the American forces, ' Baker said, 
'so that they could never be anything but an instrument of the policy of the United 
States. 1) -) j Initially, the Allies sought only munitions from the United States. But as 
the war dragged on and casualties increased, there was a great need for manpower. 26 
On the Western Front, the British and French were in the midst of a new series of 
offensives, and if they echoed the previous campaigns of the Somme and Verdun. 
both armies would suffer heavy losses. 
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The 1917 Offensives 
The forthcoming campaign had been planned duringo meetings between Allied Z-ý 
political and military leaders, even as the costly Somme campaign was , vinding down. 
It was concluded that a Franco-British offensive would take place on a broad front, 
with the French attacking between the Oise and the Somme Rivers. while the British 
were to operate between Bapaurne and Vimy Ridge. The plans changed course a 
short time later when French Commander- in-Chief Gen. Robert Nivelle. who had 
replaced Marshal Joseph Joffre, suggested an alternative plan. Nivelle wanted the 
British and French to carry out preliminary attacks between Arras and the Oise, to 
lure the German reserves from the main French attack on the Aisne River. Field 
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the BEF, was interested in a Flanders 
operation, but was ordered by the British War Cabinet to accept Nivelle's plan. The 
BEF was reduced to a supporting role, although Haig was assured that a Flanders 
attack would be next if the French plan lived up to expectations. 
Haig's reluctance to serve as Nivelle's subordinate was indicative of the uneasy 
coalition between France and Britain. Politically, the two European powers were 
long-standing rivals. This point was summed up during a private conversation 
between Maj. Paul Clark, the AEF liaison to French headquarters, and Captain 
LeBleu. a secretary at French General Headquarters (G. H. Q. ). The latter revealed 
France had 'the least affection for the Germans. and after them, for the English. ' 
Although LeBleu appreciated the excellence and magnitude of the British effort, he 
reminded Clark that thev had been 'traditional enemies throughout the last several 
centuries... and the British have always worsted the French in diplomatic 
ne0otiations. ' 27 Of course. LeBleu was exaggerating his countrN .s relationship with 
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Great Britain, but the tension between Haig and Nivelle was real and clouded the 
planning of future operations until the latter commander was relieved after the failure 
of his offensive. 
Due to a severe winter in 1917, the attack was delayed until spring. This pro,,, ed a 
mistake since the German Army, ignoring the harsh conditions, started withdrawing 
troops to a new defensive position, the Hindenburg Line, in mid-February. Hai, (). 
exhibiting keen military logic, was concerned the Germans would take advantage of 
the shift of his divisions to Nivelle's offensive, and use their reserves to attack Ypres 
and cut off the BEF's communications with the Channel coast. 28 Instead, the 
Germans stayed on the defensive in France. but launched a major attack against 
Russia on the Eastern Front during most of 1917. This was made easier by the 
construction of the Hindenburg Line, which extended from east of Arras to east of 
Soissons. The Germans completed their retirement to this portion of the line in April. 
On the 9th of that month, the British Army commenced preliminary operations at 
Arras with a five-day artillery barrage that preceded an attack on a 14-mile front. On 
the first day, the Canadian Corps, with four divisions, took Virny Ridge. 
East of Arras, the Third British Army at first made excellent progress, but as the 
attacks continued in the coming weeks, the offensive turned into 'another slogging 
match, ' as one historian described it. 29 The daily losses averaged 4,070 men until the 
operation ceased on 17 May. with total casualties around 159,000 men. In the south. 
French attacks were disappointing. A massive artillen, barrage only affected a lightly 
held German first line, and an attempt to penetrate the second position was met kvith 
heavy machine-gun fire. By the third week in April. French casualties numbered 
96,000, and there was no decisive breakthrough. Additional French attacks during the 
first week of May made modest gains, but the heavy casualties and subsequent 
mutinies within the French Army resulted in Nivelle's removal on 15 May. he Nvas 
replaced by Gen. Henri-Philippe Petain. 
Amalp-amation, Part 2 
At the end of May 1917, while the death toll mounted on the Western Front. Pershing 
and a small contingent of hand-picked officers departed from New York Harbour for 
Europe. Pershing would not return to America for two years. Among the 58 officers 
and 131 clerks,, translators and orderlies sailing with him on the Baltic were future 
generals - Fox Connor, Hugh Drum, George Patton and James Harbord. Two weeks 
later, the party and its Navy escort reached Liverpool, England. There, Pershing 
boarded King George V's private railway carriage and travelled to London for lunch 
at Buckingham Palace, and to meet Prime Minister Lloyd George and the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir William 'Wully' Robertson. Pershing 
was impressed by Robertson, whom he described as a 'rugged, heavy-set, blunt 
soldier of Scottish descent. ' 30 
The CIGS wasted little time after formal introductions to explain Britain's proposal 
for amalgamating American troops in its army. Pershing listened patiently as 
Robertson detailed how the British Army could establish a training, procurement. 
nn equipment and logistical infrastructure, and have Americans readNY to fight I ine 
weeks, as opposed to the 18 months it would take to organise the U. S. Army into a 
separate force. While Robertson sipped tea. Pershing quietly responded vvith the 
American plan to establish an independent army. He compared the American 
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Government's attempt to increase its small Regular force and National Guard with 
new enlistments and conscripts to Britain's expansion effort t-vvo years before. What 
he did not tell Robertson was that President Wilson feared that American influence at 
peace negotiations would be diminished unless his army provided its own 
expeditionary force. Robertson and Allied leaders. however. already suspected this 
fact. 31 
The American commander did confess a stumbling block to bringing troops to Europe 
-a lack of shipping - and suggested that the British help out. Robertsoti replied that 
this was out of the question because his own government was struggling to find 
vessels to suit its own purposes. He was referring to the German U-boat menace of 
unrestricted submarine warfare that had cost Britain 520,000 tons of shipping iii 
32 March, and another 860,000 tons the following month . 
Pershing understood Robertson's dilemma, but would not back down. Now both 
sides were in a stalemate regarding amalgamation and would so remain for months. 33 
Pershing left the meeting for France, where he established headquarters in the Hotel 
de Crillon in Paris. 34 There, he began the first step in creating the American 
Expeditionary Forces by appointing staff officers. At this point, he was a commander 
with only a token division, since the National Guard and National Army menwere 
Just beginning their training, which would take at least nine months. 
The U. S. Army was very active in May 1917. Besides Pershing's departure for 
Europe. Col. Chauncey B. Baker of the Quartermaster Corps was ordered to Britain, 
France and Belgium to visit camps and other establishments to observe Allied 
training, transportation, operations, supply and administration. Several officers ftom 
the various Army branches accompanied him and this was known as the Baker 
Mission. It included Regulars from the General Staff, cavalry. infantrN . field artillery 
and engineers. Among the infantry officers was Ma . George S. Simonds. the future 
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11 Corps chief of staff. Pershing had no authority over the mission, and its itinerary 
did not include a visit to the AEF conunander. However. Baker. an old friend and 
West Point classmate of Pershing, requested a meeting with him before returning to 
the U. S. They met on 7-8 July, and Pershing listened to Baker's recommendations, 
which mostly agreed with his own. 35 
The Baker Mission spent a month investigating the facets of Allied forces and 
submitted a report to the chief of staff upon return to the United States. Major 
General Scott received recommendations on how to adopt their findings within the 
American Army. Many important suggestions were made related to training; two of 
them are worth noting. First was the establishment of a school system in both the 
United States and France to instruct officers in the use of liaison, machine guns, gas, 
and trench mortars. Also significant, the mission recommended that French and 
British officers and non-commissioned officers should serve as advisors to American 
officers, who subsequently would be assigned as instructors in the training schools. 36 
I Fhe chief of staff sought to implement both of these suggestions, but ran into stubborn 
opposition from some officers on the General Staff. They feared an intrusion into the 
American tactical doctrine of open warfare from the foreign officers, who might 
intentionally influence the na*f,, -e American officers towards the British and French 
thinking oil trench warfare. Taking a contrarv view was Col. William Lassiter, the 
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American military attache in London, who had seen the British Army training on 
many occasions and thought highly of its officers. He wanted to impress upon his 
superiors in Washington the value of having British instructors. 'The British have an 
excellent army now, and that excellence is due, among other things. to schools. ' 
Colonel Lassister emphasised. 'They have evolved a school system that has the effect 
of establishing a common doctrine throughout the Army. To prevent training in our 
Army from proceeding on divergent lines, I urge that some such system as this be put 
in practice. ' 37 After much debate, the new chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, 
recommended to Secretary of War Newton Baker that French and British officers be 
brought to the United States and serve as advisors at the training camps. 38 
Haia and Pershin2 Meet for the First Time 
On 20 July, Haig and Pershing met at BEF headquarters in Montreuil, a little walled 
town a few miles to the south of St. Omer, and many miles from the front lines. 
Haig's personal quarters were located outside town. 39 Accompanying Pershing were 
three staff members that sailed with him two months earlier: Col. Benjamin Alvord, 
Lt. Col. James Harbord, and Capt. George S. Patton. Haig wrote that he was 'much 
struck with his [Pershing's] quiet, gentlemanly bearing - so unusual for an American. 
Most anxious to learn, he fully realises the greatness of the task before him. ' He was 
less impressed with Alvord and Harbord, who he described as 'men of less quality, 
and... quite ignorant of the problems of modem war. ý40 
Pershing also took pleasure in his first visit with Haig. Four pages of Aýv Experiences 
in the World It ar are devoted to his discussions with the BEF commander-in-chief, 
and General Robertson, \\ho made a point of visiting Montreuil the day Pershing and 
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his staff arrived. Most of the conference with Haig and Robertson focused on current 
operations and the high number of casualties at Arras. Haig felt comfortable xvith 
Pershing and confessed to him his lack of confidence in Nivelle and the failure of the 
French to cooperate with the British on various occasions. -His remarks, ' Pershing I 
sensed, 'entirely confirmed the belief that I had long since held that real teamwork 
between the two armies was almost totally absent. '41 
During the remainder of their visit, the AEF officers listened to BEF Assistant Chief 
of Staff Major General Butler explain the procedures for organising a headquarters 
general staff. Pershing left BEF headquarters, fully realising that the task of 
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organising the AEF was to be more difficult than he ever imagined . His visit with 
Haig was one of the few times the two men would have such an intimate and cordial 
discussion. From this point on, the issue of amalgamation caused a great deal of 
tension between the two commanders. 
Traininji in the United States 
Back in the United States, mobilisation and training were in full swing. The AEF was 
to consist of the National Guard, the Regular Army, and the National Army. The 
Regulars were, of course, professional soldiers, and men of the National Army were 
those selected in the draft. National Guard divisions were assigned numbers 26-75, 
although fifty would never be fon-ned. Divisions below 26 were Regular Army; those 
above 75 were assigned to the National Army. Because of this numbering system, 
0" Ryan's 6h Division was federalised as the 27h Division, and the southern National 
Guard units in North and South Carolina and Tennessee formed into the 30'h 
Division. 4-" 
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True to its word, the Quartermaster Corps completed the cantonments by the end of 
the summer of 1917. The General Staff sent the National Guard regiments to camps 
constructed in the wann climate of the southern, southwestern and western states. 
There, troops were sheltered under canvas, with semi-permanent structures for 
utilities. Each tent was large enough to hold a squad (10 or II men) and was set over 
a wooden floor with wooden sidewalls. A wood-burning, cone-shaped Sibley stove (a 
Civil War invention by Confederate Gen. Henry Sibley) stood in the middle. with its 
chimney through the top. 
44 Some unlucky soldiers were assigned tents without floors. 
so when it rained, as it often does in the south during the wanner months. theii, 
inhabitants were surrounded by mud. The Army did provide the men with canvas 
CotS. 
45 Regular and National Army regiments were housed in more permanent 
barracks, which were lavish compared to National Guard tents. 46 
O'Ryan's division began arriving at Camp Wadsworth in Spartanburg, South Carolina, 
during the first week of August. Close to Asheville, North Carolina and within sight 
of the scenic Blue Ridge Mountains, the camp was named in honour of Gen. James S. 
Wadsworth, a former U. S. senator and Union Army officer killed at the Battle of the 
Wilderness in 1864. Spartanburg's 1917 population was 27,000, many of whom were 
employed in the cotton industry. Merchants welcomed the soldiers and assured them 
courteous and fair treatment. 'Posters gave the announcement that no overcharges to 
men in the uniform of the United States would be tolerated. ' 47 
The naive doughboys learned quickly that few shop owners abided by this credo. 
This was particularly true for the black 369th Infantry (formerly the 15th New York 
Infantry), which shared Wadsworth as a training ground. The re(unment was not 
attached to the 27thDivision because of the Army's strict segregation policy. but was 
commanded by white officers. The citizens of Spartanburg treated the black I 
doughboys poorly, and the regimental commander referred to it as *a region hostile to 
coloured people. ' The 369thhad endured racial insults and fights, until the War 
Department removed it from the unfriendly environment and sent the unit to France. 
There, it was eventually placed in the incomplete 93 rd Division and later distinguished 
itself in several battles. 
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The other New Yorkers cheered when they learned training was to take place in the 
sunny South. The opportunity to escape the expected bitter cold northeast winter was 
great news. But the warm South Carolina climate, about which these northern 
soldiers had heard so much, was a misnomer. When winter arrived in December. ice, 
sleet and snow were more prevalent than clear skies and balmy conditions. 'It was the 
coldest goddam winter they had in the history of South Carolina, ' insisted one 
soldier. 49 Fuel was scarce and doled out for cooking purposes only. Some of the 
more desperate soldiers took matters into their own hands and stole wood and other 
bumable materials from the Quartermaster depots. 'Nights were bitterly cold, ) 
recalled Pvt. William F. Clarke of the 104'h Machine-Gun Battalion, 'but the sun 
would be scorching hot during the day. ' He vividly remembered coming back from 
either 'a day on the drill field or from a 10-mile hike, perspiring profusely, and then 
almost freezing to death at night. ' 50 
Camp Sevier in Greenville, South Carolina was designated as the training cantonment 
-, Oth for the 3 Division. Located at the foot of Paris Mountain, part of the Blue Ridge 
Mountains, Greenville, in 1917. was a town of 16,000 inhabitants. The camp was 
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named in honour of John Sevier, a hero of the 1780 Battle of KingsNiountain and the 
first governor of Tennessee. The division called itself Old Hickory. after President 
Andrew Jackson. 
The first units sent to Camp Sevier met barren conditions and were enlisted to help 
with construction. Company K of the 3 rd Tennessee Regiment arrived on 15 August 
1917, and found that before the men could pitch tents, a cotton field had to be 
uprooted. Then they had to build a company street and clear a road for supplies. 
One unit spent so much time clearing trees for drill grounds that it referred to itself as 
'The South Carolina Land and Development Company. " 52 
Nine different general officers commanded the 3 Oth Division from 1917-1919. For the 
first part of 1917, it was under Maj. Gen. John F. Morrison, who had replaced Maj. 
Gen. Charles D. Townsley. Before taking command of the division, Morrison had 
been a respected tactics instructor at Fort Leavenworth, and Townsley was 
superintendent of West Point. They were typical of most general officers, having 
graduated from the military academy and served in the Philippines. Although its 
troops had served on the Mexican border, the -')O'h 
Division did not have the 
experience of the 27 th Division, nor did its regiments carry special nicknames. But, 
according to the 3 Oth Division's official historian, the regiments 'were organisations 
whose history reached far back into the early period of our nation's life. -53 The men 
came from communities like Lenoir. Gastonia, Orangeburg. Crossville. and Etowah, Z-- 
or cities such as Raleigh. Ashville. Knoxville, Nashville. Charleston and Columbia. 
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Generally Scots-Irish, their ancestors emigrated to America, for economic reasons. in 
the early to mid 1700s, and inhabited the southern United States. Added to the mix 
were English, German, Huguenots and Welsh. who settled around the same time to 
escape religious persecution. 54 Although unaware of this in 1917. the Old Hickorv 
Division would eventually fight alongside soldiers who may haý, e shared the same 
bloodlines. 
During the middle of September, the War Department sent psychological specialists 
to the training camps to test personnel in the divisions for mental and nervous 
durability. Each man was examined and any peculiarities noted. If an examiner 
deemed a soldier was likely to break down under the nervous strain of battle, he 
would either be transferred to a non-combatant unit, or, if the condition was severe. 
discharged. According to O'Ryan, the medical officer's report indicated that 
examinations revealed 'the men of the 27 th Division as the finest body of men seen at 
any of the camps. ' 55 He had every reason to be proud of the physical condition of his 
men, since over 15,000 men were medically discharged from the Amy in 1917.56 
One serious issue the doctors failed to mention was venereal disease in all the army 
camps. Both Sevier and Wadsworth were affected with high rates. In his report to the 
Secretary of War for 1917. the Surgeon General briefly touched upon venereal disease 
and was quick to point out that most cases were pre-existing. He suggested that men 
from large cities, such as New York, Charlotte and Memphis, had contracted the 
disease before enlistment. There was a slight decrease in the following weeks, which 
proved his theory correct. The arrival of recruits and draft men caused the nUrnber of 
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cases to rise again. For O'Ryan, this must have been troubling. since he had bragged 
n 1.... 57 about his division's low rate on the Mexican border. 
In an effort to control this problem, prophylactic stations were maintained in the 
camps, and in nearby towns like Greenville and Spartanburg. Medical officers and 
social workers were dispatched to the camps by the Committee on Training Camp t-- 
Activities (CMTC) to lecture about vice and show the men upbeat films like 'Fit to 
Fight. -)58 The War Department tried to instil a feeling of kinship, which was 
threatened by immoral acts, such as drinking and consorting with prostitutes. 
However, along with the camaraderie of serving with hometown friends came 
problems of discipline. Officers often had friends and acquaintances under them, who 
sometimes refused to obey *home folks. ' Each unit had a nucleus of old soldiers and 
new officers, so that an enlisted man might have more knowledge of manoeuvres than 
his commander. 
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Keeping alcohol away from the men was another issue with which the divisional 
commanders had to contend. The straight-laced O'Ryan got an early jump on the 
potential problem. Before departing for South Carolina, he issued a plea for sobriety 
to his division: *You will notice in reading this letter that no reference is made to the 
effect upon your morals of the use of liquor or uncommendable associations. You are 
largely the custodian of your own morals. ' 60 This may have been prompted by a 
report, from the construction crew at Wadsworth. that a liquor still had been found 
only a few feet from NN-here O'Ryan's headquarters was to be located .61 After the 
New Yorkers arrived in Spartanburg. he assigned 50 men from his military police 
company to stand continuous post in the city's streets as a deterrent to would-be 
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drunks 
. 
62 Ironically. the soldiers who developed a taste for alcohol in France were 
later forced to give up drinking in the United States ý, N-hen prohibition was introduced 
in 1920 with the Volstead Act. 63 
Observin2 the Allies 
On 22 September 1917, O'Ryan was ordered from Camp Wadsworth with two 27th 
Division officers and sent to France to observe the British and French fronts. 
Although the War Department was months away from sending divisions to the British 
for training, the trip would prove to be a valuable training lesson. 
O'Ryan's observations provide insight into the Allied armies, and, at the time, 
influenced his own theories on command. The party spent most of its time with 
General Sir Hubert Gough at Fifth British Army headquarters, and with the 29th and 
31" Divisions on the front lines. While in the trenches with the 29th Division, O'Ryan 
learned the importance of duckboards, essential for movement to forward lines over 
terrain of slippery mud, so prevalent in France and Belgium. At the front, O'Ryan 
saw a number of German prisoners, and was surprised at their poor stature and 
physical condition. 
The discipline in the British Army greatly impressed O'Ryan. 'The main 
manifestation was quietness, ' he wrote. 'Neither in the front trenches nor in the back 
areas did I ever hear, among the thousands of soldiers I saw, any soldiers shouting or 
cursing at their horses or mules, or. in fact. shouting or calling in a loud 
voice to other men. " 64 O'Ryan also made a favourable impression upon the British. 
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Every American officer who spent time with them and . N-as evaluated by the British. 
and the comments were forwarded to Pershing. Major General O'Gowan of the ) " I" 
British Division was one officer who made note of O'Ryan's visit. He considered 
him 'a keen and capable officer, with considerable knowledge of his profession, and a 
facility for mastering the detail of trench warfare and the administration of a 
division. ' 65 
The last week was spent with the 38 th French Division, headquartered in Soissons. 
Although he did not witness any French Anny attacks. O'Ryan was privy to the 
forthcoming operation. His final day in the French sector was at an Amiy school 
where 'training seemed to be thorough. There was continued evidence of snap and 
ginger in everything that was done. ' 66 Upon O'Ryan's return to Wadsworth. the 27h 
Division immediately began to implement what he had learned on the Western Front. 
Training Continued - Open Warfare Versus Trench Warfare 
By the second week of October, there were 35,000 men at Camp Wadsworth. The 
27 th Division had the luxury of being 7,000 over the authorised strength of 28,000 for 
a short period. However, the strength of the 3 Oth was only 17,557 officers and men in 
mid-October, and not until 10,000 more were posted in was it was at full strength. 
Through the last part of summer, the health of both divisions was reasonably good. In 
the case of the 3 Oth Division, less than one percent had to be hospitalised. However, 
the temperature turned cold at the end of October and remained so for the next four 
months. A measles epidemic broke out. Men were forbidden to leave camp for fear 
of spreading measles. and anyone caught violating the order was punished. At 
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Wadsworth, the Spartanburg newspaper reported that *a puy Nxent to tov, -n from the 
quarantine a few nights ago and got for his troubles six months in the guard house. -67 
The change in the weather was not the only reason for this outbreak. The failure of 
the Quartermaster Corps to provide warm uniforms (the men were still wearing the 
light, khaki variety) and the fact that men were sleeping in crowded tents. x\ ere 
partially to blame. Yet, the Quartermaster had a legitimate excuse for the problem. 
After the debacle in 1898, the Quartermaster General requested appropriations from 
Congress to purchase large reserves of clothing, but was refused each time. When the 
National Guard was mobilised in 1916, the meagre stocks on hand were depleted. A 
final attempt to secure appropriations also failed when Congress adjourned on 4 
March 1917, before it could vote on the legislation. 68 Concerns over the clothing 
shortage prompted the head of the Chattanooga branch of the National League for 
Women's Service to press the governor of Tennessee to buy warm underwear for the 
cold soldiers at Camp Sevier. But the lack of a war contingency fund prevented the 
state from helping out, although Governor Thomas Rye promised to write to the 30th 
Division commander on behalf of the League. 69 
Training was also complicated by the War Department demands on divisions for 
specialists. If a soldier was skilled in pneumatic riveting or fluent in French, he was 
considered a valuable commodity, likely to be transferred. The 27'1' Division lost 
officers through this process and paid a terrible price in combat with inexperienced, 
replacement line officers. None of the replacements had seen action in Mexico since 
National Guard units were not allowed across the border; therefore they lacked 
tactical skills. 
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National Guard units were also depleted by the training schools established in France. 
The schools provided courses for field officers, as well as lo,,, ý, er grades. It was the 
intention of the Army not to take experienced officers away from commands, but this 
occurred anyway, particularly during the final offensives of the war. The War 
Department realised the hardship caused by breaking up National Guard units. but 
made it clear that there was no choice. 
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To prepare for war, the War College Division overhauled the Army's current 
structure. 71 Large divisions (approximately 28,000 men), twice the size of those of 
the Allies, were created after consultation with the British and French General 
Staffs. 72 A division was now square since it had two infantry brigades, with two 
regiments in each (See Appendix V). The realignment worked well for the Regulars, 
but created havoc among the National Guard divisions, which they were now forced 
to meet the new tables of organisation. State units, for example, had an excess of 
infantry and a shortage of artillery. As an expedient, the War Department switched 
units between arms of the service. Infantry regiments became artillery regiments or 
machine-gun battalions, and, in some cases, two regiments became one. 
National Guard cavalry units were also abolished since both the Allies and Central 
Powers had learned that barbed wire and machine guns reduced the need for cavalry. 
By 1918, horses remained numerous and used for transport to the front, but tactically 
theý- were replaced mostly by tanks. 73 Secretary of War Baker encouraged the 
chain-nan of the Commitlee on Military Affairs to empower the President to deploy 
cavalry units as foot regiments. Congress passed legislation fecleralising National 
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Guard cavalry regiments as artillery and machine-gun units. 
-4 Both the 27'h and .3 O'h 
Divisions converted cavalry regiments to machine-gun battalions and trench-mortar 
batteries. As historian Jerry Cooper pointed out. 'Many field-grade infantry officers 
lost their commands, while others were placed in charge of units for which they had 
no training. ' 75 With the realignment, the heritage of some National Guard units was 
threatened, and resentment toward the War Department developed. Protests from 
various state military and political leaders prompted Secretary Baker to urge Army 
officers commanding National Guard divisions to make e\, er,,, effort to preserve the 
identity of the oldest regiments. He also ordered Chief of Staff Bliss to make a public 
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statement on the necessity of reorganising the National Guard . 
Men in units of the North Carolina National Guard lived in the central and Piedmont, 
or mountainous, sections of the state and mobilised on the U. S. -Mexican border near 
El Paso. At Sevier, the I" and 2 nd North Carolina units were re-designated as the 
II 9th and 120th Infantry Regiments, and formed into the 60th (Tar Heel) Brigade under 
Brig. Gen. Sampson L. Faison, a Regular from North Carolina. The historian of the 
120th described his unit as 'a thoroughly American organisation' that had inherited the 
'best tradition of a fighting stock, which had proven its worth in the War of the 
Revolution and the War Between the States. ' Veterans of the regiments referred to 
their recently graduated reserve officers as 'Sears and Roebuck Lieutenants. 77 The 
fresh officers reminded one of new clothes purchased from one of America's best- 
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known department stores . 
To their dismay, units of the National Guard received drafted men from all over the 
United States. This resulted in the state units losing their local flavour. To some in 
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the National Guard system. this was a deliberate attempt býý the War Departnient to 
weaken the states' authority in wartime . 
79 The 300' Division received recruits 
representing practically all of the United States. One soldier from Indiana wrote to 
his mother how the 'southern boys are very nice'... and that *it sounds kind of funny 
to hear them talk... just like a coloured fellow talking. 80 Local men enlisted for a 
variety of reasons. Cpl. Joe Thompson from Goldsboro. North Carolinajoined the 
119'h because his 'home was broken up through the death of his parents. and lie had 
nowhere else to go. ' Thompson fitted in quite well amongst the National Guardsmen 
because they were like him: farmers who 'accepted discipline easily. ' 81 
As O'Ryan and other National Guard officers recognised, the War Department 
depleted locality pride by sending replacements. 82 During the Civil War. the Army 
learned that units formed from the same home towns fought better for the simple 
reason that mean feared word of misbehaviour would likely trickle back to their 
families and friends. After the war, Major General O'Ryan testified to what Congress 
referred to as an unfortunate replacement system, flawed because it allowed new 
troops to destroy the unity local units produced. The Allied armies, he suggested, 
were more sensitive. *Certainly the Scotchmen would not be willing to serve in any 
other commands than Scotch divisions. and I believe the Australians would refuse to 
serve in any part of the British Army, and would serve only with Australian units. ' 83 
O'Ryan's comments were carefully noted by the committee, but he was incorrect. In 
late 1915 and during the first half of 1916, the British Army began to transfer men 
from New Army and Territorial Force units to ostensibly Regular battalions. This 
was in response to the perceived poor performance of txN-o New Army divisions as 
84 Loos 
. 
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Despite what was learned from other conflicts like the American Civil War. the 
British eventually proved that strong local identity of units was not the secret of 
success, whereas better tactical methods and weapons s. ystemswere the keý'. 8 i For the 
Americans, O'Ryan's testimony did little to affect how the National Guard would be 
used in future conflicts, as the same problem occurred in World War 11. 
During the first month at camp, divisions concentrated on the schoolino of the soldier 4-- 
- disciplinary drills and physical exercise. 86 Training was difficult because not all 
men were issued a full complement of equipment. The commanding general of the 
30th Division complained to the War Department that he went two months before all 
units had rifles, which prevented them from instruction in the Army's most relied 
upon weapon. 87 The standard-issue United States service rifle was the U. S. Magazine 
Rifle, Calibre .30, Model 1903, also known as the 'Springfield * 03 .' the '03, ' or the 
'Springfield. ' The weapon weighed 8.69 pounds, with an overall length of 43 
1/2 
inches and a 24-inch barrel, and it has been called 'the finest bolt-action military rifle 
of all time. ' 
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The infantry rifle was the heart of what Pershing preached in his open warfare 
doctrine. He was openly critical of both the British and French Armies because they 
I had 'become mired in trench warfare , and, as a result, their offensive capabilities 
were diminished to a defensive posture on the Western Front. 89 Pershing was fearful 
that if his own army adopted trench warfare, it would also lose the offensive spirit. 
He envisioned aggressive movement and pursuit that Would force the enemV into the 
open. His thinking drew from experiences of the army on the frontier durino the 
Indian wars. when part of infantry consisted of expert marksmen and scouts. 
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On the Plains and in the Southwest, there were no trenches in v. -hich to take cover. 
Development of the aggressive, self-reliant infantry was his training goal-90 Pershing 
did not create this doctrine. It was based on the tactics prescribed in the Army's 
Infantry Drill Regulations (IDR), particularly the 1914 edition. The IDR was first 
published in 1907 and remained the Army's doctrinal bible well after this World War. 
One of Pershing's biographers describes open warfare as 'fluid, open-ended. and 
flexible... Oriented to the earth's surface, rather than its bowels, it is inclined to go 
around strongpoints rather than into them. ' 91 This doctrine resembles the infiltration 
tactics used by the British, French and Gen-nans. But in the U. S., training of troops 
focused on trench warfare, as opposed to the open warfare tactics Pershing insisted 
upon. He repeatedly cabled the War Department about his concern that training with 
the rifle was not being sufficiently stressed at home. He was correct; when the 
doughboys arrived in France, they had to be re-trained. Historian Timothy K. 
Nenninger has called this 'tactical dysfunction. -)92 
The armies in France were equipping their soldiers with rifles and bayonets, but these 
weapons were used in conjunction with mortars, grenades, machine guns, artillery and 
tanks. 93 Pershing also failed to appreciate that the British were using a 'bite and hold' 
tactic, where the attacker attempted to occupy a section of the defender's front before 
it could respond. Then the attacking unit would revert to a defensive posture to 
oppose the likely counterattack. 'This procedure, " according to historian Paddy 
Griffith. 'was always perfectly possible on the Western Front and \,, vas repeatedly 
performed successftillý .. ' 
94 
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At Camp Wadsworth, an elaborate, specially constructed trench systern covered a 
front of 700 yards. while its length totalled eight miles. The system included shelters 
and bomb-proof dugouts. 'It afforded opportunity for every unit to engage in 
practical instruction in the use of pick and shovel. trench sanitation. the construction 
of listening posts, barbed-wire entanglements, saps. mines, machine-gun 
emplacements, and lines of communications. ' 95 
Soldiers entertained themselves by attending stage shows at the camp theatre, a visit 
into town, quiet time reading and writing letters (at a Y. M. C. A. -maintained building), 
or enjoying a home-cooked meal at a Hostess House. They most looked forward to 
the coveted weekend leave or furlough, issued in rotation, so that every man would be 
granted a Saturday and Sunday holiday at least once every six weeks. 96 
In late October 1917, the French and British armies began to send instructors to 
America. Eventually, 286 French officers, predominately artillery specialists, and 261 
British officers, primarily for training in gas warfare, physical fitness and bayonet 
drill. spent several months in the United States. Through a special congressional 
appropriation, the War Department set aside funds to pay the foreign officers $10 a 
day, plus train or bus fare, when they travelled and had to find accommodation in a 
city or town. When British and French officers stayed on an Army post, this extra pay 
was reduced to $6 per day. 
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British instructors spent more time than their French counterparts at Sevier and 
Wadsworth, and greatly influenced the way the 27 th and 30thDix-isions trained. 
Physical training. the British Army had shown. Nvas essential to both the minds and 
muscles of soldiers. Maj. J. B. Sharp was ordered to Wadsworth to senýe the 27h 
Division as an adviser in physical and bayonet training. A member of the Buffs (The 
East Kent Regiment), he impressed the Americans with his "high standard of 
disciplined efficiency' and devised games that tested a soldier's physical ability. 
When lecturing American officers, Sharp claimed that experience proved groups of 
fighting men were most effective when trained to respond as a team. This was 
particularly true during the height of noise and confusion in combat. 98 
Physical fitness, it was reasoned, would 'tighten the relation between the mind and 
muscle, so that the latter would become automatically and instantaneously responsive 
to the former, and the former instantaneously resourceful in applying methods to aid 
the latter when hard pressed. '99 British officers encouraged squads from each 
regiment to specialise in a branch of warfare. Hence, one squad may have been 
proficient in grenade throwing; another may have had special skills with machine- 
gunning. This was enshrined in the British doctrine in early 1917. Manuals such as 
the Instructionsfor the Training of Platoonsfor Offensive Action (SS 143) provided 
four areas of concentration: Lewis Guns, Hand Grenades, Rifle Grenades and Rifles. 
The physical training schedule devised by British officers consisted of exercises - 
three hours of drill in the morning and three in the afternoon. Lectures for non- 
commissioned officers were held each evening. Also sent to Wadsworth was Sgt. 
Maj. William Tector of the British Army Gymnastic Corps. who displayed 
tremendous skill as a physical and bayonet instructor. and became popular among the 
men. 
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As training progressed, other components of soldering were emphasised. such as the 
bayonet, Chauchat machine gun, and instruction in adjustment and use of the small 
box respirator, or gasmask. Gas drills were held until every man could don and adjust 
his mask in less than six seconds. At the end of gas training, all infantry regiments 
were put through a gas chamber in the camp, with actual, non-lethal, gas filling the 
room. This was supposed to simulate an attack of this nature while on the front 
I ine. 100 
Maj. H. D. Matson, a British specialist in machine-gun training, was sent to Camp 
Sevier to instruct the 3 Oth Division. 101 Along with other British instructors in the 
Untied States, Matson helped establish schools in bayonet, bombs, Stokes mortar, 
sniping and scouting. Classes formed for special courses in tactics. During later 
weeks of training, scarcely a man had not been a student at one of these special 
schools. Essentially, Matson was following the British training doctrine prescribed in 
SS 143. 
Officers serving with the British Mission refrained from openly criticising their 
American pupils; however, they told their superiors in England their true feelings. 
Lieutenant Colonel Murray of the British Training Mission in the United States wrote 
to his commanding officer in England that the training had been difficult. Each 
American division exceeded 20,000 men,, and the five officers assigned to each of the 
camps were overwhelmed. Murray addressed the weak discipline between American 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers. He hoped the British instructors 
'affected a oreat deal in the required direction. and that the necessitv for strict 
discipline is now understoo . 
10" 
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Not surprisingly, the American officers found reason to fault their well-intentioned 
British instructors. 'Intolerable and overbearing, ' commented Lt. Kenneth Gow. a 
machine-gun company commander in the 27 th Di-vision. "There is only one way 
which is right - their way. ' He much preferred French instructors because they were 
'considerate, polite, and will always take suggestions. ' 103 Lieutenant Gow may not 
have felt this way if he knew that in seven months time, he would be sharing trenches 
with many British officers in France. 
1917 Offensives Continued 
In 1917, the BEF reftised to wait for American officers like Gow to come to its aid, 
and planned its next major operations. They were split into two phases, with the first 
to consist of an attack on the Wytscaete-Messines Ridge. This phase commenced 
when Gen. Sir Herbert Plumer's Second Army ordered an artillery bombardment with 
756 heavy pieces against Messines Ridge, a feature that dominated the southern flank 
of the Ypres salient. Then, on 7 June, 19 mines detonated under the German 
positions, essentially ending the attack in one day. The fighting continued until 14 
June, with British losses at 25,000. Many casualties resulted from German shelling 
that pulverised the infantry crowded on the ridge. 
' 04 
Next, the British conducted an operation known as the Third Battle of Ypres or 
Passchenclaele, which lasted from the end of July until the middle of Noveniber. 
British losses reached about 260,000 during the campaign. Pilckem Ridge was the 
most significant gain. where on 31 July. nine divisions of the Fifth Army advanced. 
with five divisions of the Second Army covering their right and two French divisions 
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on the left. Excellent artillery support followed by effective infantry tactics allowed 
successes at Menin Road Ridge from 20-25 September and Polygon Wood. 26 
September-3 October. German counterattacks were eliminated by artillerý and 
machine-gun fire. During the fighting it began to rain, and the ground turned so 
muddy that operations had to be halted. The rain and mud worsened in the continuing 
days, ensuring that Passchendaele would always be remembered for its terrible 
conditions. 1 05 
On 20 November, Lt. Gen. Sir Julian Byng's Third Army launched an offensive on 
the Cambrai front, where eight divisions and a thousand guns faced two Gen-nan 
divisions. The battle involved the first large-scale use of tanks (48 1) employed in 
masses wit out a preliminary artillery bombardment, while overhead were 289 
aircraft. The British also employed the tactic of predicted fire by its artillery to 
achieve surprise and avoid churning ground. At 6: 20 A. M., 300 tanks moved forward 
and caught the Germans by surprise. It took only four hours to overrun the 
Hindenburg Line and advance four miles, capturing 10,000 prisoners. The British did 
not have the manpower to support these gains, and a German counterattack on 30 
November won back nearly all ground lost, capturing 10,000 men and 200 guns. 
Casualties on each side numbered 80,000. A British board of inquiry blamed the 
reverse on poor training, and the three corps commanders became scapegoats. 106 
The 1917 campaigns did. however, result in the British Arrny making advances in 
doctrine. Lessons from the Somme campaign were converted into new tactics, and 
many historimis recognise this period as the start of a steep leaming curve that 
continued through the final year of the war. The key development was the artillery .1 
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barrage, protection for the advancing infantry, rather than simply bombardment. firing 
before an attack. With cover from a combination of guns. mortars. machine guns. 
tanks and aircraft, the infantry could move in short advances. 107 These tactics were 
evident at Virny and Messines. 
Some of the success can be credited to the efforts of G. H. Q. to disseminate lessons 
from 1914-1916 operations, particularly in artillery and small-unit tactics. The results 
were introduced in the influential Instructionsfor the Training of Divisionsfor 
Offensive Action, SS 135 (December 1916) and the previously mentioned Instructions a, 
for the Training ofPlatoonsfor Offensive Action. SS 14-3 3 (February 1917). 108 These 
publications and many others were shared with the Americans and sent to each camp 
for the officers to study. 109 It is doubtful that brigade and regimental officers 
understood the value of these works, and the War Department never made an attempt 
to find out if they did. It was more interested in learning if officers were training the 
enlisted men for overseas duty. 
Inspections 
To gauge the effectiveness of divisions during training, the General Staff ordered 
inspections. Officers from geographical commands (Camps Sevier and Wadsworth 
were part of the Southeastern Department), acting on behalf of the Office of the 
Inspector General, were to conduct two inspections of each division. The first was to 
be completed before Christmas 1917, and the second prior to the division"s 
embarkation overseas. The inspections of the National Guard divisions Nvere 
'thorough and generally critical, ' according to the Inspector General's Office 
historian. 'reflectino. in part. the bias of Regular Army inspectors' completing the 
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first round. After completing the second inspections. senior inspectors Nvere to return 
to Washington to discuss their findings and rate the National Guard units. from the 
most to least deployable. Among rating factors were evaluation of training, strength. 
administration, discipline, and quality of commander and staff. ' 10 
The first inspection of the 27h Division took place on 23 November 1917 by Col. Eli 
A. Helmick, and his conclusions were far from impressive. He noted a number of 
deficiencies, in uniforms and overall neatness, but the most severe criticism pertained 
to instruction of the soldier, squad and company. Targets were the regimental and 
company commanders. According to Helmick, drill schedules were not followed, or 
officers would change 'drill to suit themselves. ' He commented further about one 
brigade's straggling and lack of discipline. "' 
On 20 December 1917, Col. J. B. McDonald inspected the 30thDivision. He criticised 
officers for not being 'efficient instructors or disciplinarians. " The most disturbing 
conclusion was that the division still had a shortage of woollen clothing and training 
equipment. McDonald concluded that the division was not prepared to fight and 
would require three months with better-trained field officers before it could be 
recommended for overseas service. 
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The mention of lax discipline in the inspection reports is not surprising since the 27 th 
and 30'hDivisions had received large numbers of new soldiers, normally a cause for 
decline in efficiency. Still. there were enough minor infractions to keep court-martial 
boards busy for both divisions. Offences included petty theft, desertion. writing bad 
58 
checks, disorderly conduct, and sleeping on post. Depending upon the findings, 
sentences were forfeiture of pay or confinement xvith hard labour. 113 
The Amalgamation Issue Continues 
By the end of 1917, only four American divisions (1". 2 nd . 
26h and 42 nd ) plus 
logistical support, numbering 175,000 men, were on French soil. Their strength was 
far from the target of one million men that Pershing wanted by June 1918.1 14 The 
military outlook for 1918 appeared perilous, as there were indications that the Gernian 
Army planned a spring offensive. With the collapse of Russia and defeat of the 
Italians at Caporetto, the Germans redeployed divisions from the Eastern Front to the 
west. The exact date of the expected offensive remained a mystery, but the need for 
Allied reinforcements was crucial. 
As 1917 ended, the British and French pressed for amalgamation during meetings of 
the recently formed Supreme War Council. ' 15 Getting nowhere with Pershing and 
other American representatives in Europe, the Allies appealed directly to President 
Wilson. Although Robert A. Bruce"s study of French-American relations, A 
Fraternity ofArms, suggests Pershing feared that Wilson would cave in to Allied 
pressure, this assessment is far from the truth. Throughout the war, the President left 
matters of military importance completely in the hands of the AEF commander. As 
Pershing's biographer Donald Smyth reminds us, 'Perhaps no field commander in 
history was ever given a freer hand to conduct operations than was Pershing by 
Wilson. 116 
An urgent Christmas Eve cable from Secretarv of War Baker arrived at Pershing's 
Chaumont headquarters the following day, supportino thi 
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s point. It informed 
Pershing that 'both the English and French are pressing upon the President their 
desires to have your forces amalgamated with theirs by reggiments and companies. ' 
Baker also indicated that 'we do not desire loss of identity of our forces. but regard 
that as secondary to the meeting of any critical situation by the most helpful use 
possible of the troops at your command. ' He added that -The President desires you to 
have full authority to use the forces at your command as you deem Nxise in 
consultation with French and British commanders- in-chief" 118 After receiving 
Baker's cable, Pershing waited almost a week to respond. 
Despite the tense relationship with the Americans regarding the amalgamation issue, 
Field Marshal Haig remained enthusiastic about the AEF officers he met. Haig wrote 
his wife in December 1917 'our idea of what American men are like is quite wrong. 
Those we are working with are quiet, unassuming fellows--entirely unlike the 
fashionable Yankees we used to see in London following in the wake of some loud- 
voiced Yankee beauty! Personally, I am finding the American men connected with 
the U. S. A. Forces very much like our own officers. I need give them no higher 
recommendation. ' 119 As amalgamation became more of an issue between the U. S. 
and Britain, Haig's high regard for the Americans would diminish somewhat. 
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Chapter 2: 'Waiting to Go Over' 
Amalp-amation 
'The winter of 1917-1918 was the most severe of the war. ' General Pershing remarked in 
hismemoirs. 1 He was, of course, referring to the freezing temperatures and heavy sno\\s 
that tormented both France and the United States. Yet. he easily could have meant the 
frigid relations that formed between him and senior British and French commanders over 
the amalgamation issue. Not only were they pulling him in opposite directions, but his 
own government also was beginning to question his reasoning for withholding troops 
from the front. 
On I January 1918, Pershing finally replied to the Christmas Day cable by \kriting to 
Maj. Gen. Tasker Bliss, not Secretary of War Baker. His long message assured Bliss: 'I 
do not think an emergency now exists that would warrant our putting companies or 
battalions into British or French divisions. ' 2 Pershing echoed his long-held conviction 
that if American troops were amalgamated, they would lose their national identity, and 
that the methods of instruction in the Allied armies might interfere with AEF training 
doctrine. 'Attention should be called to prejudices existing between French and British 
Governments and Armies. ' he wrote, 'and the desire of each to have American units 
assigned to them, and the exclusion of similar assignment to the other. ' 3A cable to Bliss 
three days later indicated that he was beginning to soften his vieN\ s. albeit slightly. He 
x\as no\\ entertaining the idea of the British transporting and assisting in the training of 
American troops, as long it \\as *strictly supplementary to our o\\n regular programme* 
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of fielding an American army. Pershing recognised that British help ýýas needed to 
4 transport troops to France, and it was up to him to make a concession . 
Sir William Robertson (and two aides) met with Pershing on 9-10 January 1918. The mo 
men had last conferred in November 1917, but that discussion accomplished little. N, ox\ 
it was a new year and a fresh start for both. Robertson brought a proposal that offered to 
transport 150,000 troops (150 battalions) from divisions still in the United States that 
were not already scheduled for overseas duty. He also suggested they could be broken up 
as the British had done with some Territorial Force and New Army divisions in 1915 to 
supply reinforcements and lines of communication troops. The proposal, he reiterated to 
Pershing, related only to infantrymen and machine gunners. They would be used to 
reinforce under-strength British units. He also sought to reassure Pershing by reminding 
him that he in no way wished to interfere with the build-up of an independent American 
army. 
The British were willing, temporarily, to forgo the shipping used for importing food and 
raw materials from abroad, and use it to provide the immediate transport of American 
troops, if only Pershing would approve. Sensing that Pershing was not going to accept 
the proposal, Robertson told him that unless the Americans provided men to fill up their 
decimated divisions. the British Army could very well exhaust its manpower and the 
Allies would lose the war. 5 
68 
Pershing later recalled that he was beAIldered that the British suddenlý, offered to 
transport troops, when previously he had been told that no shipping was available. In 
addition, he remembered, it bothered him that Robertson's current proposal ýý as not 
current at all; it was essentially the same as that submitted to Lloyd George bý the House 
Mission a few weeks earlier. 6 However, Pershing was clearly overreacting, because the 
British, particularly Robertson, were in no way trying to be deceitful. On the contrary. it 
was an attempt to be amenable by offering to sacrifice tonnage to bring the Americans to 
Europe as soon as possible. 
After Robertson finished outlining his proposal, Pershing responded that instead of 
carrying 150 battalions. ) the British should bring over full divisions. He reasoned that if 
they could find shipping for battalions, they could certainly find space for divisions. 
Robertson expected this reaction and had a ready answer: the infantry battalions were 
needed badly, not the support units. He left the meeting without obtaining a firm answer. 
The American general did not let on that the proposal had actually attracted him. On 13 
January, Pershing cabled the War Department: 'This whole question seems to me to be 
one of necessity, and we must consider the probability of strong German attacks in early 
spring and summer... the emergency requires this temporary supply of men for the 
British. 
The War Department naturally agreed with Pershing, and a recommendation was 
submitted to President Wilson, xvho approved, but with caution. Sounding much like 
Pershing. he warned: 'Whatever they may promise no\\, the British \\ill, \\hen it comes 
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to the pinch, in fact. cut us off from some part of the tonnage theý ýý ill promise us for our 
general programme in order, themselves, to make sure of these battalions, or NN ill promise 
us less for the general programme than they would otherwise have given, had their plan 
for these reinforcements for their own front not been accepted. '8 Wilson ýý as, of course. 
greatly concerried with how America's role on the battlefield would affect the peace 
nego ia ions. 
A few days later, Pershing was having second thoughts and wrote to Bliss on 21 January: 
'We should be very guarded in making any concessions to the British. '10 Four days later, 
he again met with Robertson, this time in Paris. Here Pershing broke the news to him 
that he would not approve the shipping plan. Robertson was shocked... and with good 
reason. As Robertson knew, less than a week before, Pershing had met with General 
Haig and General Petain, and expressed no dissatisfaction with the proposal. But 
Pershing now reiterated that he felt it was in the best interest of the American Army that 
the British transport whole divisions, not individual battalions. Once the divisions 
arrived in France, the British would supervise training, and. should the need arise, the 
troops could have limited use in combat. All this was news to Bliss, who favoured the 
British plan and made his feelings known to Pershing. The two met privately and 
Pershing stressed to Bliss the importance of a unified front to the Allies, and that the 
transport of complete divisions was the only acceptable course. Bliss reluctantly agreed. 
Now, Pershing needed to persuade the British to come aboard, which they did a week 
later. 11 
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Accordingly, Pershing and Bliss met with Lloyd George, Lord Milner, Robertson and 
Haig on 29-30 January 1918, and after two days of tense discussion, both sides accepted 
an 4agreement between the commanders-in-chief of the American and British forces in 
France regarding the training of the American troops with British troops. " 2 They settled 
on the American plan for the British to transport six complete divisions, less artillerý. to 
France for aI O-week training programme. The artillery units would be trained in 
merican camps located in the French sector. The British would be responsible for 
feeding and supplying the Americans. Pershing emphasised that the American divisions 
were on loan to the British Army and could be recalled at his discretion. 13 
The agreement contained several strongly worded clauses outlining how training would 
proceed. The most important proviso stated that once platoons, companies, battalions 
and regiments of each division completed training, they would be designated ready 'to 
take the field... and would then be handed over to the American commander- in -chief, 
under arrangements to be made between the various commanders-in-chief. ' 14 This gave 
Pershing the assurance he insisted upon - that American divisions were only temporarily 
assigned to the British. The British also enhanced the agreement by proposing that 
American commanders and staff officers be attached to corresponding British 
headquarters for additional instruction. This clause was also to Pershing's benefit since it 
gave his inexperienced officers the training they never would have received in the U. S. 
On 4 February 1918, the American and British representatives met again and finalised the 
training agreement, but onk after Pershing insisted upon a few changes. Among them 1 .1 
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were that the six divisions would form an American corps, and the training programme 
was to be designed by the Americans after consulting the British. To the latter. these 
revisions were of little concern, and on 12 February 1918, the arrangement became 
official. In a memorandum to Haig the same day. Pershing promised my full and earnest 
cooperation in ensuring successful execution. " 5 Although the training agreement ýwuld 
undergo many minor changes in coming months, it set in motion a relationship bemeen 
two armies that had a profound effect on how the war was fought. 
The French reaction to the British proposal was one of disappointment. Since December 
1917, Petain had requested transfer of AEF divisions in France to his army for 
amalgamation. He was anxious to strengthen his divisions before the impending German 
attack. Pershing, of course, rejected this request. Nevertheless, he had great fondness for 
Petain and wanted to ensure that good American-French relations continued. 
As a matter of courtesy, Pershing had met with Petain on 21 January to inform him of the 
British proposal. He did not tell him why troops were to be sent to the British, but he did 
indicate that he hoped this decision in no way would hurt their friendship, 
or show any lack of respect toward the French Army. It was a necessity to accept the 
British offer to transport troops since the Americans lacked shipping, he explained. 
Pershing promised that his troops would undergo advanced training with the French 
Army, and that he would immediately place some regiments with French divisions for 
training. True to his word. Pershing sent the four black infantrý regiments of the 93 rd 
Division to the French. This included the 369h Infantry. which had trained brieflý at 
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Wadsworth until racial tension with the citizens of Spartanburg forced the unit from the 
Jim Crow south. In France, the 'Harlem Hell Fighters, ' as they were called bý the 
French, would distinguish themselves in the fighting during the spring and summer of 
1918.16 
The Orizanisation of 11 Corps 
With the amalgamation issue behind him, Pershing could put his energy into organising 
his much -sought-after army. An important move in this direction was the creation of the 
corps. He formed 11 U. S. Army Corps on 20 February 1918 to establish administrative 
control and supervise the training of the six American divisions scheduled to arrive in the 
British sector over the next two months. 17 Pershing chose Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen. ) 
George S. Simonds as its chief of staff. It was a wise selection because Simonds already 
knew many BEF staff officers from his work with the Baker Mission the previous year. 
Also, he was a good officer, as his already-impressive career had shown. 
After graduating from West Point in 1899, Simonds was commissioned in the 22 nd 
Infantry and took part in II engagements and expeditions during the Philippine 
Insurrection, before helping suppress the Boxer Rebellion. His superiors thought highly 
of him, one rating Simonds *an excellent, conscientious and painstaking officer, capable 
and fitted for any duty. " 8 During the years before the U. S. entry into World War 1, he 
served mostly as a training officer. After returning from France with the Baker Mission, 
Sit-nonds N\ as appointed the 26 th Division chief of staff. remaining x\ith the 'Yankee 
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Division' only a short time before being transferred to AEF G-3 staff (Operations). His 
fluency in French probably had some bearing on his return to France. ' 9 
As a corps chief of staff, Simonds now 'faced with aplomb the tremendous task of 
formulating training programmes, ' as one historian points out, -solving logistical 
problems, and adapting American principles of organisation and administration to those 
of the British. -)20 Since Pershing did not immediately select his corps commanders, 
Simonds, for a short time, was the highest-ranking American officer in the British sector. 
He reported to Brig. Gen. James G. Harbord, by this time the AEF chief of staff. 
Two days after Simonds' appointment took effect, Harbord presented him with a two- 
and-a-half-page directive outlining his duties. It gave him the background on 
arrangements to bring divisions to France--when they would arrive, and how long they 
were to train with the British. More importantly, it made clear that Pershing had the 
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authority to determine the disposition of each division after training was completed . 
Such tight control over administrative matters was typical of Pershing. As AEF 
commander, he continually managed the minutest details and was not averse to relieving 
staff officers if they did not follow his orders. In this case, it can be understood why 
Pershing was not willing to relinquish control, after experiencing difficult negotiations 
xý ith the British. SimplN put, Simonds was to carry out Pershing's proposals and ensure 
the British did not exceed their authority. This was unfortunate for Simonds because the 
limited po\\er often hindered his performance as a corps chief of staff. 
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Recognising the difficulties Simonds was about to confront, Harbord offered some much- 
neededadvice. He urged Simonds not to rush into the job, but to take his time organising 
a staff at the AEF headquarters in Chaumont. After all. the first of the six divisions ýýas 
not scheduled to arrive until early April. so there was plenty of time to sort out the 
administrative details with the British. Although appreciative of Harbord's suggestion, 
Simonds was anxious to start working. It would be more prudent, he thought. to schedule 
a visit to British G. H. Q. and discuss the training programme with Haig's staff before 
selecting corps staff. 
Simonds departed Chaumont on 20 February 1918 with two aides and arrived at the rail 
station near Montreuil the following morning. Several British officers and the chief of 
the American Mission at British G. H. Q. Col. Robert Bacon, enthusiastically greeted him 
at the train. Bacon, one might add, as a lawyer, banker, diplomat, and now a soldier, 
would work well with Simonds. He and Pershing were also long time acquaintances, 
and, for that reason, as well as his 'intimate knowledge of the French people, and his tact 
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and discretion, ' Bacon was a natural for the job . 
Simonds and his greeters moved on to Montreuil, where he *found great excitement and 
enthusiasm about the American troops coming to the British front. ý23 After the usual 
formalities, they \,,. ent to work in a conference attended by the British deputy chief of 
staff, the director of training, the quartermaster, and the heads of the various supplý 
branches. Shortly into the conference. it soon became apparent that tN\o problem areas 
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existed in making the preliminary arrangements for American divisions: loulistics and 
training. Complicating the second and more important of the two was the apparent 
misunderstanding by British staff officers over their role in supervising training. 24 
Practically ignoring Simonds. the British officers openly discussed plans to train the 
Americans at the battalion level, then place squads, platoons and companies in line. 
Simonds did not expect such frank discussion, and he was unprepared to talk about these 
matters so soon. For the moment, he kept quiet. Yet, he knew, from his briefing ýý ith 
Harbord, that only American officers were to supervise training, and it xNas his 
responsibility to ensure that arrangement. 
As the meeting ended, Simonds addressed some of the issues brought to the table. 
Regarding supplies and equipment, he was able to talk candidly. The supply officers in 
attendance told Simonds the British were quite willing to provide the Americans with 
whatever they needed, as long as resources were available. In turn, Simonds promised to 
make their task less complicated by creating supply and equipment tables. and to adapt 
the British items and system of issue to the American organisations. 
When it came to training, Simonds still avoided the sticky question of who would instruct 
the Americans. He did request that the British turn over one of their training areas to 
each American division, warning that at a later time, he might require an increase and 
modification of the areas to suit the needs of the American training s,, stem. 
Overwhelmed and tired from travelling, and recognisin(. 1, the task at hand. Simonds had 
done enough talking for noN\ and asked that they meet the folio\\ ing day. ýý hen he 
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promised to be more prepared. He then retired to his temporary corps headquarters in 
Colonel Bacon's office, 'a dingy little building' at Montreuil. There. he and his aides 
were supplied with transportation, clerks, typewriters and batmen. 25 
The next day's conference was more productive. Simonds was well organised and started 
off the agenda with a plan that the British supply 11 Corps with all items except the 
distinctive articles of uniform: overseas caps, overcoats, blouses and breeches. He 
recognised that accommodating an additional 150,000 troops was going to be a burden on 
the al ready- stretched British supply system. To complicate matters, the British Armý! did 
not have organisations that corresponded to an American regiment and, therefore, would 
have to adjust accordingly to the AEF system. To the British the infantry brigade was the 
regimental equivalent. Therefore, the components of a regimental headquarters 'seemed 
to them like excess baggage. ' 26 
To comply with the American regimental tables of organisation, the British supply 
system would have to provide for such units as the headquarters company, machine-gun 
company and supply company. Another issue was horse transportation for combat units. 
Here, Simonds was willing to compromise. British tables of organisation also gave a 
greater proportion of personnel to animals than the Americans, and he agreed that his 
units would conform to the British practise of handling and care for animal 
transportation. 
Simonds xN as beginning to see the need to adjust and compromise over certain issues. 
As the meeting continued. much progress \\as made regarding supplies and equipment, 
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but Simonds had yet to broach the sensitive issue of training. When this subject was 
finally raised, the meeting intensified. British staff officers repeatedly questioned 
Simonds' authority, and, in response, he had to remind them that direction, supervision 
and control of training were done at 11 Corps headquarters. These were the instructions 
given to him by AEF G. H. Q. Any arrangements for training were to be handled bý him 
until he appointed a G-3 (Operations) officer. 
The British seemed happy to accommodate Simonds for general training, as well as 
provide an area for short-range rifle training, but they refused to make provisions for 
open warfare and long-range rifle practise. Both were integral components of American 
training doctrine and part of an issue Simonds knew could not be compromised. So, he 
arranged a conference with the staff of the Second British Army, scheduled to assist in 
training the first American formation, the 77'hDivision. 'After a somewhat lengthy and 
spirited discussion, ' he was promised that American specifications would be met 'in so 
far as time and conditions would permit. ' 27 
Now that the foundation for training had been set, Simonds could breathe a bit easier and 
start to build his staff with officers from Chaumont. The British provided him Chdteau 
Bryas, at St. -Pol-Sur Ternoise, for his headquarters. It was centrally located near the 
divisional training areas, about 70 kilometres from the front in the direction of Arras. He 
spent most days attending more conferences, and inspecting training areas and the ports 
of Calais and Le Havre, where ne\\, ly arriving troops would disembark. One of the 
78 
British officers who conferred frequently with Simonds was Lt. Gen. Sir Charles 
Bonham-Carter, the BEF director of training. 28 
Bonham-Carter was 42 years old, and his background was týpical of most First World 
War general officers of the British Army. He had been educated at Sandhurst and the 
Staff College at Camberley, before serving in the South African War in 1900. Prior to his 
appointment as training director, he was a staff officer of the 500' Division in 1915. A 
year later he was promoted brevet lieutenant-co lone I and appointed GSO I to the 7 th 
Division. Afterward, he went to G. H. Q. as training officer, and from there, he served on 
the staff of III Corps for seven months before being chosen by Haig to set up a neN, ý 
training section in early 1917, where he was to produce manuals and develop tactical 
doctrine. 29 Previously, training was not standardised, but conducted as seen fit by the 
various army, corps, division and brigade commanders. 30 Although he was still learning 
his job, Bonham-Carter would prove a great asset to 11 Corps, especially as a liaison 
between Simonds and the British staff officers charged with supervision of the American 
training. 
As the weeks passed, other American officers were seen in the British sector. Most were 
students of the General Staff College established by Pershing in September 1917 at 
Langres. Its mission was 'to train selected officers for staffs of divisions, corps, armies. 
and lines of communications. " 31 Many of its instructors were British and French, who 
lectured on subjects such as military map reading, staff organisation and intelligence. .1- 
After graduating. the American officers were ordered to observe British and French ltý 
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divisions at the front, and some officers were also attached to Neýý Zealand battalions for 
up to six days. Confidential reports on the Americans ýý ere then compiled b\ the hosting 
officers and submitted to Pershing's staff. An AEF officer \ý as deemed *,, -ery keen and 
energetic during his attachment, ' and another 'showed intelligent and critical interest in 
what he saw. ' 32 
Training in the United States 
With the start of the new year came the continuation of Period B training for the 27 th and 
30th Divisions. Brutal temperatures like the ones experienced on the Western Front were 
a regular occurrence in South Carolina. 33 The chilly weather naturally brought on 
sickness in the camps. Company H of the II gth Infantry was quarantined for smallpox, 
and training schedules were amended because of a mumps outbreak. Pneumonia also 
took its toll throughout the 3 Oth Division. At Sevier, one officer and 29 enlisted men died 
from the disease. 34 The same diseases debilitated the 27 th Division at Wadsworth, as well 
as an outbreak of spinal meningitis, which also quarantined some of the New Yorkers. 35 
Training varied, depending upon the type of unit. Engineer regiments, for example, spent 
a significant amount of time practising the construction of wire entanglements and 
bridges. Like infantry troops, engineers also received training in combat firing. 36 This 
proved a necessary skill to have in France since engineers constructing or repairing roads 
often would be the target of German artillery or indirect machine-gun fire. As late as 
February 1918, training was still hampered by lack of equipment. At Sevier. units of the 
3 Oth Division xNere still badly in need of ordnance accoutrements like cartridge belts and 
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bayonet scabbards; even helmets were in short supply. Despite constant pleas to the War 
Department, many of the men would not become fully equipped until theý arrived 
overseas. 37 
During the final months of training, internal unit evaluations ýý ere conducted at 
Wadsworth and Sevier to assess readiness for overseas service. Most evident in the 3 Oth 
Division was low morale. There was one main factor that contributed to this dilemma. 
Unlike the 27 th Division, by spring 1918, the 300' had been commanded bý four different 
generals since its organisation in August 1917. The division was now under the 
temporary command of Brig. Gen. Samson L. Faison. A former tactics instructor at West 
Point, the 60th Brigade commander took over the division for three months when Maj. 
Gen. Clarence P. Townsley was detailed to detached service at the Port of Embarkation, 
Hoboken, New Jersey. 38 Another related and complicated morale issue was that a large 
number of officers and men were detached from duty and sent for instruction elsewhere, 
further depleting the camaraderie of National Guard units. 39 It was a fact of life among 
all U. S. Army divisions since there were so few competent officers, and those displaying 
abi I ity were often transferred where the War Department felt they were needed most. 
Despite the morale problem, discipline remained good, and there were no major 
infractions reported to the War Department. 
In an attempt to improve morale, Faison ordered the men to adopt a division insignia. 
They responded by choosing a blue. elliptically shaped letter '0' on its side. It 
Surrounded a blue letter 'H' \\ ith blue Roman numerals XXX inside the crossbar of the 
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, H, ' which was superimposed on a maroon field. This was in honour of the di, - ision 
nickname, 'Old Hickory. 
00 
At Wadsworth, inspections of the 27thDivision also exposed a number of problems. 
Foremost was discipline within regiments. During an inspection of the 106thMachine- 
Gun Battalion, O'Ryan was appalled to see men in one company wearing 'nondescript 
clothing, ' such as sweaters and overalls. He observed half the company drilling, \N'hile 
the other half slept in cots, or played games in the street. There appeared to be little 
supervision since the captain of the company was in his quarters, leaving two lieutenants 
in charge. 'There was an entire absence of steam, snap and punch, ' O'Ryan complained. 
On the same day, he inspected Company H of the 106 th Infantry and found their dugout 
'in disorderly and unsatisfactory condition. Mess kits, books, papers and equipment were 
scattered about. ' 
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As punishment, O'Ryan ordered the delinquent captain to report before an efficiency 
board, where he was reprimanded, but allowed to stay with his unit. To the division 
commander, the 27 th may have appeared more like a collection of amateur soldiers, and 
less like the professional outfit that impressed the Regulars on the Mexican border the 
previous year. But, there was little that could be done at this point in the training. In 
reality, discipline within the 27 th Division was quite good. An examination of the 
divisional court-martial orders is telling in that few cases went to trial. Drunkenness and 
unauthorised absences \\, ere the main infractions, and they were dealt \\ ith by regimental 
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commanders as was the case in the 3 Oth Division: there were no general court-martial 
hearings reported that winter or spring. 
Further testament to O'Ryan's strict command style was reflected in an incident that 
occurred in early January. The two main British trainers, Tector and Sharp, held a s6ance 
at Wadsworth. Although the two officers were clearly enjoying a humorous moment 
with a group of naYve New Yorkers, O'Ryan found this less than amusing. He 
immediately issued a general order that made it known there would be 'no more 
indiscriminate hypnotism in this camp. 
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During a routine inspection in February, the 27 th Division almost lost its commanding 
officer. O'Ryan rode to the artillery range at Glassy Rock Mountain. 25 miles outside of 
camp, accompanied by the 52 nd Artillery Brigade commanding officer. Brig. Gen. 
Charles Phillips. When the two were seven miles from the range, one of guns fired. The 
tremendous noise scared the general's horse as he led it up a mountain pass, and the 
startled animal kicked O'Ryan so hard in the stomach that he was unconscious for 15 
minutes. The party was far from the first aid station at the range, and it was feared the 
27 th Division commander might die before receiving medical attention. However, the 
physically fit O'Ryan surprised everyone, and after several days of rest and nursing. he 
43 
was back at work . 
One can only speculate on the effect O'Ryan's death would have had on the division. He 
had done so much to shape the 27thup to this point. The affection of the men of the 27 th 
0, 
Division for O'Ryan can hardly be overstated. This became e\ ident when he solicited 
ideas for the division insignia. The men unanimously voted in favour of an elaborate 
insignia that consisted of the letters NYD (New York Division) monogrammed ýN ithin a 
red-bordered black circle, along with the stars of the constellation Orion. This ý\as a 
44 tribute to their commanding general . 
After several months of training, the division was still not at full strength. It was 
undermanned by 800 men after losing so many highly qualified officers and men to other 
units. It received 1,200 men in late March, but O'Ryan had another solution for 
increasing the strength of his division. He organised recruiting parties within the division 
and sent them to their home localities in New York State. They were told that any man 
wishing to join up would be considered. Especially needed ýý, ere specialists, such as 
mechanics, musicians, saddlers and cooks. 45 O'Ryan's plan proved a great success. 
Maj. Tristin Tupper, an aide to O'Ryan and head of the recruiting parties, reported at the 
end of April that more than 2,000 men had signed up to join the division. One-third of 
them were rejected, but eventually 1,200 were transported to Spartanburg and placed in a 
separate camp for special intensive training. 46 
Planninp- for 1918 
While Pershing and the Allied leaders tangled over amalgamation in the early part of the 
nexN year, there was relative quiet on the battlefields of the Western Front. Other than 
raids, and mortar and arti I lery attacks. there x\ ere no major confrontations between the 
Allies and the Central Powers. Yet, tension still existed between the British Prime 
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Minister (Lloyd George), the CIGS (William Robertson). and the BEF commander (Field 
Marshal Haig). Haig wanted to renew the offensive in France and Flanders in Januarý, N 
1918, but the Supreme War Council (SWC) ceded to pressure from Lloyd George and 
agreed to postpone the next major operation there until 1919. By then, it ýý as hoped. the 
American Army would be in place and it could be used in conjunction X\ ith the tanks, 
47 aeroplanes and guns being brought together by the Allies . 
Lloyd George wanted an offensive in Palestine, where he hoped a successful operation 
would improve his country's bargaining power during the peace conference. Also, 
delaying an offensive on the Western Front, he could minimise the loss of life, which had 
reached appalling numbers during 1916 and 1917. Haig and Robertson, however, 
insisted that victory could only be won on the Western Front, and for this to occur, more 
troops were necessary. The BEF commander requested 334,000 replacements, but in 
spring 1918, he received onlY about half that number. 48 
Most British divisions were reduced from twelve battalions to nine. The Australian 
Imperial Force (AIF) and other dominions retained their divisions at 12 battalions. The 
commander of the 3 rd Australian Division, Maj. Gen. John Monash, thought they would 
eventually 'follow the lead of the British Army and cut down our brigades to three 
battalions each. ""' He was referring to the consequence of the conscription referendum 
defeat in Australia, which destroyed any immediate possibility for large numbers of W 
replacements. Monash considered the realignment of troops a temporary dilemma and 
thought 'that the British Army \\ill be able to restore its four-battalions-per-brigade 
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strength by absorbing one U. S. battalion in each brigade. This will be an excellent 
arrangement for both sides if it can be worked Out. - 
50 He was obvious]y not pri,., -, to the 
recent arrangements made between Haig and Pershing that strictly forbade 
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amalgamation. 
The friction within the British command came to a climax when Robertson was forced to 
resign as CIGS on 16 February 1918. His downfall had been brewing for some time. 
With Russia now out of the war and the Germans massing troops in the west, Robertson 
had called for a general reserve of British and French divisions. He wanted the British 
divisions under his control, but Haig and Petain both balked this suggestion; neither the 
British nor the French had divisions to spare. Prior to this Lloyd George had limited 
Robertson's power by appointing Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Wilson as British representative on 
the Executive War Board of the SWC. Robertson countered by refusing to go to 
Versailles as British Permanent Military Representative, or to remain as CIGS in a 
reduced role. 52 He also lost the support of his usual ally, Haig, who sided with Lloyd 
George, instead of threatening to resign, and reminded Robertson of his duty to the 
government. Robertson then reluctantly accepted the Eastern Command in the United 
Kingdom. Two days later, Lloyd George appointed Wilson as CIGS. 53 
The Sprine Offensives 
The Western Front erupted on 21 March, a foggy Thursday morning.. when the Germans 
launched an attack that has been called Ludendorff s last hope of victory. 54 Code-named 
Wichael. ' it started with a five-hour artillery barrage - the greatest of the \ýar so far - at 
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4: 40 A. M. against the British defences near St. Quentin. Reportedlý. the guns could be 
heard as far away as London. The Germans fired 3.2 million shells on the first day. one- 
third of which were gas. ' It seemed as though the bowels of the earth had erupted, ' 
recalled a private in the 24 th British Machine-Gun Battalion. 55 
Although poor visibility affected the accuracy of the barrage, the Germans were still 
proficient. The creeping barrage was designed to move forward on a fixed schedule, but 
because of poor communications, it was difficult to modify or stop once it started. The 
St. Quentin attack depended on the infantry advance complying with the creeping 
barrage. Because there was little flexibility in adjusting the firing schedule, some 
infantry units would have to run to keep pace. 56 One reason the Germans were initially 
so successful was the utilisation of the newly developed storm trooper tactics that OHL 
(Oberste Heeresleitung) published in January 1918. The Attack in Position Warfare 
called for destruction of enemy position. as opposed to *nibbling away at the enemy front 
lines. 57 
Five hours after it started, the creeping barrage moved forward under cover of fog, and 
the infantry followed closely behind. The Germans pushed forward enormously fast, as 
62 divisions left the defences of the Hindenburg Line and attacked the Third and Fifth 
British Armies on a 50-mile front between Cambrai and La Fere. The Third Army. 
under Gen. Sir Julian Byng, held its front after being slightly pushed back, but Gen. Sir 
Hubert Gough's Fifth Army retired 10 miles back toward the Somme. The reaction to the 
German attack among, the ranks xNas one of disbelief. An Australian soldier. H. G. Ta,, Ior. 
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overheard some troops in his battalion complain that the 'territorý that has taken months 
of hard fighting to acquire had now been recaptured by the Germans in a matter of a fe%ý 
days. ' 58 
The OHL had begun to seriously consider an offensive in October 1917. Ludendorff xN as 
optimistic that if the general situation of the war stabilised, and enough troops could 
transfer from other theatres, an assault, or Kaiserschlact (Amperial Battle'), x\ as possible 
against weak British positions. The object was the separation of the British and French 
Armies, and capture of the Channel ports. He considered three possible locations for 
attack: Flanders, where the ports were vulnerable; the Somme, where British and French 
lines met; and the south, against the French positions. With Russia and Romania having 
suspended hostilities in December 1917, the Germans had been able to transfer 33 
divisions to France and Belgium by the end of the year. 59 
The Germans were also helped by the fact that the British were caught by surprise when 
the main thrust of their attack came in the Fifth Army zone. With light machine guns, 
satchel charges, flamethrowers and stick bombs, 62 German divisions attacked 26 British 
divisions. The offensive eventually penetrated 40 miles, after confusing the Allies over 
the location of the main thrust. Using elaborate deception measures, the Germans made it 
seem that the main attack would be in the French sector, near Rheims. Haig also 
expected an assault further north and concentrated on strengthening the Flanders front to 
protect the Channel ports, the lifeline of the BEF, and counted on the French to cover the 
south . 
60 Instead, the major thrust was directed against the British positions east of 
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Amiens. The Fifth British Army bore the brunt of the attack and took terrific losses 
before falling back. It also seemed that the French capital was in peril. In Paris. more 
than half of the population left the city after tiring of the frequent German air raids. One 
historian estimates that 20,000 tickets were issued at the main rail station. Ný hich ý\ as 
more than double the usual number of departures. 61 
After achieving a tactical success in breaking through the British lines, the Germans 
suffered immense casualties, causing their offensive to stall at the end of March around 
Arras. Typical of the German General Staff, the original operations plan diverted from 
its strategic aims, and now the objective was the important railway centre at Amiens. 62 
According to historian Dave Zabecki, by 26 March OHL accepted the fact that Operation 
Michael had stalled. 
Amiens became an ad hoc tactical objective for all the wrong reasons. The 
Germans wanted to take the city so at least they would have something tangible 
to show for their efforts. They were unaware of how bad they could hurt the BEF 
by takin, § Amiens as one of the two key choke-points in the entire British rail 
system. 6 
After Michael officially ended, the Second German Army sent OHL a telegram 
requesting some additional OHL-level, very heavy artillery batteries to try to neutralize 
the rail center. Within a day Ludendorff sent a telegram back denying the request, stating 
that OHL had higher priority missions for the guns. 64 
Because 11 American Corps headquarters \\as situated in the British sector, Simonds 
became an e,, e\\ itness to the German offensive. He \\as ordered by Harbord on 2 -3 ) 
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March to serve as a special observer of the battles, and then send a \ýeekl) bulletin to 
Chaumont. For two weeks, Simonds visited a portion of the front to the east of Amiens. 
and was able to get as far as brigade headquarters, frequently even to battalion 
headquarters. In one bulletin, he wrote about the impressive use of machine guns by the 
Germans, which were sent forward in large numbers with their infantry units. An 
American doctor assigned to a British hospital informed Simonds that most of the 
wounds he was treating were the result of machine-gun fire, the highest number he had 
encountered since coming to France. He also reported on hoýN the British used automatic 
weapons to great effect, and that one or two Lewis guns supported small units of infantry. 
which 'time and again held up German infantry until the guns could be pulled out and 
gotten away. ' 65 Later bulletins sent by Simonds were less optimistic about Allied 
success. One reported that stories from men at the front told of 'determined rear guard 
actions where men and guns simply stayed until they were engulfed by the oncoming 
masses of Germans. ' Simonds saw firsthand the withdrawal of tired divisions that 'show 
the effects of what they have been through. 'The companies are small and the survivors 
look worn out he reporte .' 
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Each day. when Simonds returned from the front, he read the numerous intelligence 
communiques sent by the British. They were summaries of information that provided the 
economic, military and political conditions of each of the Allied and Central powers. He 
found the ones written by the Italians particularly amusing because they frequently 
contained such phrases as 'retreating for strategical purposes. ' or being covered ýN ith 
gflory. ' To break the monotony of his everyday routine and relieve the tension of the 
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military situation, he wrote his own bulletin that parodied the Italian stý le of reporting 
There was much to report since the German drive into British territory caused some of 
the training areas allocated for the American divisions to be moved further ýý est to the 
vicinity of Calais to south of the Somme. 67 
Simonds was also forced to relocate his headquarters from Chdteau Bryas to Furges, 
closer toward the coast. He wrote a sarcastic account of the movement of headquarters 
by informing Chaumont that 'll Corps has this day retired 75 kilometres. The move was 
a great success. Our brave clerks, stenographers, batmen, and other camp followers 
would have defeated the enemy with great loss had he dared attack. The move ýNas ably 
supported by our noble allies. ' 68 The bulletin circulated throughout G. H. Q., and the 
amused staff responded by sending Simonds congratulatory notes on the success of the 
m ve. 
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At the insistence of Haig, an emergency session of the Supreme War Council was 
convened at Doullens on 26 March to discuss the crisis. Haig now recognised that a 
unified command was necessary to counter the growing threat from the German Army. 
One outcome of the conference at the Hotel de Ville was the selection of Gen. Ferdinand 
Foch to coordinate the tactical operations on the Western Front, thus taking pressure off 
Petain and Haig. 70 However, Foch's appointment did little to immediately improve unity 
of command among the coalition partners since he had no real authoritý over his 
subordinates .71 As Gar), Sheffield points out, Foch was a 'coordinator rather than a true 
commander. ' Even \\ ithin the French Army. he was not the field commander as Petain 
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remained in this position. Rather, Foch, as Sheffield suggests, 'behaved as a true 
coalition commander, placing himself above narrow national interests. - 72' 
The following day, the military advisory committee of the SWC met. and the main topic, 
as proposed by the new British representative, Gen. Sir Henry Ra\ý I inson, \\ as the 
temporary use of American units in Allied army corps and divisions. Pershing. not 
surprisingly, refused. He suggested that the Allies amalgamate their under-strength 
divisions and place them in line, and also promised that as soon as his new divisions 
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arrived in France, they would serve as replacements . 
The committee was not impressed with this idea. Bliss, in particular, opposed Pershing 
in this matter, urging the other representatives to adopt Rawlinson's plan and send it to 
the SWC as Joint Note #18. It directed that 'only American infantry and machine-gun 
units be brought to France. ' Pershing, 'very much surprised at the attitude of Bliss. ' 74 
held tight and refused. The note was passed to Secretary of War Baker, in Europe at the 
time, who approved its contents and made the recommendation to President Wilson. By 
then, the President had received cables from Lloyd George and Foch, who told him that if 
the Allies were to hold the enemy, they must have American troops. Wilson said yes, but 
there was a clear failure in communication. Joint Note #18 requested preferential 
shipment of infantry regiments and machine-gun battalions, it did not mention numbers, 
or when they would arrive. Wilson claimed to have informed Allied leaders that his 
government *would send troops over as fast as Nve could make them ready. ' 75 The details 
of the arrangement, ho\\ever, were to be handled by Pershin(gy at his discretion. 
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It took almost a month of negotiations between Pershing and the British representatives. 
mostly the Secretary of State for War, Alfred Lord Milner. before an accord %Aas signed 
on 24 April in London. Known as the London Agreement. it stipulated that during the 
month of May, infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions \ý ere to be shipped first bý 
the British and trained in their sector. If additional shipping could be found, the 
remain er of the divisions would be brought over as well. Essentially, it was the same 
agreement made by Pershing and Robertson three months before. The only difference 
was that Pershing would not receive complete divisions all at once. Still, the Allies were 
not entirely happy with this agreement and continued to press Pershing for more troops. 
On 2 May, the SWC met in Abbeville, and Pershing suggested a compromise that the 
London Agreement would be extended through June. Desperate for an increased 
American presence on the battlefields, the British had to accept Pershing's offer. This 
meant they would transport 130,000 infantry and machine-gun units in May, and another 
150,000 in June. American shipping be used to transport artillery, engineer, auxiliary, 
and other units for the American Army. 76 
Pershing was a frequent visitor to 11 Corps headquarters that spring, and often queried 
Simonds about infantry tactics being used at the front. During one discussion, Simonds 
remembered, Pershing paid close attention to his explanation of how the 'Germans 
appeared to be extremely skilful in manoeuvring their small units in the open. ' The 
British, Simonds described, 'fought with great bravery and tenacity as long as they were 
in the trenches, but NN lien forced or manoeuvred out of them. they appeared to be lost 
until they got into another prepared position. . 77 To summarise his point, Simonds used 
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the analogy that the bewildered British troops ýýere 'something like that of a naked man 
who suddenly discovers he is out in the open with a lot of people looking at him. ' He 
did not report whether the normally serious Pershing laughed. The AEF commander. 
however, was certainly happy to hear the potential of open warfare. and when he returned 
to Chaumont that evening, he sent a cable to the War Department. urging more training 
with the rifle and bayonet. 
79 
The morale of the British troops was surprisingly high, Simonds recorded. A Julý 1918 
censorship report on soldiers' letters corroborated his observation. The report revealed 
that although there was a general sense of war weariness and distrust towards politicians 
and the higher command, the combat soldiers' spirits remained high. By examining a 
sample of censored soldier letters, it was concluded that overall, the British soldier 
believed his army would prevail in the end. Recent historiographý, confirms that even 
though the Fifth Army took tremendous casualties, 'morale was sound enough to allow it 
to fight the German Army to a standstill. 80 
Not so surprising was that morale in the German Army was failing. After a week of 
continuous fighting, its troops were tired. Most could not even take the time to change 
clothes or remove their muddy boots. The OHL battle plan encouraged constant moving, 
N%hich meant little time to bring in reserves to rest troops at the front. The supply lines 
and transport broke down because of the difficulties in traversing a shell-pocked 
battlefield. Water was scarce and of course need for drinking. This meant the troops had 
to forgo bathing. It appeared to the German soldier that the chance for victory had 
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passed; the end of the war was not going to occur soon. Casualties ýýere over 200,000, 
and unlike the Allies, who were relying on the Americans for replacements. the Germans 
had none. 81 Most of the German casualties were storm troops, who ý\ ere replaced bý 
less-skilled men from other divisions. 82 
Despite now-declining morale, the Germans had taken 1,200 square miles of territory bý 
the time the spring offensives temporarily stalled on 5 April. as stubborn resistance bý 
Allied soldiers inflicted those enormous losses on the attackers. 'in sheer scale, ' 
according to one historian, 'these battles rate as the greatest British defensive victories in 
history. ' 84 But British losses were staggering, with about 164,000 casualties, including 
90,000 men taken prisoner. The BEF also lost 200 tanks. 1,000 guns, 4.000 machine 
guns, 200,000 rifles, and 70,000 tons of ammunition. 85 
On 9 April, the Germans commenced another offensive, this time to the south of Ypres in 
the area of the Lys River. In Operation Georgette, the Sixth German Army struck the 
First British Army in an advance to take the rail junction of Hazebrouck. Like Operation 
Michael, the attack started with great intensity. The next day, the Fourth German Army 
enjoyed an advantage over the under-strength British Second Army and seized 
Armentieres. Further gains forced General Plumer to abandon Messines and Wytschaete, 
which his men had fought so hard to occupy a year earlier. The desperate situation 
prompted Haig again to request assistance from the French. Foch, now generalissimo of 
the Allied Armies, had introduced a system of rotation that allowed British divisions to 
move to quiet French sectors and be replaced by French reserves. But. he %ýas unable to 
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coerce Petain into releasing his reserves. On 10 April, Haig told Foch that the German 
offensive had now extended from La Bassde Canal to Messines, and that the British 
Army needed the French to take immediate steps to relieve some part of the British front, 
and actively participate in the battle. 86 Foch relented, and although he refused to relieve 
British forces in Flanders, he did order the V and X French Armies to the north of the 
Somme to relieve British positions in this section of the front. Also. he promised to send 
troops to Arras, but they did not reach this zone until three days later. 87 
When news of the latest attack reached Chaumont, Simonds again was ordered to observe 
the fighting. On his way to the front, he and his driver got caught in part of the action. 
The Portuguese Corps (I " and 2 nd Divisions) was holding a large portion of the line 
between Armentieres and the La Bassee Canal when nine divisions of the Sixth German 
Army attacked. It received the brunt of the assault, and during the hasty withdrawal of 
the Portuguese, the automobile in which Simonds was a passenger became mired up in 
the confusion. Fearful of capture by the onrushing Germans, his *chauffeur had to make 
some time and do some skilful driving to keep up' with the fleeing Portuguese troops in 
order to reach the safety of the rear. 
By II April, the Germans were within five miles of Hazebrouck, and on this day. Haig 
issued a special order that told his men they had their 'backs to the wall. Every position 
must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. ' 88 His troops heeded the 
warning, and two days later. the tide turned slightly in favour of the Allies when the 
Germans suffered heavN losses after being battered by the British artil ler\. On the L\ s. 
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stiff resistance from the 5 th and 33 rd British Divisions. supported bý the I't Australian 
Division, stopped the German drive, and even recaptured some of the lost ground. The 
Germans were now the desperate army and launched another attack on 24 April towards 
Amiens at Villers-Bretonneux, but it too ran out of momentum and ý\ as halted b. \ 
Australian and British troops. Five days later, Ludendorff called off Operation 
89 Georgette. 
The Final Weeks of Training 
Across the Atlantic, the coming of spring in South Carolina brought a ýýelcome relief to 
the troops training at Camps Wadsworth and Sevier. With the difficult winter behind 
them, the men were no longer cooped up indoors. They had their fill of watching such 
films as 'The Training of a Soldier, ' and were now anxious to be outside. The warmer 
climate helped reduce the sick rolls, and morale noticeably improved. 90 Free time was 
spent playing baseball and other sports that had been neglected during the past few 
months. The men were also in high spirits for another reason - rumours spread 
throughout the camps that they would soon be heading overseas. In the case of the 30'h 
Division, it was more than a rumour. Its commanding general learned from the War 
Department on 14 March 1918, 'that your division will be prepared to embark for 
overseas service late in May and will undergo a 10-week course of training with the 
th nd h British Army in France. '91 It was among the six divisions, along ý\ ith the 77 , 82 .3 )5 , 
28 th and 4 th , chosen 
for transport on British vessels as part of the training agreement ýý ith 
Pershing. Similar nex\s \\as not received at Wadsworth, and it would be some time 
before O'Ryan \\ould learn the dates of embarkation for his division. 
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At Sevier, the 30'h Division needed to be brought up to strength before departure. 
Therefore, new recruits were obtained from Camp Dodge, Iowa and Camp Jackson. 
South Carolina. The men had previously been assigned to depot brigades. ýOich ý\ere 
formed to train men who needed special help and were deemed unready for assignment to 
a combat unit. These organisations supplied manpower to under-strength combat 
divisions throughout 1918. The men arriving at Sevier were immediatelý placed at the 
mercy of non-coms and taught the rudiments of soldiering and other skills. which at the 
time seemed foreign. 
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With overseas service on the horizon, the remainder of March and the entire month of 
April saw intense training for both divisions. Despite Pershing's call for training in open 
warfare, men were spending up to three days at a time in the trenches at Sevier and 
Wadsworth. Infantry units also spent a great deal of time training with the artillery in the 
mountains where O'Ryan had his accident. An enlisted man in the 107 th Infantry 
marvelled at the fact that after reaching the artillery range, 'you could see all over the 
country for miles. ' Even more fascinating to Private Pierce were the stereotypical local 
i-nountaineers, who he guessed 'shave only once a year. ' Furthermore, 'they think it is a 
wonderful sight to see a company of soldiers, ' he observed. 'They all flock to the front 
door as if the world had come to an end. . 
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Officers away attending schools, such as the one for brigade commanders and field 
officers at Fort Sam Houston. Texas, were no\\ brought back to the camps. There. they 
NN, ere educated in map reading,. training methods, guard duty and militarý laxN. " Back at 
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Sevier and Wadsworth, the divisions concentrated on the fundamentals of machine-gun 
instruction and gas training. In the latter, infantry battalions were taken company by 
company and instructed in the use of respirators as gas clouds passed by. 95 A private in 
the 30th Division described the ordeal of gas training. The troops \\ ei-e taken into the 
woods where shots were fired. Officers told the men it was gas and instructed them to 
put on their gas masks. 'You clamped your nose, so you had to breathe through your 
mouth, through chemicals in your mask, ' Private Clodfelter recalled. *It kept the gas 
from getting in your lungs. ' 96 
At Wadsworth, gas training was even more sophisticated. The men marched to the 
trenches, where an elaborate system of bells and iron bars were used as alarms. As soon 
as the smell of gas was detected, a sentinel at the head of the stairs leading down into the 
trenches would kick a pail. The noise was intended to be the first warning to the men to 
put on their masks. Another soldier would then ring the bell or beat on the bars to alert 
the others of an attack. If a more general attack was suspected, then warning was sent 
from the headquarters by telephone. 97 
Additional training was conducted by the newly arrived Allied instructors, including 15 
Canadians, some of whom were veterans of Vimy Ridge, to teach the raw Americans the 
correct way to operate a machine gun. All of this training, according to a major in the 
27 th Division, Ný as 'to make the American soldier the best-trained, most self-reliant and 
thorough soldier the world ever knew. ' After becoming skilled N\ ith the bayonet and 
rifle, he would become a 'dangerous foe to combat. '98 
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Despite being kept busy with training, the New Yorkers at Wadsworth were grox\ ing 
impatient. Soldiers wrote home complaining that the division ýý as being ignored and told 
families that perhaps it was destined to sit out the conflict. This prompted Senator JAV- 
Wadsworth of New York, a descendent of the family after which the training camp \ý as 
named, to write the War Department that the 'delay in sending the 27"' Division abroad 
has received considerable notice, especially when the quality of it is compared x\ ith the 
other divisions already gone over. ' Assistant Secretary Benedict Crowell replied that: 
'We fully appreciate the excellence of the 27 th Division, and it is far from forgotten. The 
officers and men, and their friends at home, can rest assured that the War Department 
intends to use the division to full advantage. '99 
Finally, on 15 April, O'Ryan received orders for overseas deployment. The instructions 
were extremely vague; they made no mention of when the New Yorkers were to leave 
Wadsworth, or what would happen once they arrived in France. One part told O'Ryan to 
'prepare various parts of your division for shipment overseas by June I and the remainder 
a month later, since there was not enough shipping available to take the entire division 
over at one time. ' On the other hand, O'Ryan was told to 'be prepared for movement to 
concentration camp at any time for possible earlier shipment. ' Four days later, another 
telegram ordered O'Ryan to 'send advance detachment of 314 officers and men. 
designated therein for your division, reported ready and equipped for overseas dutý .' 
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All of this meant he had about two weeks to prepare his men. 
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The decision of when the 27 th and 3 Oth were to be deployed ýý as based largelý upon the 
reports filed from the first round of inspections in late 1917. They were revieý\ed at the 
War Department, and a ranking system rated the divisions from the most to least 
deployable, based on remarks by the inspectors. Although a second round of inspections 
was scheduled for the spring, these would have I ittle bearing on when the divisions ýý ere 
to be sent overseas. The General Staff assumed that any deficiencies could be corrected 
in the training areas in France. Still, the Inspector General's Office took the next 
inspections seriously, as evidenced by the reports filed on both the 27hand 3 Oth 
Divisions. 
Brig. Gen. Eli Helmick, who had conducted the first round of National Guard inspections 
at the end of 1917, again was charged with visiting the training camps. He made no 
effort to hide his disdain for the state units and wrote detailed reports on their alleged 
problems. He arrived at Wadsworth on 2 May and found most of the camp nearly 
deserted. One unit that had not yet headed north for embarkation. the 106t" Infantry, 
receive a thorough review. Helmick's report was particularly hard on the regiment's 
officers. He wrote that the camp was 'lacking definite control on the part of the officers, 
which is an index to good discipline. ' Helmick noted that the 106 this problems ran deep, 
and his only suggestion to alleviate its troubles was for the regiment to get extensive 
training before being allowed to enter the front lines. He was proved correct four months 
later when the 106thengaged the enemy during its first major offensive and suffered 
significant casualties. largely the result of poor leadership on the battlefield. 101 
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Helmick inspected the 30thDivision on 10 May, but by then Maj. Gen. George W. Read, 
who had taken command of the division and most of its mo infantrN bri glades. from 
Faison, had left for the port of embarkation. Thus, Helmick"s inspection \\as laraely 
based upon interviews with the few officers remaining in camp and internal reports left 
behind. He and two assistants spent five days at Sevier and admitted afterward that a full 
inspection could not be made. As a result, he was unable to 'arrive at any definite, just 
conclusions as to the training. ' 
However, in an angry tone, Helmick wrote that he was *satisfied training was defective, 
and discipline was far from satisfactory. It would not be possible for me to attempt to fix 
the responsibility for this condition. ' He concluded that *numerous changes of division 
commander made it practically impossible to hold any one officer responsible for the 
training and discipline. ' Furthermore, it was his opinion that it 'will take from 30 to 60 
days intensive training for the infantry regiments, after they get abroad, to become ready 
for active service in the field. ' 
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Overseas Deployment 
The thrill of finally going overseas was evident throughout Sevier and Wadsworth. At 
the latter, Sgt. Judson W. Dennis, of the II 9th Infantry, noted such excitement in his 
correspondence. He wrote home from South Carolina for the last time on 28 April. 
Dennis and the rest of his company were placed in quarantine, a standard procedure for 
troops preparing for overseas duty. he told his mother Minnie, living in Tip Top, 
Tennessee. Ho\\ex, er, the night before was a different story. 'The girls of Greenville 
1021 
gave the soldier boys a farewell reception at all the dance halls in Green'. ille last nighC 
Dennis proudly told her, and *they sure did treat us so nice. ' He then turned serious and 
reassured his mother: 
Don't be uneasy or worry about me, for we are going to make it alright. We are 
willing and ready to sail, for we feel it is our duty and a debt we owe to our 
country to be loyal sons. We feel that we are going to be cared for and someday 
return to our own native land of the free. 103 
Dennis also wrote to his brother, Tom, on the same day, to say that his company was 
'longing for the time to come for us to see sunny France. We want to see the front and go 
over the top. ' 104 Sadly, Dennis would have the chance to write his mother and brother 
only a few more times throughout the next six months. He was killed near the Selle 
River in late October. ' 05 
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Chapter 3: Carried Over 
Sailinp. to France 
The advance party of the 3 Oth Division left Camp Sevier on 30 April 1918 and moved 
north for embarkation overseas. It was customary for an officer and small detachment to 
sail ahead so that arrangements could be made in France for reception of the division. 
Other elements of the 3 oth departed shortly thereafter. and by the end of May. the etitire 
division had left South Carolina. Typically, it took two days by train to reach the 
embarkation ports of the Northeast. Cheering crowds greeted the troops when they 
passed through the towns of North Carolina and Virginia, and during stops in 
Washington, D. C. and Philadelphia, Red Cross workers served them coffee and 
sandwiches. 1 
For the men of the 30thDivision, many of whom had spent their lives in the rural south, 
the departure combined fear and excitement. A soldier from the II gth Infantry noted that 
when the train approached New York City, the sight of the Statue of Liberty in the 
distance 'did much to ease his nerves. ' 2 Sergeant Dennis. also from the II 9th, was 
overjoyed by the hospitality his unit received. 'Don't spend another year in the south, ' he 
wrote his brother. 'Come to the northern states. They are the garden spot of the world. ' 
Dennis was impressed by a *big reception' given by the New York City YWCA where 
the girls 'sport diamonds as common as an old shoe' and *are the friendliest people I ever 
I 
met. '-' 
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The War Department conducted the movement with detailed efficiencý. Because so 
many men were heading to terminals in New York and New Jersey at the same time. 
trains going north moved at a slow pace so they would not all arrive at the same time. 
This gave ample opportunity to write letters or sleep. Men rode in comfort: theý rested in 
passenger or overnight sleeping cars, while company cooks took up residence in baggage :M 
cars that had been converted to kitchens. 
Upon entering the New York City area, men were assigned to an embarkation camp - 
either Camp Mills on Long Island or Camp Merritt in New Jersey (17 miles north of 
Hoboken). Merritt was the larger and busier of the two camps, and by the Armistice, 
more than 578,000 men had passed through there. 4 Facilities included a base hospital, 39 
warehouses, and a bakery that produced 22,000 loaves a day. Troops were expected to 
5 
stay in the camps a few days before movement to the port at Hoboken . 
Days were marked by inspection, instruction in behaviour aboard ship, and 
indoctrination. For officers, it was a busy time, as they had to ensure that service records 
were in order, and that men were issued clothing and equipment. For soldiers, there were 
woollen puttees and caps, instead of canvas leggings and campaign hats. As a grim 
reminder of war's potential consequence, each soldier was issued two aluminiurn 
identification discs that contained his name, rank, unit designation and serial number. In 
the event of death, one disc remained around the neck of the deceased man when buried, 
N\hile the other was sent to the Graves Registration Service headquarters for inclusion in 
6 
the casualty file. 
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Soldiers also received their final pay before leaving the U. S. The War Department 
recognised that converting foreign currenc,,,, might be a problem. so to eliminate 
unnecessary money changing; soldiers were paid in either French francs or British 
pounds. The Army encouraged families to visit loved ones, and through efforts of the 
YWCA, hostess houses provided relations with meals and lodging. Commanding 
officers were discouraged from issuing leave passes in an effort to keep men from the 
vices of New York City. 7 
Before a soldier was allowed to board the transport, there was a final physical 
examination, and anyone diagnosed with a contagious disease was not allowed to sail. 
To prepare for what lay ahead, there were motion pictures about lifeboat drills, along 
with lectures about the threat of German U-boat attacks. Soldiers were required to sign 
and address cards to next of kin indicating that 'the vessel on which they sailed had 
arrived safely. ' The cards were kept at the port of embarkation and mailed when a ship 
was reported arrived. 8 
By the time the entire 3 Oth Division reached France on 2 July 1918, it had used 25 
transports to take it across the ocean. Most transports were British, although the 105 th 
Engineers was 'carried over' on the Talthybius, a 1eaking and dirty' Canadian transport 
that was once used as a cattle boat. 9 Before any of the ships left the docks. precautions 
were taken to prevent sabotage. Portholes were closed, and all men, with the exception 
of guards, were sent below deck. Once the transports entered open water, the troops were 
assitimed submarine observation duty. Each ship had a specific place for observation, 
with posts connected to a central station by telephone. 10 Ships ýN ere equipped NN ith 6-inch 
guns and travelled in a convoy, normally with 10 others and a group of Navý destroyers. 
A zigzag course was developed in an effort to confuse and dodge the prowling enemy 
submarines. " 
Although none of the transports carrying either 27 th or 300' Division troops encountered 
danger, U-boat attacks were a serious threat, as shown by the sinking of the Tuscania on 
12 February 1918. On its way to Le Havre with 2,013 men aboard, the transport was 
struck by the two torpedoes fired by UB-77, and it sank seven miles north of Rathfilin 
Island. The attack cost 230 lives. Despite stringent efforts to protect the ships. the 
Tuscania was the first of several transports attacked in 1918.12 
A typical voyage was that taken by the 1190' Infantry, which sailed on the Haveýford- 
The transport was accompanied by a school of porpoises that joined the convoy and 
unknowingly provided entertainment during the slow trip across the Atlantic. ' 3 It took 12 
days to reach England - average time for a transport. Ships to France took two days 
more. Seasickness was prevalent, and when a man was well enough to eat, he was fed 
British fare. Instead of fried chicken, pork chops, hot biscuits, and other American 
delicacies, a meal might consist of mutton and orange marmalade. 'Six meals a day - 
three up, three down' is how one soldier described the difficulty of eating. 14 
-, Oth Transportation of the 27thDivision \\as similar to that of the -3 
Division. except that a 
teNN of its regiments sailed from NeNN port News, Virginia. It NN as a minor port compared 
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to Hoboken, and prior to sailing, the men were housed at Camp Stuart - smaller than 
Merritt and Mills. The 1070' Infantry spent a ý\eek here. ý\here men slept in *ý\arm, 
comfortable barracks, furnished with spring beds instead of canvas Cots. - 
15 They 
travelled aboard the USS Susquehanna, a captured German vessel previously named the 
Rhein. Slightly larger than other troop transports, men called their quarters 'The Black 
Hole of Calcutta' because they were located so far below deck. The 107 th had shown 
stamina during its months of training at Wadsworth. but General O'Ryan xvas concerned 
they would go soft during the voyage. ' 6 He therefore issued orders for the regiment to 
continue physical exercise aboard the ships. It was to be done as long as it did not 
interfere with the policing of quarters, guard duty, administration, and kitchen policing. 17 
To help pass the time on board, newspapers printed wireless news and ship gossip. The 
Calamares, which transported the 53 rd Brigade and the 104thand 105 th Machine-Gun 
Battalions, produced The Sea Serpent. It attempted to bring humour into the boring 
passage. The paper announced the weather forecast as 'dry - until we reach France. ' and 
indicated the regulation uniform would be 'life belts - day and night. ' Another transport 
called its paper the Mid Ocean Comin' Thru, still another named its publication the Rail 
Splitter, in honour of the ship's name, the President Lincoln. 18 
Arrival 
Units of the '10'hDivision, such as the II 7th Infantry, docked in Liverpool. England and 
remained there for a day before being transported by train to Dover, England for the 
passage to Calais, France. As the train passed through London. people \ýaved flags and 
I 1- 
I1 
handkerchiefs to welcome the Americans. After a mo-hour trip aboard a channel 
steamer, the regiment reached Calais. Instead of cheering crowds, the doughboý s heard 
distant artillery fire that told them they were now in a war zone. The nighttimes brought 
further reminders of what war was about, in the form of air raids b,, the Germans. ' 9 
At Calais, the men had their first look at the devastation of four years of war. When a 
soldier from the 105 th Engineers wandered through the city, he was shocked by the sight 
of 'hundreds of little children on the streets all day begging, ' and how the roads Nvere 
4narrow and dirty, with a few street cars in operation, manned by women conductors and 
motor women. 20 Over many years, Calais had seen its share of destruction. Twenty-two 
miles from the English coast, it was once the eighth largest port in France, known for 
factories that processed silk and cotton tulle. In 1347, the city put up a heroic stand 
before capitulating to the English, and it took more than two centuries before the French 
recaptured it. By 1918, they still maintained control of the city, but numerous German air 
raids had laid much of it in ruinS. 21 
The 27 th Division had not yet received its training orders, and, therefore, sailed directly to 
France and disembarked at Brest. The port city dates back to the Romans, and it had a 
population of 90,000 just before World War 1. In 1918. the U. S. Army and Navy took 
over Brest, including its famous chateau. 22 Sergeant Jacobson. along with two other men 
from the 107'h Infantry, went sightseeing one day during their brief stay in the city. After 
'turning the corner of a particularly beautiful avenue, ' Jacobson recorded, ýNe forgot the 
NNarbling birds and the idyllic quiet of the sleeping city (Brest). We saN\ our first 
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Germans! We beheld perhaps 50 prisoners marching between blue-clad poilus. 'NeN er 
could one imagine a motlier crew. They were unkempt of hair and person. shockinglý in 
need of razoring [sic], and their unifon-ns were of every cut and colour ever issued in 
Germany. ' 23 
A more frequent sight in Brest and other French ports was troops on leave. For the right 
price, a meal, hot bath, or female companionship could be found. The brothels in France 
were in great demand, as witnessed by British Capt. Robert Graves. On one occasion in 
Calais, he passed by a brothel and saw a 'queue of 150 men waiting outside the door, 
each to have his short turn with one of the three women in the house. . 24 They were 
probably visiting one of the houses licensed by the French. Even though legal prostitutes 
were supposedly inspected on a weekly basis, British and French authorities still recorded 
high numbers of venereal cases. This was of no surprise to Col. Hugh H. Young. The 
Johns Hopkins urologist witnessed some of the medical examinations of prostitutes. He 
was appalled by the unsanitary methods employed and advised General Pershing to keep 
25 Americans away from the houses . 
Pershing had previous experience with organised brothels during the Mexican Punitive 
Expedition. In 1916, he had established a fenced-in compound where prostitutes were 
kept and routinely examined. Upon entering the area, soldiers were examined. and when 
they left, they were given a tube of prophylactic ointment. There were no documented 
cases of disease during the expedition. Despite the success in Mexico, Pershin(-, never 
seriouslý considered a similar operation in France. for the simple reason that he did not 
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want families back in America to think he condoned immorality in the AEF. Whereas the 
Punitive Expedition was conducted with Regulars, the Army was now o" em helminglý 
citizen soldiers. 26 Pershing issued three general orders in 1917. warning the troop's 
already in France, and as a preventative measure for those soon to arrive. 
The first order urged officers to lecture men on the virtues of staying clean, and instructed 
medics to conduct examinations every two weeks. Pershing established prophylactic 
stations in every command, and any soldier who failed to get treatment xN ithin three hours 
of infection was subject to court-martial. He issued another order that established 
regimental infirmaries so soldiers could be at the front for treatment with their units and 
not crowd hospitals in the rear. The third order was more severe in that it demanded that 
officers 'give personal attention to matters pertaining to the prevention of venereal 
disease. No laxity or half-hearted efforts in this regard will be tolerated. ' Pershing 
declared houses of prostitution and saloons off limits; limited passes and a report of 
infection rate were required in ports such as Brest and CalaiS. 21 
While some commanders turned blind eyes while their men consorted with prostitutes, 
O'Ryan paid close attention to the commander-in-chief s third general order. Wherever 
the 27 th billeted in France and Belgium, he ordered military police to stand picket in front 
of houses of ill repute to discourage his men from visiting. 28 This measure apparently 
worked since only five men from the 27ffi were reported infected at the end of June. The 
3 Oth Division was even healthier, with only three reported cases that month . 
29 In both 
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instances, it is likely that some of the cases ýý ere contracted before the men left the 
United States. 
Preparation for Training Continues 
Units of the 3 Oth Division left Calais during the final week of May and moved south to 
the Eperlecques training area. Afterward, the first overseas training camp was 
established at Inglinghem in Belgium, where units were affiliated to the 39t" British 
Division. This division was originally composed of locally raised battalions. mainly from 
the south of England, and like many British divisions on the Western Front, it had 
suffered enormous casualties during the Somme Offensive, and at Third Ypres. The 3 9th 
was reduced to a cadre in May 1918 and never reconstituted. Before departing for the 
training area, the current division commander. Major General Read, issued a general 
order to help protect the men of the 3 Oth against the dangers they might encounter. 
'Where troops are in tents, it is not necessary to pitch tents in regular order. ' he warned. 
'They should be pitched under trees and alongside hedges, where as much concealment 
can be secured as possible. Furthermore, embankments, 3 feet high and 2 feet wide at the 
top, wi II be thrown up around each tent, in order to give protection from bursting bombs. 
This work will be done at once. ' 30 
The 27 th Division departed Brest during the first week of June, and any concern O'Ryan 
had about the physical condition of the men w, as put to rest. Regiments hiked through 
one village after another, carrying packs, ammunition, and rifles weighing about 80 
pounds, \\ithouta soldier lagging behind. " At this time. the division received \wrd that 
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it was going to be trained by the British in the Rue-Bui(-jn\ area. O*Rvan looked to this 
decision with pride and told his men: 'Without a doubt, our division ýý as selected for 
cooperation with the British not only because of its military excellence, but also the ýNell- 
known intelligence of its personnel and their ability as New Yorkers to get along Nvith 
strangers under any circumstances. ' 32 
O'Ryan's division commenced training on 10 June 1918, attached to the cadre of the 66h 
British Division, which had been designated the 66 th (2/East Lancashire) Division and 
formed from Second-line troops of the Territorial Force units in the 42 nd Division. It 
supplied drafts to overseas units before heading to France in March 1917, where it fought 
with distinction. The 27 th Division commander knew from the inspections at Wadsworth 
that his division had some minor disciplinary problems, and these would have to be 
addressed immediately, before training with the British got underway. On 9 June 1918, 
Bulletin #39 'was issued to each squad in the division armed with the rifle... to be 
frequently read and discussed by the men of the squad. ' Among the points covered in 
almost three pages, he stressed: 'Be disciplined; shoot to hit; preserve your morale; never 
be surprised; know your gas defence; and finally, read and follow orders governing 
personal hygiene, sanitation, rules of the road, and march discipline. ' He promised: "Do 
these things and the enemy will always fear the 27hDivision. . 33 
Enterine the British Sector 
Assigned temporarily to the American divisions were the British officers and other ranks 
w1lo had accompanied them from the United States after serving as instructors in the 
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camps. The British General Staff granted special permission *for them to remain \\ ith the 
American divisions during their period in the back area since they may be of use to assist 
in the general training. ' 34 Once the Americans were ready to enter the line, the British 
were to go back to England for reassignment. 
The first words of advice given to the newly arrived Americans dealt with the frequent 
danger of air attacks. Lights were not permitted at night, they were told, even the lighting 
of matches outside of tents was prohibited. However, such precautions did little to deter 
persistent German pilots. Bombs fell 'almost every evening when the weather was clear, ' 
a doughboy recorded in his diary. 35 The British, used to the constant bombardments, 
headed for the dugouts, while the green Americans watched the air raids and 'appeared to 
enjoy the performance as much as a child enjoys the circus. ' 36 They were, of course, 
destined to learn this lesson, and would not have to be reminded twice to go for cover. 
Since February, Colonel Simonds had worked countless and often frustrating hours with 
his British counterparts to prepare for the 280,000 doughboys arriving in the spring. He 
had ironed out most of the kinks so that when the 100 divisions set foot on French soil in 
May and June, they could train in the British sector without delay. Simonds sorted 
through British training publications, such as The Training and Employment of Platoons, 
The Training and Employment of Divisions, Bayonet Training, and Scouting and 
-, 
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Patrolling. that Pershing had ordered Colonel Bacon to send to 11 Corps for its officers. ' 
He also dealt w-ith more complicated matters, such as soldier's mail, the issue of rations. 
and the discipline of troops while attached to the British. 
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The censorship of mail had concerned the British Army since the Boer 'vVar, and in 1914. 
all mail sent from France was passed through a censor. who blacked out any mention of 
location or numbers of troops. On the outside of the envelope, only the soldier's name 
and unit could appear.. Any words the censor thought potentially helpful to the enemý 
were deleted. Simonds and the British intelligence agreed before the first Americans 
arrived that they would follow the British procedure and use the green envelopes and 
Field Service cards the British soldiers had been using since war commenced. 
The mail problem involved complexities, and lectures were arranged to explain the 
regulations and encourage doughboys to use the Tield Postcard, ' which had fixed 
phrases, such as 'I am quite well, ' 'I am wounded, ' 'I have received your letter. ' and 'I 
have received no letter from you. ' The soldier would cross out the inapplicable phrases 
and send the card home. Most preferred to write letters, which kept censors busy, as they 
crossed out certain phrases, or, in some instances, confiscated the correspondence 
altogether. 
38 
Despite the great effort placed on the mail issue by Simonds and the British to ensure a 
smooth operation, the Americans still managed to complicate matters. First, the AEF 
Postal Service at Chaumont failed to establish an Army Post Office (A. P. O. ) in the 
British area. Therefore, mail sent to officers and men in 11 American Corps either went 
astray, or was routed to a BEF post office at Hesdin. From there, it ýN, as sent 
motorcycle sidecar to the 11 Corps statistical office for distribution. The long process 
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caused much delay in delivery to the recipient. Not until early September 1918 did the 
39 Americans in the British sector have their own post office, A. P. O. 790. 
There was also the problem of men blatantly violating the censorship regulations. Each 
month, the British would issue a report on censorship of mail sent by American troops, 
since outgoing mail passed through the BEF. One of the more serious cases involved 
Pvt. Curtis Conion of the 412 th Telegraph Battalion. In an innocent letter to his mother in 
Texas, which mostly dealt with her health issues, a small map that showed the location of 
his unit was inserted between the envelope and the folded pages. The letter was stamped 
approved by his unit censor, but opened by the British War Office censors and 
confiscated. The violation was reported to 11 Corps headquarters and Private Conion was 
tried by a court-martial. As a result, he was to forfeit two-thirds of his pay per month, 
and to perform hard labour for one month. 40 
An even more important issue to contend with was feeding the troops. To simplify 
matters, Simonds agreed that the British would handle rations. A British officer was 
detailed as a senior supply officer, and, along with two assistants and a detachment of 75 
men. he distributed rations at a railhead. From there, the rations were delivered daily by 
horse or motor transport. known as pack or ration trains. They were then handed over to 
American division senior supply officers and distributed to the regiments. " 
Despite the best efforts of the American regimental quartermasters, there NN ere early 
difficulties in distribution, as noted sarcastically bý lieutenant, later Maj. Gen.. J. M. L. 
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Grover, who was assigned to train the 107thAmerican Infantry. *They had a little 
organisation for meals and lined up in single file to receive their portions. ' Goýý er 
noticed. 'The result was that as the last man got his dinner. the first man ýýas back for the 
next meal. There wasn't a single night that I was with the Americans ý\hen at least one 
company failed to get anything, although they'd been working with us then for some 
wee s. 942 
Once the rations found their way to the hungry troops, it is clear from comments made by 
them that the food was disagreeable. Although Americans had been introduced to British 
rations aboard transports, they had difficulty with the foreign food and complained 
bitterly. Accustomed to large portions, the doughboys were issued a small meat ration, 
tea instead of coffee, and cheese. Receiving the brunt of complaints, Simonds appointed 
a board to investigate the alleged problems. 
The board concluded that British rations were slightly less than those issued by the U. S. 
Army. The meat ration was deemed sufficient, and it suggested that American soldiers 
would get accustomed to eating cheese. To appeal to the American palate, the board 
recommended more vegetables, and coffee rather than tea. According to O'Ryan. the 
British soldiers found the last recommendation very peculiar since every afternoon at 
5: 00, he claimed, 'they had a tea break, no matter Nvhat the battlefield situation or ý, N here 
they were located. . 
43 
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Simonds also had to decide how disciplinary actions that reached the level of a court 
martial should be handled. After consulting with the AEF judge advocate general. he 
decided that 11 Corps would deal with any infractions committed while training with the 
British. Only court-martials convened by American officers could convict. and sentences 
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were to be carried out only by American authorities . This made sense to the British, 
since the Dominion forces under BEF command handled their own disciplinary action S. 45 
Trainine Beizins 
To help Simonds prepare for instruction in the British sector, the G-5 (training) Division 
of AEF headquarters wrote a 25-page guide, Program of Trainingfor American Divisions 
with the British, and distributed it to the divisions in 11 Corps. Each period of training 
was outlined, along with the hours necessary to train each unit. Calculations were based 
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on a minimum six-hour day, with Sundays and holidays excluded . 
The training programme provided 10 weeks for infantry and machine-gun troops in three 
periods. The first period was to be undertaken out of line for a minimum of four weeks, 
encompassing drill. musketry and physical exercise. This included tutoring in infantry 
weapons, such as Lewis guns, light trench mortars, bombs and grenades. During this 
period, signallers, engineers and medical personnel received their specialised training. 
During, the second period, the Americans were to be attached to British troops in the line 
for three Nveeks. Officers and non-coms entered for a 48-hour period; men combined 
with British companies and platoons for shorter periods. During the third period, each 
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regiment traine in a rear area for three to four weeks for advanced instruction. This 
included complicated procedures like the manoeuvring of battalions and companies. 47 
The principal advantage of training with the British was the extensive experience both 
their officers and NCOs provided. But, as one might have expected, there \\ ere 
problems. One was that the Americans expressly refused to alloNý, training to be 
dominated by British doctrine. Continuing to oversee the instruction on the British side 
was Lieutenant General Bonham-Carter, and his diary and correspondence show that he 
met with Simonds or visited training areas on a daily basis. Among his private remarks 
are: 'Spent all day visiting Americans; officers good - NCOs bad; men first rate; and the 
men in the ranks did not appear to render their officers the respect given by ours to 
officers on account of holding a commission, nor the trustful obedience and devotion our 
men give to any officer who proves his worth. They always seemed to be keeping their 
en up. ' 
48 
Training with the British 
The main problem that persistently hampered the training process was how much of a 
role the British were to play in instructing the Americans. Simonds sensed 'the tendency 
of the British was to actually take over the training of the platoons and regiments' from 
tile inexperienced American officers, who 'wanted to be friendly and cordial" with their 
allies. He sent a tersely worded memorandum to division commanders: *A clear 
understanding has been reached with the British Training Section that American 
authorities retain absolute control of, and responsibility for. the trainingo. British 
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instructors will lend assistance to American officers, mainly by going through the \ýork 
beforehand with them and during the actual instruction of the troops. In no case during 
this training will British officers take command of American troops. . 49 Such feelings 
were known to Haig, who responded by telling Bonham-Carter: -Our officers are not to 
command and order the Americans about, but must only help American officers hý their 
advice and experience to become both leaders in the field, as well as instructors. ' 50 
The British soldiers whom Bonham-Carter assigned to instruct the Americans were, in 
some cases, fresh from combat. Three years before, they had been much like the 
Americans as recruits heeding the call of Field Marshal Lord Kitchener. Now they were 
survivors of the Somme and Passchendaele. The weight of their experience was quite 
apparent to a private in the 105'h American Machine-Gun Battalion, who viewed his 
British instructors as 'a tired, inarticulate crowd. ý51 But such experience would be an 
advantage when the two allies went into battle together. Lt. Col. Sir Phillip A. 
Christison, a former battalion commander in the 15th (Scottish) Division, was ordered to 
help train the Americans. His assignment was to command the 7 th Cameron Highlanders 
(Training Battalion), one of the many skeleton units formed for the purpose of assisting 
the doughboys. After his month-long assignment with the I l9thAmerican Infantry, he 
bemoaned: 'I never saw my old and loved battalion again. ' 52 
Remarkably. spirits remained high \vithin the British ranks, despite heavy losses during 
the 1916 and 1917 campaigns, as well as the recent German Spring offensives. The 
British, at this stage in the \\ ar. Nvere ideal tutors. As Paddy Griffith wrote: 'By 1917. 
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BEF infantry units had come of age... as some of the battalions had maintained a 
reputation for good discipline, cohesion, and an aggressive desire to dominate no man's 
land at every opportunity. ' 53 Although perhaps not appreciating it at the time, the 
Americans would receive the benefit of the British hard fighting at the Somme. 
Passchendaele, and, later, St. Quentin. While French units also trained AEF divisions in 
their sector and had much to contribute, the British offered them even more. At French 
headquarters, Maj. Paul Clark observed that for 'their first period of instruction, the 
Americans are just as well off, if not much better off, with the British as xN ith the French. 
There is a community of language, and there is no doubt that the discipline of the British 
is superior to the discipline of the French. 54 
In 1918, the composition of the American Army in many ways resembled that of the 
British Army when it first entered the war. In August 1914, when the war commenced, 
the British Army consisted of small cadre of pre-war Regulars, supplemented by a larger 
Territorial Force that nearly doubled the original BEF. The latter was organised much 
like the American National Guard regiments. By January 1918, the British Army was 
filled largely with conscri PtS. 
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It is true that losses in their battles over four years had changed British units. But such 
changes in British Army divisions from 1914-1918 had little effect on their ability to 
keep fighting. 'In 1918, as in earlier years, ' according to a study of morale in the BEF. 
'some units w-ere more effective than others, and a host of reasons determined military 
effectiveness. Leadership, morale. training and tactical ability \\ere among the most 
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important. ' Recently drafted men survived bý blending ýý ith veterans. and 'the survk al 
of distinctive traditions and ethos in some units supports this contention. Conscription 
did not in itself affect combat performance to any great degree. -56 
One area that neither Simonds nor the British could prepare for was hoýN the American 
and British officers and men would actually get along as allies. This would not be an 
easy relationship since criticism of the Americans ran deep with some in the British 
officer corps, who, obviously, were still annoyed by Pershing's reJection of 
amalgamation. One fervent critic was Maj. Walter Guinness (later the first Lord Moyne). 
As a staff officer of the 66 th British Division, Guinness became well acquainted with the 
27 th Division and its commanding officer, who he described as 'a typical Irish soldier of 
fortune. ' Guinness' diary is replete with negative comments about the American officers 
and their ability to command: 'The senior American officers were very poor indeed. 
Many of them had been Regular Army officers, physically and mentally unfit for 
responsible commands under the strenuous conditions of modern war. 57 
Guinness' harshest criticism, however, was aimed at the training programme Pershing 
organised for the doughboys. He considered the AEF commander 'to be the stupidest 
man in France, showing quite remarkable narrow- rn indedness and obstinac,,. He 
[Pershing] worked out a so-called -schedule- of training. which iternised, almost hour by 
hour, x\ hat the American troops \\ere to do. In many respects, the schedule ý\as perfectly 
absurd. For instance, it made no provision \\ hatsoever for route marching. and although 
in our weeklý confidential reports on the American troops, ý\ hich we had to furnish our 
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G. H. Q., we continually emphasised this omission. there ýý as nothin2 x\e could do to get it 
remedied. 558 
Furthermore, Guinness found it ludicrous that 'all troops, wherever the\ ýN ere billeted. 
had to do exactly the same programme for each week of their course. We ý\ere obliged to 
organise the area to afford special facilities near the coast for long-range musketrN and in I- 
the southem part for manoeuvres of, say, a whole brigade at a time. The third area was 
only suited for elementary training, owing to the difficulty of getting large tracts of land I 
for manoeuvres and the impossibility of making safe rifle ranges. Nothing. however, 
would induce American G. H. Q. to remodel its "schedule" so as to conform to the 
necessities of the training ground. 59 
While there is much truth in Guinness' comments, he was probably incorrect in one area. 
'Many of the American divisions no doubt would have liked to take advantage of our 
organisation and advice, but they were often too afraid to do so, * he claimed. 'because 
they had a vicious system under which the Inspector's Staff used to arrive unexpectedly. 
look at troops at work, and send in a report to American G. H. Q. 60 In this regard, 
Guinness greatly exaggerates the system of inspection in the AEF. Instead, inspectors 
made every attempt 'not to interfere with programmes of instruction, " according to one 
historian. 61 
Less cynical than Guinness was Lt. L. G. Pinnell of the 57thBritish Machine-Gun 
Battalion. He felt it NN as his task to assist Americans in adopting -British principles of 
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tactics an organisation. With all due respect to our French allies, ' Pinnell thought. \\ e 
are admittedly more advanced than they. ' He surmised that -the system of organisation 
adopted by the Americans is halfway between ours and the French. ' His commanding 
officer responded firmly, but sympathetically: 'It is out of the question to attempt to 
influence the course of training or system that they will adopt. I am afraid things must 
take their course. ' 
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How well the American and British troops interacted with each other varied. An 
advantage was that both spoke the same language. It was exciting for the majority of 
soldiers from both armies to hear their native language spoken for the first time with a far 
different accent. To the British soldier, the popular stereotype of an American was that 
of the cowboy. It was perpetuated by popular works of western fiction published since 
the 1870s that circulated around the world, and enhanced by the success of Buffalo Bill 
Cody's Wild West Show, which toured Britain on three occasions. Cody's last tour was 
in 1916, and 'by then, the show had become the best-known representation of America, ' 
according to one chronicler of this period. 63 
The letters, diaries and published histories from both the doughboys in the 27 th and 30"' 
Divisions and the British Tommies reveal, in rich detail, their personal feelings about I 
each other. This is especially true about the relationship between the southern soldiers in 
the 30th Division and their British instructors. Lt. Col. Graham Seton Hutchison of the 
-, -, rd 
-3-3 British 
Division was typical of those troops who believed the coN\ boy stereotype. He 
was quite disappointed that not a single doughboy in the 3 Oth American Division 
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resembled -a gentleman in a wide-brimmed hat. aiming sly shots at peaceful drinkers. 
rifling his pockets, and disappearing into the vastness of the mountains of Arizona, ' as 
portrayed in the movies. Instead, the 'North Carolinians from the hills of southern 
America' struck him as more like his own division's Highlanders. 64 
Still another surprised British soldier wrote that the men in his battalion 'had decided that 
these quiet, thinking men of North Carolina were not at all like the popular type of 
"Yankees. " Some of them were proud to claim English decent! We wanted tojustify our 
conception of the slack-jawed, keen-eyed man of quaint jargons and turns of speech that 
Mark Twain and others had introduced to us. ' 65 British troops repeatedly reflected on the 
impressive stature of their American allies. The 33 rd Battalion Machine-Gun Corps 
historian commented that they 'struck one at first glance as a concourse of very grave 
men with extremely tight uniforms. ' 66 A philosophical Tommy opined that: 
it is impossible to lay down any characteristics of the American soldier, owing to 
the large and varied area from which he may be drawn, and the mixture of races 
to be found in the large cities... At the same time, the general impression gained 
is that the American is quicker witted than the average British soldier, and men 
from the country districts are undoubtedly of very fine physique. 68 
A member of the 26 th Royal Fusiliers observed Americans camped next to his unit as 
. men with cowboy hats, who wore their packs the way Indian women carried babies. ' 
69 
Major General Grover echoed the conclusion of Haig that the rawness of the American 
National Guard troops \\as much like the British Territorial units in 1914. *They came 
from all walks of societý, ' he commented, 'and did stupid things. like shooting their 
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ammunition when there was nothing to shoot at, and throwing grenades when there NN as 
nothing to throw them at. ' 70 
The Americans were, in many cases, just as bewildered about their British allies. and, at 
first, had no particular affection for them. With such a large population of Irish- 
Americans in New York, it was not surprising to hear some men in the 27hDivision 
openly express their dislike for the British and make it known they would much rather 
train in the French sector. There were also a fair number of German-Americans in the 
division, and like their families and friends at home, they may have secretly wished for a 
German victory. 71 But O'Ryan, whose bloodline was also Irish-American, kept his 
opinions silent and, as a good officer, insisted that his soldiers cooperate with their 
British hosts. Although the 30thDivision's ranks were heavy with men of Scots-Irish 
descent, and it is likely that anti-British sentiment existed there as well. no written 
account of such feelings was found. Recognising the potential for dissention, the British 
officers and men were cordial to the American troops, and over time, they warmed to 
each other. 
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Lieutenant Gow of the 107'h Infantry perhaps best summed up the American attitude in a 
letter home in early June. Only a few months before, he complained about the British 
officers who had helped train him at Wadsworth, but Gow now had a complete change of 
opinion after entering the line with the Tommies. *1 like the Britishers, ' he wrote to his 
family. 'The Englishman has a reserve that's very hard to break through, but when it is 
down, he is very much a human being. ' 73 Gow did not point out that most officers were 
I, 
1-, 
likely to be of a very different social class than other ranks. and difference social 
behaviour. 74 
Gow's division commander positively summarised the early days of the Anglo-American 
relationship. 'We trained about one month with the British, ' O'Ryan wrote, 'and having 
British officers assigned to each regiment helped us learn all the little things that \\e 
wanted to pick up on. We were given problems in field exercises and trained on a larger 
scale in war than we had ever been trained before, as the British had large training 
grounds about 20 miles south of Calais, and every sort and kind of school. ý75 
The Amaluamation Issue Returns 
While the training of the Americans was underway, the amalgamation issue again 
complicated matters. Although Pershing had made his position on amalgamation very 
clear, there was a new effort to get him to acquiesce. Lt. Gen. J. C. Smuts, South Africa's 
representative in the War Cabinet, went so far as to suggest to Lloyd George that 
Pershing should be replaced since he was *without real war experience, and is already 
overwhelmed by the initial difficulties of ajob too big for him. ' As a compromise, he 
suggested that 'Pershing remain in charge of all organisations in the rear. but let the 
fighting command over the American Army be entrusted to another commander. ' 76 
Smuts, NNho had hoped to obtain a field command, was probably referring to himself. 
Lloyd George took Smuts' suggestions to heart during a meeting with Pershing on 21 
June. He read a proposal requesting that Pershing *agree to leave entirely in the hands of 
the BEF the decision as to the schedules of training of American divisions assigned to the 
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British, and also the power to put these divisions into action. -77 Pershing held his temper, 
but very firmly objected to this proposition and stated that he *could not, should not and 
would not surrender my prerogatives in this manner. . 78 Lloyd George again backed off, 
and instead stressed the importance of establishing good relations between the mo 
English-speaking allies. He also met privately with Newton Baker during one of the 
Secretary of War's trips to France and communicated a 'desire for opportunity of 
American and British soldiers to fraternise. ' Lloyd George became oratorical: 'The 
future peace of the world depends upon the American and British peoples understanding 
one another, and the best hope of such an understanding grows out of the intermingling of 
the soldiers of the two armies. ' 79 
Despite the Prime Minister's pleadings, amalgamation had once more failed, so the 
British now sought to make the Americans amenable to their training methods. Sir 
Douglas Haig did his part to make the Americans feel welcome in early June when he 
inspected a brigade of the 30'hDivision. During a private conversation with Col. Robert 
Bacon, he remarked that 'they were some of the most splendid men I have ever seen 
and very well drilled. ' Because they were National Guard troops, which 'corresponded 
I to our old militia , Haig said, 'they pick up the work very quickly and, 
I think, should be 
able to go into the line much sooner than was anticipated, which is a good thing. ' 80 
Division Trainim! 
The doughboys had to acclimate themselves to the training area. The system of areas and 
sub-areas used bý the BEF in the zone of the advance \\as complicated. according to 
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Sergeant Jacobson of the 107 th Infantry. 'Each British unit ýý as assigned to a certain 
longitudinal sector running westward from the battle front. ' he observed. 'and these 
sectors were divided laterally into three areas - the battle area, the f6m ard area. and the 
training area. ' Billeting was very rudimentary, especially for enlisted men. While the 
officers had the luxury of sleeping in comfortable rooms at private homes. 
accommodations such as the bam one New Yorker slept in 'next door to cows. pigs and 
horses' were not unusual for the enlisted men. 81 It was found that enlisted men rarely, if 
ever, knew the names of the villages wherein their own billets were situated. Man), 
officers werejust as ignorant. As a result, the officers were directed to familiarise their 
men in the local geography and distribute maps, if necessary. 82 
Gradually, the Americans became accustomed to serving with the British. As the days 
passed, the regiments began to receive all sorts of British equipment--limbers, water 
83 
carts, officer's mess carts, rolling kitchens, harnesses, animals and ordnance. The 
American rifles, cartridge belts and bayonets were collected and replaced with British 
Lee Enfields, British belts and British bayonets. The Americans were issued British gas 
masks and steel helmets. 
The doughboys reluctantly turned in their reliable '03' rifles in exchange for the 
unfamiliar British Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) Rifle, No. 1, Mark 111. 
Ordnance experts have called it one of the finest military bolt-action rifles ever produced. 
The SMI. E \\eighed slightly less than the U. S. Model 1903) and was chambered for the 
standard British . 303 cartridge. 
This meant the smaller American ammunition ýýas not 
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compatible. 84 Afterward, British NCOs instructed the Americans about their nexN rifles. 
Using imitation bullets, instructors showed them how to load and fire the weapon... and 
*scores of other things a fellow should know about it. ' 85 
The training schedule was the same each day, and it started early. This was primarilý 
because the nearby artillery firing commenced around 4 A. M. and made sleep impossible. 
After breakfast, a detachment of British non-coms would arrive in the American areas to 
instruct U. S. non-coms in the use of gas masks, rifles and bayonets. The Americans then 
instructed their own men on what they had just learned. One of the British lecturers 
boasted he had been 'over the top 19 times without the loss of a single one of his men. ' 86 
Sergeant Jacobson described this instruction by the British as 'up-to-the-minute, 
vigorous, and very interesting. ' 87 More advanced training was given in trench xý, -arfare, 
bayonet running and marksmanship at a short-range rifle pit. The cloughboys drilled in 
grenade throwing and trench movement under a gas cloud. In all this, according to a 
soldier from Tennessee, British instruction 'was valuable beyond estimation. 88 Yet, all 
of this should have been familiar to the Americans since it was already taught at the 
camps in South Carolina. 
Leisure time, as one New Yorker recounted. consisted of a once- or twice-a-week cooling 
off in a close by lake, or a visit to a nearby town like St. Omer. The latter ýNas a short 
hike from camp and gave the doughboys an opportunity to see the destruction of war 
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firsthand since some of the village's d\N, ellings and pavement had been damaged. While 
13 5 
the Americans played tourist, the British ýý ere entertained at night by horse shoxvs and 
dinner parties for officers. 90 
Removal of American Divisions 
On 3 June 1918, Foch informed Haig he was planning to remove five American divisions 
from his sector. He was concerned that the German offensive, with about 4.000 guns, at 
the Chemin des Dames, on the Aisne, had battered the Sixth French Army along the 
ridge, and there were few French divisions to hold off the enemy. Haig. as to be 
expected, adamantly opposed this move. He considered it 'a waste of valuable troops to 
send half-trained men to relieve French divisions. In three weeks time. these Americans 
will be fit for battle, ' he said, and he doubted 'whether the French divisions they relieve 
will ever really fight in this war. ' 91 
Lloyd George sided with Haig, fearing that German reserves were still a threat to the 
British in Flanders, and the shift of divisions would be harmful. But it was Foch's call 
since he was General- i n-Ch ief of the Allied An-nies in France. For Pershing, this meant 
the divisions would be closer to the main body of the AEF, and he could use them once 
the crisis subsided. Therefore, on 15 June, five divisions (35th, 77 
th 82 nd , 4thand 28 
th) in 
the British area were transferred to quiet sectors on the French front. 92 
As a gesture of goodwill between the British and French. Haig sent Bonham-Carter and a 
quartermaster to help coordinate the transfer. It was a long trip by Rolls Roý ce for the 
British officers and their drivers, made longer because of *txNo or three tyre punctures and 
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no spare wheels. ' After arriving in the French sector. Bonham-Carter 'had little to do at 
the conference except deal with administrative matters and ansxýer questions about 
training. ' 93 
Changes in Command 
Also during the first week in June, Pershing finally selected a commander for 11 Corps. 
Although he had created a corps headquarters staff. he waited to appoint a corps 
commander until he evaluated the performance of his general officers at the division 
level. 94 His choice for 11 Corps was Major General Read, 'a handsome, tall cavalryman, 
who looked to one acquaintance as if he might have been a model for one of Frederick 
Remington's drawings of a frontier cavalry officer, ' said a historian describing the former 
recruiting officer and 3 Oth Division commander. 
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Pershing had been impressed with Read for some time and had recommended him for 
promotion to brigadier general in 1917.96 Read's appointment was well received by the 
divisions attached to 11 Corps. The officers of the 3 Oth Division. in particular, were elated 
to see one of their own selected, and O'Ryan was also pleased since he and Read had 
been classmates at the Army War College. The British too, especially Haig, were 
comfortable with Read. *He seemed to me too old for the duties of a G. O. C. Division. ' 
the BEF commander thought, 'but he knows the fundamentals of war, and should do well 
as a corps commander. ' Haig was a bit generous in this statement. Read maý have 
kno\\ n the fundamentals of \\ ar, but had no battlefield experience to put such knoý\ ledge 
into practise. After graduating from West Point in 1883, he tau(-lht military science, than . tý - 
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took command of the 5hCavalry Regiment at a remote ýýestern post. Later. he served in 
Cuba during the Spanish-American War, but never engaged the enemy. Instead, Read 
was a Fifth Army Corps staff officer. 97 
Haig's approval of Read was probably self-serving. He must have felt a sense of security 
when Pershing selected a corps commander, since he could then assume there was no 
immediate plan to remove the other divisions from the British. When Haig and Pershing 
met on 30 June, they discussed the appointment of Read and agreed that 'four divisions 
are too large a force for an inexperienced corps commander. Two divisions are ample. 98 
This was a peculiar comment since 11 Corps had five divisions, and Pershing had not ý et 
decided that he was going to remove three more of them. 
Historians have ignored Read's work as corps commander, probably because he failed to 
leave personal papers and is rarely mentioned in the correspondence of others, either 
American or British. Those who do mention Read describe him as amiable. Fourth 
British Army commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, for example, considered him a 
ýnice calm gentlemanly man who not get rattled. '99 This is especially true in the 
operations when he relinquished control of his divisions to Haig's more experienced 
commanders. After the war, Read wrote a brief. unpublished narrative of his experiences 
in France. The only known copies are among the personal papers of Colonel Simonds. 
The manuscript is superficial and shies away from intimate or controversial moments 
durin. () the \\ar, although there is one instance that offers some insight into Read's 
personality. He humorously tells of breaking up a gambling party during his first \ýeek at 
- 
11 Corps headquarters; he warned the culprits that he would not tolerate such behaviour 
unless he was invited to join. 
It is difficult to gauge the command style of Read as a general officer. An examination of 
the orders issued from 11 Corps headquarters reveals that most were written by Simonds, 
and it appears that Read allowed division commanders wide latitude in day-to-day 
functions. Although during his short tenure as division commander, he never issued 
orders or bulletins in the manner of O'Ryan, he can be judged as a commanding officer 
who wanted to be liked by everyone and tried to avoid controversy. This trait, however. 
would almost cost him his post as corps commander during the Hamel operation. 
With Read now corps commander, a vacancy existed in the 30th Division. Brig. Gen. 
Lawrence D. Tyson of the 5 9th Brigade thought he might finally take permanent 
command. He had been with the division since August 1917, and felt that he had proven 
himself. A more logical replacement for Read would have been Brigadier General 
Faison, who had also been with the division for a long time, and temporarily had been its 
commander. But Pershing had other ideas. He brought in Maj. Gen. Edward M. Lewis 
from the 2d Division as the 30'h's seventh commanding officer. Lewis had been 
promoted from brigadier general after an impressive showing as the 3 rd Brigade 
commander at Belleau Wood, where he earned glowing praise from Pershing's close 
friend, Maj. Gen. Harbord. 100 Lewis perfectly fitted the description of a Pershing 
commander. Not only \\as he a West Point classmate of the commander-in-chief, but a 
graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and the Army ltý 
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'. 
101 " O'hDi\ ision War College. Praised as 'a model commander LeNN is remained x\ ith the .3 
until it returned home in 1919. 
Tyson's reaction to Lewis' appointment was predictable. "Faison and I have borne the 
brunt of the day, ' he moaned to a friend in Tennessee. 'We trained the division and 
brought it over here, and made it all ready for somebody else's benefit. "O-' But neither he 
nor Faison had a chance at being named division commander. Tyson's rating, compiled 
after the Armistice, illustrated how lucky he was to have been given command of a 
brigade. He was a good disciplinarian, but 'not deemed aggressive enough. ' Another 
officerjudged Tyson's ability more harshly: A do not recommend him for promotion. If 
active operations were to continue, I would be disposed to recommend him for duty at a 
depot, rather then for the command of a fighting brigade. ' 103 
Faison's rating, on the other hand, showed him to have possessed 'the essential 
qualifications of leadership and an excellent, well-trained mind. ' But Pershing was the 
one making the decision, and he had not thought highly of Faison. During a visit to the 
3 Oth Division training area on I July, Pershing was angered that Faison 'had not arranged 
any programme for visiting his troops; consequently, we did some aimless wandering 
through his sector. ' Furthermore, he noted, Faison 'seemed to have no energy or grasp of 
the situation. ' 104 Pershing would never publicly or privately state why he had not 
selected Faison as a division commander. despite a friendship between the two that lasted 
until Faison's death in 1938.105 
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With the appointment of Read as corps commander and Lewis as his diN ision 
replacement, there was also a change of officers on the British side. On 23 June 1918, Lt. 
Gen. Sir Ivor Maxse was appointed Inspector General of Training of the BEF. B,, virtue I 
of this new position, Maxse directly oversaw the training of the American divisions in the 
British sector. At 56, he was a career officer who trained and commanded the 18 th 
Division until January 1917 and shaped it into one of the BEF's best units. Maxse then 
was promoted to command XVIII Corps. Haig had long considered creating of a BEF Zý 
Inspector General of Training, and in a letter to the Secretary of the War Cabinet, Sir 
Maurice Hankey, he wrote: 'I consider it a matter of the highest urgency to take steps to 
improve the efficiency of training throughout the armies in France. " 06 Maxse's 
biographer believes the conflict with Home made the choice for this new post an obvious 
107 
The new position of British Inspector of Training eclipsed that of Bonham-Carter. 
Although disappointed that he was no longer a field commander, Maxse worked hard in 
his current assignment and made inroads in coordinating a unified training doctrine, 
which had been lacking within the British Army in France. But this took time, and there 
is no evidence that his work had any direct influence on the training of American 
soldiers. Bonham-Carter, on the other hand, did have some effect on the doughboys. In 
reflecting upon his work Ný, ith 11 Corps, he wrote to his sister: 'My work with the 
Americans is now practically finished. and the most backward of the divisions noxN xý ith 
us is very nearly fit to stand oil its own feet and xv-alk NN, -ith help. Their freshness is verý, 
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invigorating; one only realises after being with them how tired \\e all are. ' 108 He had 
done his bit. 
Training with the Dominions 
During training, the doughboys also became acquainted with Canadian troops, their 
North American neighbours, and, as was true of the British, so they learned from the 
Canadian divisions. It was not hard to run into them. By the time of the Armistice, more 
than 458,000 Canadians were overseas in France as part of the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force. Canada had mobilised for war in August 1914. Training commenced at 
Valcartier, outside Quebec City, and the Canadians based some of their doctrine on what 
had been learned during the Boer War in 1899-1902. In early October. the first 
contingent left Valcartier for England, where more extensive training was held at Bustard 
Camp, part of a large complex on Salisbury Plain. As battalions came over, they were 
formed into brigades, eventually becoming the I" Canadian Division. 
Initially, one-third of staff officers were British. By autumn 1918, the Canadians had 
formed into their own corps of four divisions under Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur Currie. Although 
they never trained or served together with the Americans, the two forces had many 
similarities. As it had for the 11 American Corps, the British Army provided supplies and 
artillery to the Canadian Corps. Also, the Canadians were not responsible to the British 
government. but to the government of the Dominion of Canada. Through political 
pressure, its divisions were not split up, but served together as a Canadian corps. 109 
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The Canadians provided a Ministry of Overseas Military Forces in London and kept a 
liaison officer at BEF headquarters to deal ý\ ith matters affecting them, which \\as similar 
to the American mission to the British at Grosvenor Square. Also like American 
commanders, Currie had the power to reject any requests from Haig and BEF 
commanders if he judged them not in the best interest of his corps. The Canadian Corps 
was 'a junior but sovereign ally, ' as one historian defined the relationship. ' 10 
On 22 June, an official proposal was made to have the Canadians play a more active role 
in training the Americans. Maj. Lloyd C. Griscom. the American representative at the 
British Embassy in London, met with the Premier of Canada, Sir Robert Borden, about 
this matter. Borden 'considered the rapid training of our troops, ' Griscom wrote to 
Pershing in Chaumont, 'the most important single factor of the war today, and he 
believed that Canadian officers could train our troops as fast, and possibly faster, than 
anybody else. ' Borden also believed that the 'Canadians had developed some things in 
the art of war that were peculiar, and which would be of value to the American Army. "'' 
As recent historiography suggests, Borden's biased assessment of his army is correct. 
One historian called it the 'shock army', and its attack across the Canal du Nord in late 
September 1918, substantiates this opinion. ' 12 But Borden's proposal was for naught. 
Sir Henry Wilson thought that the offer had come too late and would disturb the training 
schedules already in place for the American divisions. " 3 
Also charged with helping instruct the Americans were the Australians, ý\ho ultimately 
influenced them greatly. By most accounts, the Americans and Australians had a natural 
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affinity with each other. Upon seeing the Americans. an Australian officer remembered 
that 'we amused ourselves watching a lot of verý brand-neýý -looking Yanks arriving with 
their extraordi nary- looking equipment. Some of the officers carried leather suitcases and 
umbrellas and looked more like commercial travellers than soldiers. ' 114 Another xN as 
entertained when he saw some Americans *coming up the road with bayonets fixed and 
rifles ready kilometres away from the front line. They wore their gas masks when there 
was not a whiff of gas about. ' 115 The Americans were also fascinated by the 'diggers, ' as 
the Australians were known. A 27thDivision staff officer recalled that the Australian 
soldiers he encountered were 'dressed in olive-drab uniforms, wrapped puttees and 
broad-brimmed hats fastened up the side. ' and they reminded him of 'Roosevelt's Rough 
Riders at San Juan Hill. ' 116 The diggers served as mentors to the cloughboys and eagerly 
offered advice. A frequent warning to the Americans was to avoid capture by the 
Germans at all costs, since it was rumoured that the enemy tortured Allied pOWS. 117 
The myth about Australian troops was largely perpetrated by the newspaper 
correspondent, C. E. W. Bean, who was later the official historian of the Australian 
Imperial Forces (AIF). In 1915, he developed the legend of the Australians as tough, 
undisciplined soldiers. ' 18 To Bean, the Australian soldier was a 'bushman in disguise. ' 
After observing them in Gallipoli. he noted that the 'wild pastoral life of Australia, even 
if it makes rather wild men,, makes superb soldiers. " 19 There was some truth to Bean's 
rhetoric, according to the American troops xNho fought side by side w-ith the Australian's 
in the summer and autumn offensives. 'As individual fighters, they were superb, ' a 
couple of 11 American Corps officers wrote about the Australians after the war. 'Their 
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initiative, vigour and bodily strength enabled them to surprise, wear out. or overpower the 
foe in almost every encounter. ' 120 Lt. Gen. Sir John Monash commanded the fi\ c 
divisions of the Australian Army Corps, part of the Fourth British Army. Not a tN pical 
officer, he was an engineer in civil life... and Jewish. The historian John Terraine credits 
Monash with studying 'the military profession in peacetime with a thoroughness that fex\ 
Regulars could match. ' 12 1 The Americans would form their own opinions about Monash 
in the coming weeks. 
The Reality of Traininp_ 
As the first phase of instruction from the British in full swing. a certain attraction 
developed between them and the Americans, although problems did arise. The American 
divisions in the British sector on the Western Front underwent their initial training and 
gained some exposure to life on the front lines. It was a strange alchemy that brought the 
doughboys across the Atlantic, into all the strangeness of the Old World, and set them up 
in the British sector, where they heard the strange accents and received, among other 
items. 
) British equipment. The 
booming guns in the distance were an incessant reminder, 
night and day, that they were close to the front. There were also the frequent air raids, 
not to mention front-line training when the German foe was at hand across the fevv 
hundred yards of no man's land. 
In all of this, they encountered the more familiar Canadians, who offered their 
experiences and enjoyed, as neighbours can do, their similarities. Then there ý\ere the 
Australians, \\hose backgrounds of frontier life on the Outback or residence in cities as 
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new as American cities fostered friendship. These ties would be tested in a feNý short 
weeks at Hamel, and on a larger scale months later during a major operation against the 
Hindenburg Line. 
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Chapter 4: We Have Found Each Other at Last 
Two weeks had passed since the 27hand 3 Oth Divisions commenced their training on -18 
May 1918. The Americans had developed comradeship with the British and Dominion 
troops, while learning from these experienced instructors. Then, actions by the AEF 
commander-in-chief caused a strain in relations. But, the American troops eventuallý 
entered the line, showed impressive tenacity in battle, and everything settled doNN, n. 
Period A Training Continues 
With the Americans showing some progress in the early stages of training, the British 
were anxious to bring them into the line sooner, rather than later. Pershing and Haig had 
agreed, from the beginning, that the Americans could serve as reserves only if an 
emergency necessitated such action. But, Haig's army commanders. such as Second 
British Army Commander Gen. Sir Herbert Plumer and the Fourth British Army's Gen. 
Sir Henry Rawlinson, were attempting to accelerate Period A. They reasoned that more 
progress would be made if the American 'troops were brought in closer contact with 
frontline conditions at an earlier stage of their training' and wanted them in the sector 
near Ypres that was in danger of being overrun by the Germans. ' 
Simonds responded negatively to this request because the forward areas did not have 
adequate training facilities for bayonet practice, target practice. and other exercises that 
\\ere essential to the completion of Period A. It made more sense to continue the current 
instruction in the rear until Period B commenced, and then consider alloý\ inu) the 
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divisions to enter the line. However, he would consider the idea if the British x\ould 
lumish this office with such information as you may deem necessarý as regards ý our 
plans and lines of defence' so that 'proper steps could be taken to utilise these diN isions 
by preparing tentative plans, making reconnaissance. and in other ý\ ays preparing to 
assist in the defence of this sector. 
Plumer made another appeal on II June. He told Simonds that intelligence indicated 
German divisions were massing for an attack to the east of Cassel. a vital part of the 
British defences. He sought to use the 3 Oth Division in a sector of the Winnezeele Line. 
Plumer promised they would be reserves, but would move them to the front if the 
situation dictated. Simonds again said no. He did not consider the German movement a 
real emergency that required immediate attention. His decision was correct since the 
attack never materialised. 3 
Haig appealed directly to Pershing. The BEF commander- in-ch ief had been to 11 Corps 
headquarters and met Simonds. He left believing that both Simonds and Pershing had 
agreed that American divisions were ready to enter the line. He wrote requesting both the 
27 th and 33 rd for occupation of the lines to the northeast and east of Arniens, since they 
\ýere the closest American divisions to this section of the front. Haig recognised that 
tacilities \\ould not be 'quite so good as those in the areas they noxv occupy, and the 
training mi0ht be, to some extent, though not seriously, delayed. ' 4 perhaps tiring of the 
constant appeals. Pershing approved ýN ith the understanding 'that the training of these 
divisions \\ iII be continued insofar as conditions permit and necessities require. ý5 
Iý 31 
By moving closer to the front, the 27 th Division had lost almost a week of training, x\ hich 
had to be made up before passing to Period B. In addition, it had suffered a sl ight setback 
when Col. Willard C. Fisk, in command of the 107 h Infantry, became seriously ill ý\ ith 
stomach trouble. Now 60 years old, he had been with the 7 th NeýN York for 40 ý ears and 
was considered one of the National Guard's most competent and experienced leaders. 
Under his leadership, the 107 th was the pride of the division, achieving high marks in 
efficiency ratings. O'Ryan ordered Fisk home and another National Guardsman, Col. 
Charles 1. DeBevoise, replaced him. Formerly in command of the I st New York Cavalry. 
he was fresh from the Army School of the Line at Langres, where he graduated first in his 
class, and remained as an instructor until O'Ryan brought him back to the division. He 
proved capable in combat and kept up the morale of his regiment during its darkest hours 
in the attack on the Hindenburg Line. After the Armistice, DeBovise was promoted to 
command the 53 rd Brigade. 
6 
At 30thDivision headquarters, the southern soldiers were also having a setback, 
according to Brigadier General Faison. Taking advantage of his remaining days as acting 
division commander, he wrote to Read of concern that the 3 Oth was not progressing in 
Period A. The infantry brigades were 'badly handicapped by the lack of suitable and 
well-trained officers, ' he warned. Members of his staff shared this distress, and they 
recommended that any officer not doing his job should be relieved. Faison blamed the 
War Department regulations that allowed incompetent officers to remain in command, 
and feared that 'under present conditions. this division is not capable of manoeuvres. and 
the prospects are not bright for this state of affairs to come about. ' Read did not respond 
154 
to Faison and the 3 Oth continued training with its regimental commanders still in place. 7 
When Lewis took over as division commander, Faison made him aware of the situation. 
but this made little difference. Lewis refused to act on the grounds that he ýNas nexv and 
felt the need to give his officers a chance to improve. 8 
The Hamel Operation 
With Read now firmly in place as the corps commander. he found himself in the middle 
of the struggle between his own commander-in-chief and the British Army. The latest 
friction occurred over use of four companies from the 13 I't and 132 nd In fantry 
Regiments, 33 rd American Division during a proposed assault on the village of Hamel. 
The American portion of the operation was planned by the Australian Corps and 
approved by Read without Pershing's knowledge. This was Read's first real test as a 
corps commander and he handled it poorly. 
The operation against Hamel was deemed essential. The German Spring offensives had 
caused a huge bulge in the British lines, including the village of Hamel., and the plan was 
to re-take this ground Located near Arniens, a ridge shadowed the village and provided 
the enemy with observation of the Australian Corps, and easy prey for enfilading fire. I 
Fhe battle plan, designed meticulously by Monash. was to shorten and straighten the 
Australian line by capturing the ridge above Hamel (see map after page 157). His object 
\\as to take the village of Hamel, the woods nearby.. the village of Vaire. and the spur 
beyond. Intelligence reported t\\o German divisions with an estimated 3,000 troops 
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defending this area. If the attack was successful, Hamel ýýould be the staoin gg area 
for a 
larger operation a few weeks later. 
The 33 rd Division, composed of Illinois National Guard troops. had shown promise since 
its arrival in the latter part of May. It was attached to Rawlinson's Fourth Armý for 
training, and instructed mostly by the Australian Corps and III British Corps. For the 
attack, Rawlinson suggested 10 American companies from the division so that Monash's 
troops, in the line for several weeks, could have a much-needed rest. Rawlinson claimed 
to have chosen the date of 4 July for the operation because of its significance to the 
Americans. However, this isn't entirely correct. The original date was 2 July, but 
Monash asked for two more days for his troops to prepare. Rawlinson agreed and 
postponed the operation to 4 July. Because the new date coincided with the American 
Independence Day, the British used this to their advantage as an enticement to bring the 
doughboys aboard. 9 
To have the Americans appealed to Monash since he had met many of them after their 
arrival in France. It was commonplace for American officers to billet with the Allies 
before reaching permanent stations, and Monash was one of the hosts. When he was in 
-, rd command of the -3 
Australian Division, several AEF officers had stayed with him in late 
1917. Like many foreigners, he formed his impression of the doughboys by reading 
American fiction. Monash read voraciously. and one of his favourites \\as the author 0. 
Henry. 
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Monash discovered the Americans were dedicated soldiers like himself. Withbut,, ery 
few exceptions, ' he wrote to his brother, A have formed a ,,! erý high opinion of the 
excellent qualities, both mental and technical, of these officers. My impression is that 
some of the divisional commanders are rather old, and not as receptive of neý\ ideas as 
may be desirable, but their attitude toward these problems is in every way satisfactorý-. 
and they show themselves open-minded and receptive to an admirable degree. 10 He I 
would soon learn that not all Americans were as open. 
Read received the request from Monash to use 2,000 men of the 65 th Brigade and agreed, 
with the caveat that 'not more than the equivalent of one battalion be employed. ' Heý\as 
concerned that so many men in the line for the first time would cause confusion and high 
casualties. Monash assured him his intent was to assign a platoon to each American 
company as guides. Read then gave permission for the use of two battalions. " 
The 11 American Corps commander considered the Hamel operation 'valuable training 
for which due credit may be taken, if accomplished, as part of the weekly training 
schedule. ' Read informed Maj. Gen. George Bell, the 33 rd Division commander, of his 
decision and ordered him to select eight companies from the 13 1 st Infantry and mo from 
the 132 nd . They would report to the 
4 th and II th Australian Brigades. Why Read ýýas so 
agreeable, \\hen his chief of staff had done just the opposite and recently rejected all 
requests to use the Americans, is unknown. He may have felt that Pershing's approval to 
allox\ the '333 d to movc closer to the line \\as an indication that theý could take part in the 
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attack. it is unknown if Simonds attempted to sway Read's decision. But ý\hat is kno%An 
is that Read's judgement was not well received at AEF headquarters. 
The Battle Plan 
Surprise was a component of most successful operations and Hamel was no different. 
The men and equipment had to move forward quickly under cover of darkness. Morale 
among German troops around Hamel reportedly was low. Monash instructed his artillery 
to fire at German dumps, trenches and headquarters prior to the attack. If wind 
conditions allowed, it would add 4.5-inch howitzers with chemical shells to the mix. ' 2 
This harassment, he hoped, would cause so many German casualties that the infantry 
would only have to mop up the trenches. 
Tanks were an important element of the attack plan. Although in use since 1916, the 
early models were clumsy and ineffective. But in the summer of 1918, the Mark V Tank 
was introduced, and it promised to be faster, agile, and better armed. Its predecessor. the 
Mark IV, moved at a rate of just over three miles per hour, while the Mark V could cover 
more than four miles an hour. Mostly, it was more reliable and was less prone to 
breaking down. ' 3 Still, the Australians were mistrustful of the tanks after an unsuccessful 
experience with them at Bullecourt in April 1917. There, the unreliable machines were 
late in arriving to support the 4hDivision. then unable to reach the German xN, ire once 
engaged in battle. 
14 
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If everything went as planned, Monash expected the operation to last no more than 90 
minutes. The level of preparation that he and his staff undertook for Hamel cannot be 
overstated. Such detail, time and energy in planning an operation ý\ ere bý noý\ a Monash 
trademark. In the attack on Messines the previous year.. Monash boasted that 'everýihing 
is being done with the perfection of civil engineering so far as regards planning and 
execution. ' 15 With the plans for Hamel well underway. Haig called him 'a most thorough 
and capable commander, who thinks out every detail of any operation and leaves nothing 
to chance. ' 
16 
The meeting notes for Hamel confirm this assessment. They contain several pages that 
cover every aspect of the operation, including possible failures. Monash had a staff 
officer calculate visibility at night for 3-4 July. Based on this information, he knew that 
'movement can be observed at 9 P. M., but cannot a half-hour later. ' Because he wanted 
the attack to be a surprise, Monash worried that moonlight would cast a shadow and 
allow the Germans to see troops and tanks moving toward the front. 17 As another 
precaution, Monash ordered harassing fire by artillery and a squadron of low-flying 
planes to bomb the German lines to drown the noise of the tanks as they advanced. 
Planes would also be used to drop ammunition by parachute to the forward troops. 
Pershing Intervenes 
Mean\\ hi le, controvers\ over the use of the Americans \Nas brewing, at AEF G. H. Q. 
The), NN ere committed \\ ithout Pershing's kno\\, ledge. unti I Read made it kno\\ n on 30 
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June when the two met at British Army GHQ. Pershing reacted negativelN and told him 
to withdraw the men: they were not allowed to fight. The next day. he conferred N\ ith 
Haig and told him the same thing. Hamel was a 'radical departure from the program of 
instruction of this division, ' Pershing lamented, *and an exercise for ý\hich these men are 
not yet prepared. '18 
Haig had to abide by Pershing's order and told Rawlinson to have Monash withdraw the 
Americans. The latter balked, and countered that without them, he would have to 
abandon the attack. Now in a quandary, Rawlinson attempted to contact Haig to 
determine how to proceed, but the BEF commander was on his way to meet ývith 
Pershing and could not be reached. During their afternoon discussion in Paris on -3) 
July, 
Haig assured Pershing 'he quite agreed with the decision to forbid American troops from 
participating. " 9 Haig was, of course, not yet aware of the situation at the front and 
thought the withdrawal order had been obeyed. 
The American units were in the line when the withdrawal order was issued. Only six of 
the ten companies learned of it, as Companies C and E of the 13 I't Infantry and A and G 
of the 132 d Infantry were too far forward and oblivious to what was going on behind 
them. Rawlinson finally reached Haig and the two conferred. They agreed the operation 
was 'to go on as planned. ' despite Pershing's objections. 20 
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The Operation 
At 1: 30 A. M. on 4 July. the tanks moved up to the starting line, 1,000 yards in the rear of 
theinfantry. The attack commenced as scheduled. at 3: 10 A. M.. with the barrage 
catching the Germans by surprise. Facing little resistance. the Australians and Americans 
quickly achieved all objectives in 93 minutes. Of the 60 tanks that started, 58 \\ere still 
operable by the end of the battle. The Germans were driven from Hamel, the surrounding 
villages, and the ridges. (Map after page 161). 
The consensus of contemporary judgement is that the American troops fought xýell, but at 
times became impetuous. They ran into trouble by getting too far ahead of the barrage. 
After entering Hamel and moving beyond the objective line. the Illinois soldiers had to be 
told that 'it was not up to them go on and take the next town. ý21 As Monash assured 
Read, the Australians kept a close eye on the Americans by pairing runners and stretcher 
bearers with them as they advanced toward the enemy lines. On one occasion. a 
lieutenant from an American platoon was wounded after his company encountered 
resistance near Hamel's western edge. An Australian runner took command of the 
22 desperate situation and helped clear the Germans from the village . 
Pershing received word of the battle on 5 July when a 11 Corps staff officer told him 
about 'participation of our troops in the action with the Australians. . 23 A note from Haig 
arrived. written the night before, confirming the neNvs. 'The operation of \\hich I spoke 
NN ith you yesterday \\as carried out this morning with great success. ' he told Pershing. 
*Evervtlling \\as done in accordance \\ith your \\ I shes to relieve al Iý our troops before 
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this operation began, but a few detachments that could not be removed acquitted 
themselves with great distinction and fought like tigers. I feel sure that this momin-, -, 's 
success at the beginning of your great anniversary promises still greater successes in the 
future. 24 
Rawlinsion validated Haig's praise of the American performance. He wrote to his 
brother that 'American troops conducted themselves admirably. and have x\ on the 
undying admiration and affection of the Australians, who xý ere heard to remark: 'I'm 
damned glad they are on our side. ' 25 Monash echoed this sentiment when he said: *The 
contingent of them who joined us acquitted themselves most gallantly and were received 
by the Australians as blood brothers. 26 
Despite losing 176 killed and wounded, the Americans proved fearless in battle. Captain 
Gale of the 13 1" Infantry Regiment best articulated this point when he wrote: 'More real 
good was done to this company by this small operation with Australians than could have 
been accomplished in months of training behind the lines. 2' The Australian losses were 
about 1,400, and although the exact figures for the Germans are unknown, it is estimated 
they lost about 2 '000.28 Preparations were made for a quick withdrawal of the American 
troops, but it took two days before they left the lines. While waiting at the front, there 
xx ere numerous enemy counterattacks, and on 5 July, further casualties were incurred 
from a gas attack. Company E NN as the hardest hit, with 34 men seriously affected. 
162 
Aftermath 
Read and Simonds were ordered to Paris by Pershing and reprimanded. They listened as 
he lectured about his difficulties with the British, and even though this operation proved 
successful, 'you will have to watch those people. ' Pershing said. 30 He wrote in his diar,, 
that 'the incident, though relatively unimportant in itself., showed clearly the disposition 
of the British to assume control of our units, the very thing that I had made such stroncy 
efforts and had imposed so many conditions to prevent. ' 31 
While Pershing obviously overreacted by not allowing his corps commander more 
discretion in the use of his troops, Read deserved blame. Inexperienced in his role as a 
corps commander, he should have sought approval before agreeing to the battle plan. 
Had the operation resulted in heavy casualties, Read probably would have been sacked. 
Three days after the battle, Simonds wrote to Col. Fox Conner (G. H. Q. 's G-5) to tell him 
his side of the story. A 'careful inquiry from all possible sources as to the outcome of the 
operation was made, ' the chief of staff said, and the 'accounts are unanimous that the few 
men we had in this thing did excellent work, as we hear everywhere else of our men. ' 
Simonds then qualified this statement with: 'We always have to make due allowances for 
their enthusiasm over getting us into these scrapes. ' 32 
News of the victory spread throughout the front. The British liaison officer at French 
Army headquarters was overheard telling his American counterpart: 'We have found 
. 3. , each other at last. ' Although neither the 27thnor 30thDivisions xNere involved at 
-, rd Hamel, they had interest in its outcome. In a sense, the 33 Division N\ as representing 11 
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Corps. If it made a poor showing, it would reflect on the corps. At 270' Diý ision 
headquarters, O'Ryan waited anxiously for word from the front and ýý as relie\ed N\ hen a 
'British officer hastily came into division headquarters. and his joyous manner indicated 
what the general result had been. -)34 
The British official historian declared Hamel a 'minor operation, ' and this ý\as true, 
considering the number of troops involved and preparations made. Many elements of 
Hamel had been introduced the year before as the British and Dominion forces had begun 
to perfect the limited-objective, set-piece attack at Vimy Ridge, Messines Ridge. Polygon 
Wood, and the first day of Cambrai. Still, the success of Hamel would have an influence 
on how future operations were to be conducted on the Western Front. Operations vý ere 
now becoming more complicated, and in the case of the Fourth Army. Rawlinson had a 
greater reliance on others for planning. 35 The tactics used at Hamel were introduced in 
the later phases of training for the 11 American Corps. 
Period B Training Delayed 
When the training schedule was drawn up in March, it was agreed that the first period 
was the most crucial, and four weeks would be the minimum time allotted for its 
completion. Both sides recognised the possibility of delays in the arrival of troops and 
equipment. Halfwav through this first period, a ýstate of training' was conducted of some 
of the American divisions by the BFF to ascertain their progress. The report shoxýed that 
although training was progressing satisfactorily. there had been significant delays in 
issuing British rifles and Le\\ is guns, and one division (the 27h) had little training beýoncl 
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drills and physical exercises. 36 The AEF G-5 took the comments to mean that am o- 
week extension of Period A was necessary. As a result, Period B x\ ould noýý commence 
during the third week of July. 
Discipline within 11 Corps had remained good since the start of the first phase of training. 
with some exceptions. There were a few minor instances in which officers and men on 
leave in Calais had failed to produce proper passes, and this resulted in the militar\ police 
having to return the guilty parties back to their units. The corps inspector general made 
his judgements on frequent visits to the regimental billets and saw firsthand that saluting 
was 'not yet uniform in all units of the same division, ' and *soldierly bearing' was 
'generally good, even though many recruits in all divisions bring down the average. ' But 
37 
none of these infractions was excessive, and his report for July was positive . 
Enterinp- the Line 
British intelligence reported the Germans were preparing for an attack in the Second 
Army sector, thus making it necessary to move the American divisions from the training 
areas to a position in close support to the front. 
38 Therefore, the 27 Ih and 3 Oth Divisions 
were assigned to the Second British Army and moved to its sector, southwest of Ypres, 
on 9 July. They were placed under the command of XIX Corps, and ordered to organise 
and defend a portion of the East Poperinghe Line. The 30th Division moved near 
Poperhinghe and Watou, xxbere it came under the tactical control of the 11 British Corps, 
\\hile the 27 th assumed the second, or reserve, position in the British defences near Mount 
Kernmel. This included Dickebusch Lake and the Scherpenberg areas. 39 
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Two days later, the 30t" moved to the same reserve sector as the 27 th . and the divisions 
were practically right next to each other. Both were on the north face of the Lys salient. 
which covered a front of 4,000 yards. The salient was formed in the Allied line south of 
Ypres that spring, when the Germans attacked along the Lys River during Operation 
Georgette and took Kernmel Hill from the French. A British officer wrote that the 'loss 
of Kernmel by the French is good; we held it anyhow; it should make them less 
uncivil. 940 (Map after page 166). 
The British referred to the Ypres sector as simply 'The Salient, ' and Ypres as *Wipers, ' 
'Eepriss, ' or 'Ee-pray. ' Ypres had played an important role in the war since 1914, when 
the Germans first entered the medieval town on 13 October and the next day met ýN ith 
opposition from the BEF. The first battle of Ypres commenced, and for the remainder of 
the war, the salient continued to be one of the most active parts of the Western Front. 
The Menin Gate memorial near the town centre reminds one of the terrible costs suffered 
by the British in four years. It commemorates the almost 55,000 British and Dominion 
officers and men who died in the Ypres salient area and have no known grave up to 15 
August 1917. Another 35,000 names are recorded, including the names of the missing 
from August 1917 to the end of the war, at Tyne Cot cemetery near Passchendaele. 41 
The salient extended from Zillebeke Lake, at one time the chief Nvater supply for Ypres, 
to the southeast of Voormezeele. It had been shaped by the fighting of First Ypres and 
the subsequent battles had created deep craters. The ground NN as very low. and shell 
holes became little pools. Surrounding the salient NNas the high ground - Observatory 
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Ridge, Passchendaele Ridge, Messines-Wytschaete Ridge and Mount Kemmel - all in 
German possession. It allowed the enemy a clear field of fire in all directions. An 
American observed that often the 'men in the forward systems believed they \\ere being 
shelled by their own artillery, when, as a matter of fact, the shells \\ere from the enem\ 
guns on the right and in the rear. ' 42 
The battalions of the II 9th and 120th Infantry began occupying portions of the front in the 
Canal sector, 10 rn i les southwest of Ypres on 16 July,. One regiment had its camp at 
'Dirty Bucket, ' about four miles from Ypres. Men were housed in huts built by the 
British in a grove of oak trees big enough to house an entire company (256 Officers and 
Men). Quarters were far from luxurious, for lack of cots or bunks meant sleeping on the 
floor 
. 
43 For the commanding officers of the 270' and 3 Oth, it was much different. The 27 
th 
maintained headquarters at Oudezeele, while the 3 01h Division set up its command in 
Watou, where O'Ryan and Lewis slept on beds in their comfortable billets. 44 
Both divisions were now only four miles from the front and well within range of enemy 
fire, as Pvt. Robert P. Friedman learned. A member of the 105 th Engineers, he died as a 
result of wounds from shellfire on 13 July. the first combat casualty suffered bý, the 27th 
Division. '5 Friedman was one of many Jewish soldiers, several high-ranking officers 
among them. in the 27h; his loss was mourned by all in the division . 
46 The 3 Oth Division 
had its first combat-related death a month earlier when I st Lt. Wily 0. Bissett of the II gth 
Infantry N\ as sirnilarlý killed on 17 June 1918. 
167 
In Belgium, the Americans witnessed the hardships of the civilian population. Shelling 
had destroyed villages around Ypres, but did not prevent the Flemish from cultivating 
their fields. As the 11 Corps engineers commenced working on the East Poperinghe 
Defence Line, they were instructed to avoid further damaging the crops. Yet, there \\as 
no way to entirely comply with this order since the laying of'ývire entanglements near the 
front meant clearing some of the crops, which was done under protest from the farmers. 47 
The fighting in this region had caused untold casualties among the civilians, and one unit. 
the Headquarters Company of the 106 th Infantry, *adopted' a 13-year-old orphan and fed 
him for the entire time it was overseas. In early 1919, as the regiment prepared to return 
to the United States, the men brought him to Brest as a passenger, but the military police 
48 
wouldn't allow the young boy to travel on the troop transports . 
Trainine Continues 
One of the objectives during the this phase of training was to teach American officers 
how to command in the line, so company commanders rotated to the front for a few days. 
The men of the 27 th and 30'hDivisions may not have recognised this at the time, but the 
fact they spoke a common language with their British and Dominion instructors was an 
important factor in the level of training they received . 
49 American division training with 
the French did not have such an advantage. and thus, it can be argued, suffered as a 
result. 
The British officers instructed them in doctrine defined in publications such as 
Instruction. lbr the Training (? f the BritishArmies in France (S. S. 152). Of the manual*s 
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many features, one was 'to give commanders every possible facility and assistance in 
carrying out their duties of training their subordinates, ýýhile insisting on their 
responsibility for the efficiency of their commands. ')50 An earlý student in the lines ýNas 
Capt. Henry Maslin, a company commander in the 105 th Infantry. For four daý s, he ýý as 
assigned to A Company, 7'hBattalion, London Regiment, 58 th British Division. and 
entered a portion of the line opposite Albert. 
While in the line, 'at all times, day and night. ' Maslin accompanied the commander when 
inspecting and visiting his company, and went with him out of the trenches and 'over the 
top' at night. He observed how the British had a 'battle surplus' of two officers, who did 
not enter the trenches during a tour of duty. That way, if there was a heavy loss of 
officers, 'there wi II be some officer who can assume command with knowledge of the 
company's administration. ' Maslin was also impressed that 'hot tea was served to men 
t'or breakfast, as well as one-half dry tea ration for the remainder of the day. ' Water was 
scarce, and 'men had to either go unwashed or go without tea. ' 51 He proudly reported 
afterward that 'all officers with whom I came in contact were very willing to give me all 
information. ' 5" 
Another company commander, Capt. George P. Nichols, 107th Infantry, reported to the 
1" British Division a month after Maslin. Assigned to the 124ý' Battalion in a sector 
opposite Mt. Kernmel, he spent three days in the line and afterward reported three 
specific observations: the intelligence service and the 'keenness of the men in each 
platoon assigned to the work; ' the highlý trained platoon and cornpaný runners; and the 
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Ngh morale attained by the continued efforts of platoon commanders to instil -, platoon 
spirit. "' 53 
At the 3 Oth Division, battalion officers went into the I Ine ýý ith the 49th British Divisioný 
which had been in the Ypres sector since 1915, where the area still remained dangerous 
three years later. German shells resulted in four officers and twenty-two men killed in 
action while training at the front. 54 The Americans were tutored in map reading. and the 
occupation and defence of the line. Terrain exercises were also scheduled, but the British 
cancelled them on account of the frequent shelling. 55 Despite the danger. the experience 
was a positive one for the Americans. 'The relations that prevailed between the units of 
the 5 9th American Brigade and the units of the 49th British Division, ' Maj. Gen. Tyson 
later remarked, 'were always of the most cordial nature. The men of my brigade 
cooperated in every way possible and were on the best terms with the British, and they 
cooperated in every way with us, and there was never anything, so far as I am informed, 
but the best of feelings, in every respect. 56 
Visit by Pershing 
During the second week of July, Pershing visited the 27 th Division. While travelling to 
its training area, he spotted one of the New York regiments on a road west of O'Ryan's 
headquarters and stopped for an impromptu inspection of the startled soldiers. He later 
remarked to their division commander that the 'men look fit, but cam too much 
eqUipment. Get rid of some of it. ' Pershing ordered. 57 It is not clear as to his meanin(-) of 
too much equipment. The men in 11 Corps had no more or less equipment than any other 
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soldier in the AEF. The only difference was the outer clothing. as ýýell as shoes. breeches 
and tunics, which were mostly from the British. This was done out of necessitv since the 
American supply depots were slow to refill, and Read gave the authoritv to fit the men 
from British stores. 
58 
Before leaving the 27 th Division area, Pershing complimented O'Ryan on the *splendid 
spirit' of his men, but also pointed out a number of deficiencies. In particular. he noted 
that 'one major saluted him with a riding whip, and another was seen going through the t: ) 
streets not wearing a belt. ' Pershing also observed that when reviexý: ing the men in one 
battalion, their packs 'had too much in them and were carelessly made. 59 Such 
sloppiness within the division had been noted at Wadsworth, and now it appeared that the 
National Guardsmen had brought their bad habits overseas, despite O'Ryan's best efforts 
to correct their deficiencies. 
Colonel Bacon also came to the 27thDivision training area at the same time as Pershing, 
but stayed much longer. He accepted an invitation to have lunch with some of O'Ryan's 
staff and spent much of the occasion filling in the news-starved officers of events in the 
other AEF sectors, like the French front, where some of them longed to be. Bacon told 
them of the recent operation of the I't American Division when it relieved the French at 
Montdidier, and on 28 May captured Cantigny, despite heavy losses from German 
counterattacks. It was the first operation by an American division since arriving in 
France. From there, Bacon*s enthralled audience learned of the 2 nd American Division at 
Belleau Wood a \\eek later. There. t\\o regiments of Marines x\ere matched with some 
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of the German Army's best storm troops and suffered great losses as a result. But after 
three days, the Germans were driven from the Wood. and the Americans captured the 
village of Bouresches. As Col. Franklin W. Ward. in command of the 106 th Infantry. 
recounted, Colonel Bacon's stories were the *first graphic neýý s that has been recei-ý, ed bý 
the "lost" division from their comrades on the American front. ""' Ward's comment 
revealed that being part of a lost division was a constant reminder. to him and the other 
officers and men of 11 Corps, of how isolated they felt from the main body of the AEF. 
Period B Training Begins 
On 25 July, the divisions began Period B training. One battalion of each infantry 
regiment was sent to the front lines for a period of eight days. Up to this point, the 
Americans had only heard stories of combat from the xvar-ýN ear\ British, but noýN they w 
would see for themselves. 'Battle, whatever its frequency - or lack of it - is the end 
towards which most military training is directed, ' one historian noted, 'and is an event 
which comes to loom large in the soldier's mind. -6 1 The first time in the line ýýas 
confusing for the Americans, and there xvas heav,,,, reliance upon the British. When the 
commandimz officer of the 105 th Infantry inquired as to xvhy a \\ orking party from the I" 
Battalion had not completed work on the Dickebush reserve line. he xNas told its British 
guide failed to appear and direct the lost Americans to the area in xN hich the), xý ere 
assigned. 
62 
A regimental historian recalled a feNý ý ears later that *the first trip to the front I ine 
trenches will ever remain oraven upon the memories of the men of the 107 
h Infantr\. ' 
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The unit made the journey under cover of darkness and 'along shell-torn roads that were 
fringed in many places by hidden batteries of British guns. . 63 Once at the front. the 
British soldiers would tease the green American troops and offer lots of 'practical* 
advice. One frequent suggestion was: 'Don't stir up Jerry, Yank: you shoot at Im', he'll 
shoot back twice. ' 
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Not surprisingly, some Americans arrived at the front over-confident. and somexN hat 
arrogant. An example of the latter involved four officers from the 120'h hifantrN. w1lo 
were detached for instruction with the 9th (Glasgow Highlanders) Battalion, Highland 
Light Infantry. One evening, the Scottish officers from the Highlanders were sent on a 
raiding party, and one of the American officers insisted upon accompanying them. He 
was advised to stay behind for lack of experience. Yet, despite the best efforts bý the 
Scots to keep him away, 2 nd Lieutenant Bellamy somehow coaxed a uniform from one of 
his instructors and tagged along with the raiding party dressed as a Highlander. When 
they entered the enemy trenches, the party lost one man to capture, and five others were 
wounded. Perhaps to the disappointment of the Scottish officers, Bellamy was neither 
captured, nor wounded. 
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A bitter British corporal, after leading another AEF regiment to the front lines for the first 
time, was still angry more than a month later, after being subjected to 'the big talk of 
\\hat they \\ere going to do, but had not done yet... All I hope is that when thev do start, 
Jerry will smash them to atoms, for they are nothing more than human garbage, and this 
is the best I can say about them. "' But most British officers had positive experiences 
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with the Americans. A sniper with the 2 nd Worcestershire Regiment recalled xý hen he ltý 
and other officers visited with some excited Americans who had just been brought into 
the line. 'They took us along to one of the huts, and talked aýýay about being shelled bý 
them goddamned. Bosches. ' The British officers reciprocated with ýý ords of 
encouragement while they 'drank their excellent coffee. ' The Americans also treated 
them to an evening meal of chicken, potatoes and peas... *the likes of ý\hich we had not 
tasted for many a long day. ' 
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At the highest level, relations were now peaceful between Pershing and Haig. In a piece 
of correspondence sent from the British commander, Haig ended an otherwise 
businesslike letter with a warm sentiment: 'I take this opportunity of expressing my deep 
appreciation of the cordial way in which all ranks of the American Forces have Nýorked in 
conjunction with the British Army since their arrival in the British zone, and I trust that 
the friendly relations already established may continue for all time. ' 68 
Also in mid-July, Pershing learned that the King was going to award him the Grand Cross 
of the Order of the Bath (G. C. B. ), and a congratulatory letter came from Sir William 
Robertson. The two had been at loggerheads during discussions over amalgamation 
earlier in the year. and had not corresponded since Robertson was sacked as CIGS in 
March. He was noNN assigned to the General Headquarters at Horse Guards in London, 
and the toile of his letter suggested a lingering bitterness toward Lloyd George. 
Robertson \\arned Pershing to be 'careful in looking after the best interests of the 
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American Army. ' As though the two were sharing a dark secret. Pershing responded: 
'You may be sure I understand what you mean. ' 69 
On 26 July, Pershing returned to the British sector for another inspection, this time to see 
the II gth Infantry before it moved to the front. In typical fashion, he arrived six hours 
late and 'made no apology, ' a British officer observed. He "ý\alked along the front ranks 
with a forbidding scowl on his face and did not talk to a single man. All the officers 
seemed dead scared of him. ' 70 Pershing's comments on the regiment are not recorded, so 
it can be assumed that he was mostly pleased with its appearance. 
To boost morale, it was announced that King George V would visit the soldiers the front. 
One hundred soldiers from each American division. as well as the same number from the 
British divisions, were instructed to assemble before the King on 6 August. The troops 
were formed without arms, according to the historian of the 120 th Infantry, because *the 
British were afraid some of them would take a "pot shot" at their ruler. . 71 On the day of 
arrival, a British chaplain delivered a sermon. then afterward a band placed in a field 
across the road played while the divisions marched by. The King sat on a raised platform 
to greet the troops, and after the parade, he visited the 30th Division headquarters with the 
King and Queen of Belgium. According to an eyewitness, the Queen pulled the lanyard 
of a gun in the back area, thus 'hurtling potential death among the Germans, her own 
kin. 72 
17 5 
The British Take the Offensive 
On 8 August 1918, the Australian and Canadian Corps, part of the Fourth British Army. 
attacked German positions east of Amiens. The assault ýýas planned as a limited 
operation like Hamel, but on a much larger scale. With the III British Corps actim-, as 
flank guard to the north and the IX French Corps in the south, the Allies advanced eight 
miles that day. The Germans were caught by surprise, prompting General Ludendorff to 
call this the 'black day of the German Army in this war. ' 73 A key to the successful attack 
was the combined use of aircraft, artillery, tanks, and, most important, ground troops. 
The advance had slowed by 12 August, but it was the beginning of what became known 
as the Hundred Days Campaign, and the beginning of the end for the Germans in north- 
west France. 74 The Americans had a minor role on the second day of the campaign when 
the 13 I't Infantry of the 33 rd was unexpectedly called upon by the III British Corps to 
assist in the capture of the Chipilly Spur and Gressaire Wood, southeast of Arniens. 75 
Pershing received his G. C. B on 12 August at a ceremony primarily to honour units of the 
33 rd Division for their participation at Hamel. King George V also used the occasion as 
an opportunity to impress upon Pershing his desire to have the American troops serve 
with the British Army. The King told him that although *he was not a politician and did 
not see from that point of view, he thought it was very advantageous to have some 
Americans troops serving with the British. ' He offered Pershing use of the Dunkirk as an 
incentive to bring more troops to the British sector, and confessed 'how much it would 
mean after the war to say that the Mo English-speaking races fought side bý side in this 
had heard this before and had a stock ans\\er: lt is not intended to Pershing 
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have the Americans serve either with the French or ýý ith the British. ' he said. *but ýN e are 
now forming armies of our own for which ýýe have sufficient troops. ý76 
Attending the ceremony was Rawlinson, whom Pershing had met before. and if he 
thought little of him the first time, he thought even less of him now. -He does not inspire 
confidence, ' Pershing recorded in his diary. 77 The feeling bemeen them ý\as mutual. 
Rawlinson had described Pershing as a 'tiresome, ignorant and verý obstinate man, as xNe 
shall find out later on when he begins to try conclusions with the Boche on his own. . 78 
11 Corps is Reduced 
Pershing dropped a bombshell on Haig when the two met on 12 August after the 
ceremony, saying he was going to withdraw the divisions from the British. According to 
Pershing's diary, it was an uncomfortable moment for both himself and Haky, and he 
described the conversation as 'not pleasant for a while, though xNe both kept quiet xNIthin 
the bounds of politeness. ' Pershing broke the ice by presentino the usual argument that 
his intentions were to form an independent American Army, and it \vas never meant for 
his divisions to remain permanently with the British. Haig disagreed and countered 
Pershing's argument, saying that it was his understanding that the 10 divisions \ý ere sent 
to him to fight, but now they were all being withdrawn without having participated in aný 
battle. 
In the end, Pershing compromised and allotted the British two divisions, the 27 th and 30t" 
The reason xN hy these two di\ isions \\ere chosen, and \\ hether Haiti had much influence 
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over the decision, remains unclear. One explanation might be that Read recenflý had 
rated them deficient. Pershing may have felt they needed more specialised training and 
were not ready for the operation in the St. Mihiel salient. ýNhich Nýas in the planning 
stages. O'Ryan claimed that the 27hwas selected because Haig ý\as impressed ýNhen he 
reviewed a detachment during the first week in June . 
79 Whatever the reason. it was noxv 
with the British permanently, but Pershing made sure that Haig understood it x\ould 
continue to function under its own commanders. 80 
In making the claim that the American divisions should be allowed to fight under his 
command, Haig grossly exaggerated. Pershing had made it known at the outset that the 
divisions were to train only temporarily with the British, and would be allowed to fight 
only in emergencies. Hamel should have been an indication of his intent. But, Pershing 
reminded him that 'we are all fighting the Germans, and the best ývay, at present, for my 
troops to fight the Germans is in my army. ' The meeting ended, Pershing claimed. with 
Haig confessing 'to seeing my point of view and agreed to the withdrawal of the 
divisions. ' 81 However, Haig's diary reveals a different conclusion. 'A VERY HOT 
DAY' is how he began his diary entry for 12 August. Haig was obviously referring to 
that day's dreadful summer heat, as well as perhaps making a reference to his most recent 
discussion with Pershing. 'I have done everything to equip and help these units of the 
American Army. ' he wrote out of frustration. 'So far, I have had no help from these 
troops (except the three battalions that were used in battle in Chipilly. in error). If he noN\ 
\ýitlldrav, s the five American divisions. he must expect some criticism on his action. not 
onk, from the British troops in the field, but also from the British Government. -82 Hai 
178 
then wrote: 'All I wanted to know was definitelý whether I could prepare to use the 
American troops for an attack... now I know I cannot do so. ' Furthermore. he called 
Pershing 'very obstinate, and stupid' because 'he did not seem to realize the uroenc\ of 
the situation, ' and he 'hankers after a great, self-contained American Army. ' 83 
Such a reaction was far too dramatic. Pershing was within his right to remove the 
divisions. Yet, even Pershing was unsure about this decision and doubted his actions. 
On previous occasions, he turned to the French for advice, and this time was no 
exception. In January, he had sought guidance from Petain regarding amalgamation, and 
now he went to French Premier Georges Clemenceau for counsel. Pershing told him 
about his recent exchange with Haig, and the constant pressure from him and Lloyd 
George to keep his divisions with the British. Clemenceau revealed how he originally 
agreed with the British that the idea of forming an independent American Army was a 
mistake. But after giving this subject more consideration, he was now less inclined to 
side with the British. He was of the opinion that 'everyone who was against the 
Americans on this proposition was wrong. ' The AEF 'should operate separately as an 
American Army, and you [Pershing] should not give it another thought. 84 The 
conversation with Clemenceau had a positive effect, and the change was noticeable in 
Pershing's next letter to Haig: 
My dear Sir Douglas: I have already directed the commanding general, 11 Corps 
to place, at your request, the 27 th and 30'hDivisions in the line. I have, ho%ýever, 
informed General Read that these divisions must remain under their own division 
commanders. We have so often discussed the question of bringing American 
forces together in large units that I am sure it is unnecessary for me to insist upon 
the reasons \Nhy my division commanders should exercise tactical as \\ell as 
adi-ninistrati\ e control over their own troops. As I \\rote you some time ago, I 
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would be very glad if you could find it practicable to utilise the 11 Corps staff in 
an actual tactical command at an early date. I may add that I think the realisation 
of this would be desirable from every point of view. 85 
In closing, Pershing thanked Haig for approving the removal of the divisions. but noý\ 
hinted that the decision resulted from pressure by Foch: 
rd The task that Marshal Foch has confided to me makes it essential that the 33 , 78 th and 80"' Divisions join my forces in this region at the earliest possible 
moment. I spoke to you of this when we last met, and I am now writing Marshal 
Foch and pointing out that the assistance of these divisions is essential to the 
success of the forthcoming operations. I wish also to thank you for your cordial 
cooperation and the prompt manner in which you have met our desires in the 
matter of transferring divisions, especially as at this time, I realize how much this 
may have disarranged plans that you had already made. 86 
Haig's response was more to the point. 'I always know when I am dealino with you what 
your opinion is on the question at issue! ' he wrote Pershing. This is not 'always the case 
with the French. I am very glad to assist you with the entry into the line of the 27"' and 
30th Divisions, and I feel certain that the withdrawal of the remaining divisions will 
appeal to you as being in the general interest. ' Furthermore, he told Pershing. A trust that 
events might justify your decision to withdraw the American troops from the British 
battlefront at the present moment. 'But, I have no doubt that the arrival in this battle of a 
few strong, vigorous American divisions, when the enemy's units are thoroughly ýýorn 
out, would lead to the most decisive news. ' 87 
As the three American divisions made preparations to leave the British sector. on 15 
August, Haig visited the 33" Division headquarters, where General Bell \\as \ýaiting with 
a guard of honour to greet him. This \\as their first meeting. and Hai. (: )7 thought Bell 
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looked like 'a typical -Yankee, " with a little "goatee" beard and moustache. * His 'chief 
difficulty as a commander, Haig guessed, 'is his big stomach, he is so fat that he cannot 
move far or fast without getting out of breath!! ' But, he considered him a 'capital fellow. ' 
Bell told him that he appreciated the British looking after his division, and hoý\ distressed 
he was that 'General Pershing won't let him take part in our offensive battle. '88 
With 50,000 American soldiers now attached to his forces for the foreseeable future. 
Haig wrote Foch on 27 August: 'In order to exploit the present favourable situation, I am 
strongly of the opinion that it is desirable that American divisions should take an active 
share in the battle without delay. ' Foch responded favourably. 'It was not only 
permissible, ' he wrote Haig, 'but desirable that we should use both American divisions at 
present with us in the battle after 31 August. ' 89 
Pershing's close friend and advisor, Brig. Gen. James G. Harbord, 90 was a keen observer 
in the 'game' of politics that the Americans and British were playing. His post-war 
narrative covers in detail the often-stressful relationship between Pershing and Haig. 91 
Harbord visited Pershing at Chaumont on 23 August and 'found the general full of his 
plans and problems. ' Pershing hoped that 'Marshal Foch would direct that certain of our 
divisions serving with the British would be returned to their own First Army.. ' Harbord 
observed, since 'Marshal Haig had always played the game with General Pershing in an 
understanding way. Foch, as Allied commander-in-chief, could easilý have ordered them 
back and saved General Pershin(,, a rather uncomfortable visit to British Headquarters. 
But he left the child on Pershing's lap. ' Still. Harbord correctly surmised that the 'two 
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men (Pershing and Haig) understood each other, and their friendship had never faltered 
from the day they met. ' 92 
As the last of the five American divisions from 11 Corps departed his sector on 25August. 
Haig was still seething. His diary records: 'What will history say regarding this action of 
the Americans leaving the British zone of operations when the decisive battle of the war 
is at its height, and the decision is still in doubtT Would events justiýy his [Pershings] 
decision to withdraw such a large force of American divisions (over 150,000 men) from 
me at the height of battleT Haig asked rhetorically. Tor the present, I am convinced that 
if they had taken part in this battle, they would, owing to the present tired and 
demoralised state of the Germans on this front, have enabled the Allies to obtain 
immediate and decisive results. ' 93 Haig was, of course, exaggerating again. The 
American divisions attached to the BEF would prove to be more than enough strength for 
the coming offensive. 
Defining Moment 
It appeared Pershing and Haig had survived their latest struggle. and both came out on 
top. Pershing gained Allied backing for his own army, while Haig had use of 11 
American Corps for the foreseeable future. Composed of only the 27h and 3 Oth 
Divisions, it was the smallest corps in the AEF. After 12 August. Pershing stopped 
visiting corps headquarters for inspections since he was now too busy organising the AEF 
First Army and making preparations for its first independent operation. \Vith his corps 
no\\ left \\ith the British, Read \\ould have to step up and make decisions as a 
18" 
commander without Pershing looking over his shoulder. Although he still had to keep 
Chaumont informed of how the two divisions \ýere being utilised, he had much more 
latitude to act on his own. 
Whether or not Read realised this, there was dissention within his corps. The chief of 
staff was not happy about the withdrawal of the divisions. Simonds wrote a confidential 
letter to Fox Conner, with a few carefully considered suggestions that indicated his 
preference to have had the entire 11 Corps moved to the main body of the AEF. 'I believe 
that if you had hit them for the five [divisions] instead of the three. they would have 
turned them loose, ' Simonds advised. 'I think the sooner we can get these divisions with 
our own army, the better it will be, and I suggest that since both divisions xý ill finish their 
tour on the front lines about the same time, the termination of that tour will be the 
psychological time to get them away. ' 94 These comments are peculiar since Simonds had 
made no prior indication of his displeasure with the 11 Corps arrangements. There was no 
written response from Conner, and Simonds apparently let the matter drop. 
During the second week of August, Read conducted his first inspection of the two 
divisions in 11 Corps to determine their 'state of training, general preparedness for active 
service, and general efficiency. ' Along w, ith various General Staff officers. Read spent 
two days NN,, ith each division. and the results were disappointing. Although the report of 
this inspection was written two days after Pershing had offered Haig the 27'h and _3 
Oth, 
Read may have told him of his findings in advance. For the 27 th Division, Read reported 
that it x\as *deficient in map readino. sketching. scouting, and patrolling, and rifle and 
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hand grenade practice. ' He also concluded that the division* s officers ýý ere not 
sufficiently zealous in their care of men. On a positive note, Read thought the non- 
commissioned officers were exceptionally good. 
Comments on the 3 Oth Division were also mostly unfavourable. Unlike the 27 
th. its 
officers were zealous. But 'sketchy methods have been used in the II 9hand I 20th 
Infantries. ' Both regiments exhibited inadequate instruction in map reading. sketching. 
and scouting and patrolling. ' At the end of his report.. he ranked the fi-ý, e divisions in his 
corps in order of efficiency. The 27 th and 30thwere the mo worst. 95 
Inspection by the XIX British Corps contradicted Read's report, as least as far as the 217th 
Division was concerned. The inspector determined that 'the keenness. intelligence and 
spirit of all ranks have left nothing to be desired' for the New Yorkers. Although the 
inspector did report some minor deficiencies. such as the irnproper x\earing of caps. 
insufficient knowledge of trench cooking, and a general lack of sanitary education, he 
thought all of this was attributed to 'inexperience and faulty administrative 
596 arrangemen s. 
The Line 
With the 27h and 3 Oth now close to the front and soon likely to be participating in major 
combat, Read was concerned that his corps did not have its own artillerý. It xNas tiexer 
intended for the 11 Corps divisions to have their oý\n artiller\, and from the moment 
artillerN units arrived in France, theý N\ere assigned to the French Army for instruction. 
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There was never any indication that his divisions ýýould be reunited ýNith their artillerY 
while training with the British. Still, Read wrote to the AEF operations branch: 
With regard to divisional troops, the division, at present, has ýý ith it the British 
artillery, and it is presumed that these arrangements can be continued as long as 
the divisions remain on this front. Our experience here has shown that the 
combination of British methods with our own, which is necessary to a certain 
degree where British equipment is used in our organisation, and where the 
smaller units serve together in a mixed larger unit, leads to unavoidable 
complications and results in a hampering of the proper development of our units 
along our lines. 97 
His concern was justified since the artillery regiments that trained for nine months xvith 
the 27 th and 3 Oth at Wadsworth and Sevier would never enter the British sector. Instead, 
the infantry and machine-gun units were forced to operate with the British artillery. 
whom they had not trained with. The two divisions never entirely adjusted, and this 
became a real problem during the Hindenburg Line operation. 
Another concern for the Americans, and all soldiers who fought during the First World 
War, was the terror of gas warfare while at the front. In one horrific experience, 22 men 
of the 30 th Division died as a result of a friendly gas attack that backfired. A similar 
mishap occurred three years before at Loos, when the gas companies of the 2 nd British 
Division released chlorine during an unfavourable wind, resulting in numerous casualties 
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within this division and other units nearby. This time, 400 men and officers of the 105 
Engineer Regiment, under supervision of the British, had transported 2,520 cylinders of 
gas, phosgene and chlorine in nine trains of seven 3-ton trucks each. The trains xýere 
pulled by a light railway to the Trois Rois Spur on a tramway systern organised bN the 
commander of the Royal Engineers Special (gas) Brigade. Maj. Gen. C. H. Foulkes. 99 
The cars x\ ere pushed by hand to positions just below the outpost line. When all troops 
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were withdrawn from the outpost line, the gas was released simultaneouslý from all 
cylinders, with the wind blowing about four miles an hour directl,, toward the eiiem\ 
lines. 
Shortly after the cylinders were released, a steady wind changed direction and bleýý the 
gas clouds back over the Allied lines toward the trains. Recognising the confusion, the 
Germans fired machine guns that caught soldiers from the II 9th and 12 Oth Infantries, ýN ho 
were on patrol at the front, by surprise. Casualties mounted when one of the gas 
cylinders containing phosgene fell nearby and poisoned the men before they could adjust 
their respirators. When inhaled, phosgene was so lethal that only one or two breaths 
could result in mortal respiratory wounds. 100 Other soldiers walked unknowingly into the 
gas cloud and were also immediately affected. 
According to prisoner interrogations a week later. the Germans lost a few animals but no 
, Oth men from the botched attack. 101 There were two investigations of this incident. The -) 
Division gas officer conducted the first, and among his conclusions were that officers 
'pay closer attention' and that 'no one be permitted to remove his respirator before 
receiving an -all is clear" command. ' The chemical advisor to the Second British Army 
carried out the other investigation. and his suggestions were more practical. He surmised 
that the 'leakage of gas around the edges of the mask is important and greatly emphasises 
the need of the nose-clip and mouthpiece Nvith the present type of mask. ' 10-) One bright 
spot NN as the conduct of Sgt. Guy R. Hinson, who first led the men of his platoon awaý 
from the gas cloud to safety. then returned to the cloud on four other occasions to rescue 
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men overcome by the gas. His excellent leadership xýas rewarded ýýith the Distinguished 
Service Cross. 103 
There is little that could have been done to prevent this incident since both officers and 
men had received extensive training in gas warfare. A report written more than a month 
before by the AEF chief of the Chemical Warfare Service informed Read that in addition 
to the regular training of the corps gas personnel, many of its officers and N. C. O. s took a 
special four-day course taught by the British. Also, two hours per xý eek was devoted to 
gas lectures. 1 04 
Learninp- Curve 
One may conclude that by the end of August, 11 American Corps, with its mo divisions, 
was developing into an effective combat unit. Despite distractions from the AEF 
commander-in-chief and poor showing during inspections, it was on a learning curve that 
in many ways resembled what the BEF had been through in its infancy. The Americans 
were learning quickly, thanks in part to the British and Dominion troops, and their 
patience \ý, ith the inexperienced doughboys. Yet, there was still much to be taught, and 
this w, ould become evident as the two divisions were given more difficult tasks. The 
experience of being at the front had already hardened the doughboys. An even greater 
opportunity to test their ability was coming up as the second phase of training came to an 
end. 
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Chapter 5: Alone with the British 
Now that Period B training was completed, 11 American Corps placed both of its 
divisions under tactical control of the Second British Army. and they were ordered into 
battle for the first time. Some officers and men of the 27 th and 30thDivisions had already 
seen action in the form of raids and patrols during rotation to the front with British units. 
In mid-August, sizeable infantry units and their accompanying troops. such as machine- 
gun battalions and engineer regiments, went forward to occupy their o\ý n sectors. \N ithout 
supervision, save for the command by the local British corps commander. The 
Americans of 11 Corps were now, in the common phrase, on their own. 
Forward into Battle 
Over the course of several nights, 16-24 August, the 27th and 3 oth Divisions prepared for 
combat. The 3 Oth Division ordered its 60th Brigade to take over the Canal sector from the 
33 rd British Division, which was located on the north face of the LN's salient, southwest of 
Ypres. The 1] 9 th Infantry was on the right side of the line, the 120th Infantry on its left. 
In reserve was the 5 9th Brigade (117 
th 
and 118 
th Infantries). A week later. the 53 
rd 
Brigade (105thand 106th Infantries) of the 27thDivision relieved the 6 th British Division 
in the Dickebusch sector. It took over the front and support positions with regiments side 
by side, with the 54ýhBrigade (107'hand 108 th Infantries) in reserve. The British divisions 
left their artillery units to support the Americans. ' 
I (\ 
I 'Ji 
Troop movements, as well as transport of supplies, were by light railxýay and conducted 
during the night, because daytime movements towards the front attracted the fire of 
German artillery on top of Kemmel Hill. In advance of infantry and machine-gun units 
were the 102 nd (27 th Division) and 105th (3 Oth Division) Engineers. They had the difficult 
and dangerous task of repairing pockmarked roads, nearly impassable after three N ears of 
shellfire. Once the troops reached the front, they were quartered in wooden huts built bý 
British engineers. Two squads of eight men, with a corporal in charge, slept in a hut. An 
occupant described them as spacious. 1) 
Each day involved surveillance from observation posts and aeroplanes. The first few 
days were reported as calm. A 'quiet, inoffensive attitude, ' is hm, \, - the 30 th Division 
operation report surnmarised this period. 3 But such quiet did not last. Suddenly, as the 
division's historians noted, the scene had now shifted to the battleground of the World 
War -a stem and terrible reality to the men of all ranks. 
4 They were referring to night 
patrols sent out as far as 1,000 yards to probe enemy defences. Troops patrolling too 
close to the German outpost lines were greeted with blasts of machine-gun fire. 
The Germans were initially unaware that Americans had entered their sector, but 
according to a POW interrogated at 27ý' Division headquarters, they realised it when the 
rifle fire became 'more brisk and haphazard. " When asked to elaborate. the soldier from 
the 93 rd German Infantry Regiment stated that soldiers 'who have been in the war for 
some time only fire individually when they are sure they have a target, whereas ne%N 
troops are apt to fire more or less constantly at night, whether or not theý have a target. ' 
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He said the considerable shooting during the past few nights and the flashes from the 
guns allowed the Germans to better pinpoint the American line of advance. Once theý 
recognised that untested American troops were opposing them, it became a daily ritual to 
try their mettle with harassing artillery fire, lobbing shells into back areas to hit 
crossroads and villages. 5 
On 30 August, the enemy conducted a surprise move that further tested the doughboys. 
In the early morning, heavy clouds of smoke crept toward the American lines. An initial 
report said it was a gas attack, but further observation revealed the Germans were burning 
dumps of some kind to mask a withdrawal. A prisoner captured near Kernmel Hill 
confirmed the updated report when he told interrogators that troops were retiring to the 
Wytsch ete- Mess i nes Ridge. He claimed a new line was established in front of 
Armentieres, and that eight men per company in machine-gun posts remained behind on 
6 Kernmel. They were to give the impression of strength . 
XIX British Corps headquarters sent O'Ryan a telegram that night to order patrols from 
his brigade to reconnoitre the left of the line, opposite the 3 Oth Division. The 53 rd Brigade 
instructed elements of the 105 th and 106 th Infantries to enter German trenches to 
determine the depth of the withdrawal. They reported minor resistance from scattered 
machine-gun posts. The patrols were accompanied by members of the 184 th British 
Tunnelling Company. which checked the vacant enemy dugouts for mines and booby 
traps. Later reports to brigade headquarters confirmed the prisoner's statement v, as 
correct, the Germans had given up Kernmel Hill. although not completelý. 7 Additional 
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patrols were told to be ready to advance in support of those sent OUt. 8 The Americans 
were gearing up for their first battle as entire regiments. (Map after page 196). 
The following day, 31 August, 11 British Corps ordered up the 3 Oth Division to send out 
patrols in its sector. A message was sent from Major General Lewis to the 60th Brigade 
to determine enemy strength and location. He made it clear that if strong resistance was 
met, they were to return to their entrenchments. Lewis was not ready to commit to a 
battle. Small parties from the II gth and 120th Infantries were sent out, and like those of 
the 53 rd Brigade, they found the German defences mostly abandoned. Kemmel Hill was 
taken with ease by the Americans that night, even though the Germans were still close by 
in strength. Lewis told the brigade commander to hold the line at the Voormezeele 
Switch and Lock 8 of the canal and await further orders. Messages to the front were 
often sent by runner, but some were communicated by wire. To ensure there was little 
delay in the latter method, the 105 th Signal Battalion laid 15,000 feet of cable along this 
position to establish a forward communications post. 9 
At 7: 30 A. M. the next morning, Lewis gave the order to advance; he was now ready for 
a battle. After a short barrage, a platoon of 40 men from Company 1,120th Infantry 
moved forward towards Lankhof Farm. There, the Germans had constructed a cluster of 
pillboxes in the ruins of an old farm building and positioned machine-gunners and 
snipers. The platoon would face a similar scenario a month later near Bellicourt. As the 
Americans advanced, the Germans withdrew to the canal and abandoned their defences at 
the farm. suffering only t\\o casualties. The platoon then pushed beyond the farm and 
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established contact with the II 9th Infantry advancing on the right of Lock 8. Artillery 
from the 33 rd British Division fired in support, but some shells fell short and caused 
American casualties. ' 0 
Death by friendly fire had recently affected the 3 Oth Division on two other occasions. In 
the initial instance, I't Lt. Robert H. Turner of the 115ý' Machine-Gun Battalion ýý as 
struck on 24 July by a shell from the 186 Battery, Royal Field Artillery while he and 
another officer were on patrol near Belgian Chateau. During the second occurrence, an 
officer in Company M of the 120th Infantry, 2 nd Lt. Lowell T. Wasson, was shot by a 
private from his unit on 7 August. Wasson apparently became confused after returning 
from a patrol near Swan Chateau and had entered a listening post unannounced. The 
private guarding the post was ordered to fire on Wasson by his superiors, who thought the 
intruder was a German conducting a trench raid. " Both friendly fire cases ýý ere 
investigated, and while Turner's death appeared to be an accident and 'entirely 
unavoidable, ' Brigadier General Tyson concluded that in Wasson's case, the shooting 
could have been avoided. 'Orders will be issued to prevent a recurrence of such 
deplorable results, ' Tyson wrote in his report. '" 
With the II 9h taking fire from both its own artillery support and the Germans. two more 
platoons from the 12 Oth Infantry were sent forward to help relieve the chaotic situation. 
After advancing 1,000 yards, they retired, having lost touch xN ith both flanks. The 
Germans complicated matters \Nith fire from trench mortars and machine guns hidden in 
Rav i ne Wood. At 10 A. M., the second battal i on of the II 9h Infantry advanced and held 
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on against heavy resistance. ' 3 During this action, a patrol. including Cpl. Burt T. Forbes 
of Company 1, was acting as a flank guard when a squad of eight Gen-nans approached. 
As the enemy started setting up their machine guns, Forbes crawled by himself and 
charged the Germans. He single-handedly killed three and drove the other five axýaý. 
For this act of bravery, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the French 
Croix de Guerre. 14 Word of the action was sent to the rear by pigeon. ltýýasthefirst 
time this means of communication had been used by the 3 Oth , and it xN as successful. 
Remarkably, only one hour and five minutes elapsed between the time the message \ý as Z7 
sent, received and transmitted by the division staff. 15 
The 3 Oth Division's contribution to the operation was now over, and the results were 
impressive. It gained one square mile of ground and inflicted one hundred German 
casualties, and captured sixteen prisoners. two machine guns, one grenade launcher, and a 
small amount of ammunition and stores. In the process, the 3 Oth lost two officers and 
thirty-five men killed. 
16 
In the 27'hDivision sector, XIX British Corps ordered O"Ryan's men to advance at 10 
A. M. on 31 August and occupy a line along the Vierstraat Switch, 1.000 yards from their 
present location. Patrols from the 1060' Infantry advanced along the line until held up for 
three hours by machine guns concealed in numerous nests near Siege Farm. 17 The 
Americans retaliated \ý, ith their own machine guns. as well as artillerý fired bý units of 
the 66 th British Division. B, y 5: -')'0 P. M., the enemy 
had been driven back. the objective 
gained. " 
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The fighting of August 1918 was over, another bloody month on the Western Front. and 
September started off the same way. On the morning of I September. the 105 th I nfantry 
went forward on its right to pivot on the 30th Division at Vierstraat Village. As it 
attempted to advance to the east crest of Vierstraat Ridge, the Germans again put up 
resistance and drove the Americans back to the village. Again, creativiv, b,., the 
Americans was used to send messages to the rear. In this case. the 102 nd Signal Battalion 
sent messages with pigeons and dogs, and, amazingly. the latter were able to manoeuvre 
through the lines and across ground while subject to heavy fire. 19 
Despite such valiant efforts, communication was still difficult. as reflected in a frantic 
field message sent from the I st Battalion, 105 th Infantry: 'Our new position very heavily 
shelled, making communications almost impossible... request that artillery open fire on 
hill opposite our new position. 20 Information on why the regiment was stalled did not 
reach brigade headquarters until late in the day on I September. Messages were delayed 
because shellfire had cut the forward line. To help remedy the troubling situation. Cpl. 
Kenneth M. McCann of the 102 nd Field Signal Battalion worked for 72 hours, while 
subjected to repeated gas bombardments and machine-gun fire, to replace the forward 
line near Kernmel Hill. For his extraordinary efforts. he was awarded the Distinguished 
Service Cross. 21 
More discouraging news reached the rear from an officer observing at the front that on t: ) 
the left of the 1060' lnfantrý. two battalions had become badly mixed up and crowded into 
the line. 22 Upon learning about the situation. the 53 rd Infantry Brigade commander. Brig. 
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Gen. Albert H. Blanding, ordered the commander of the 106 th. Col. William A. Taylor, to 
the front to investigate. Taylor reported two hours later that the officer in command at 
the front, Maj. Harry S. Hildreth, had *apparently entirely lost control and seemed at a 
loss as to what to do. ' Blanding ordered Taylor to immediately relieve Hildreth from 
command and take charge. Not until daylight the following morning was the situation in 
23 hand . Hildreth was only temporarily reprimanded. He was lucky this \Nas his only 
punishment since it was commonplace in the AEF, as well as the BEF, to permanently 
relieve commanders from their units for poor performance. Hildreth was allowed to 
regain his post as a battalion commander in the 106 th a few days later. 24 
On I September, Blanding ordered his brigade not to make a general attack, but to 
advance the front line as far as possible. With the help of artillery harassment, the two 
regiments moved forward, and by the afternoon of the next day, had captured the 
southern slope of Wytschaete Ridge. At noon on 2 September, Taylor phoned Blanding 
and requested permission to dig in on the line of the first objective and wait for relief. 
His request was denied. Instead, he was ordered to advance further, and after another day 
of hard fighting, the 106 th permanently reoccupied the Chinese Trench, which ran 
between the Berghe and Byron Farms. The Germans by now had retired in some strength 
to Wytschaete Ridge . 
25 The two-day operation ended with the 53 rd Brigade losing two 
officers and seventy-seven men killed, mostly from artillery fire. 26 
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In the Rear 
Two days before the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge commenced. (as the 27 h Dk ision's 
portion of the Ypres-Lys Operation was called). O'Ryan received a visit from the portrait 
painter John Singer Sargent. The British War Memorials Committee of the Ministr% of 
Information commissioned him to paint a large-scale war scene for exhibition in a Hall of 
Remembrance. 27 The subject was to be a picture of the British and American troops 
cooperating. Sargent arrived in France on 2 July 1918 and was attached to the XIX 
Corps. During his visit with the 27 th Division, he became a member of 'A Mess' in his 
quest to learn about the American troops. 
Sargent found little inspiration to paint at 27 th Division headquarters and persuaded an 
American staff officer to take him to Ypres. Roads packed with troops and trucks slowed 
the journey. Instead of despairing, Sargent thought of the congestion as a subject for 
showing the British and Americans together, as long as it 'could be prevented from 
looking like going to the Derby. ' 28 But, for an unknown reason, he never painted the 
picture, or anything else depicting the Anglo-American alliance. Later, he returned to 
2 th 29 7 Division headquarters and sketched O'Ryan . 
On 3 September, the Americans received w'ithdrawal orders, and moved back from the 
Canal and Dickebusch sectors during the next two days. The 41 s' British Division 
th , Oth relieved the 27h. and the 3 35 British Division took the sector vacated by the -) . Relief 
ý ,d of the Ne\\ Yorkers did not go smoothly. When the order reached the _ _) 
Brigade. it 
\\as so far forvvard that it took a considerable amount of time to reach the light rail\ýaýs 
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for transportation to the rear. Once the brigade reached the rear, it found that the 4 I't 
Division was in the midst of moving forward, and considerable congestion ensued. Then 
the men of the 27 th Division, looking forward warm beds and clean uniforms. found that 
billeting and bathing facilities were difficult to find. O'Ryan later wrote that provisions 
had been made for his men, 'but the lack of time and other circumstances prevented it 
being done to the fullest extent. ' 30 
After leaving the front, rumours spread within the divisions as to where theý xý ere headed 
next. Speculation in the 30th Division was that it would join the rest of the American 
Army. But a 14-hour train ride on 6 September took the division to the rear in St. Pol. It 
was a French town of 30,000 used as a rest and training area by the British - nowhere 
near the main body of the AEF. The 27 th Division left Belgium the night before and 
arrived several hours later in France at Beauquesne, where billets were arranged 
throughout the village. For the first time in a month, the Americans were out of reach 
from the German artillery, and the men could relax without fear of shellfire. 31 
Lessons 
While the recent operation was still fresh, the battalion and company commanders were 
charged with after-action reports. Only those written by the 3 oth Division line officers 
remain in both their original form and printed versions in the division history. 32 In many 
cases, they are very detailed and provide a window into the seemingly chaotic American 
experience of being in the line for the first time. In one report, a lieutenant in the II 9th 
Infantry complained that his platoon's ammunition supply was defective, and for 24 
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hours, he had no reserve rounds. 33 Another officer told hoxý the supplý of water that 
reached the front lines during the nights of 2-3 September was not enough for one 
platoon, and 'this shortage, which seems to exist in all parts of the line. is the greatest 
hardship the men have to bear. ' 34 These were annoying problems that had to be 
corrected. Other mistakes were not so insignificant and showed the weaknesses in the 
division's officer corps. 
Problems arose in many situations. After reaching an objective, a platoon commander 
could not communicate with his left flank because he did not have a telephone, lamp, 
pigeons, or even a signalman. 'Liaison was poor, ' he complained. 'I had no ground 
flares, no panels, and no other means of getting in touch with aeroplanes. ' 35 Lt. F. J. 
Dietrele's concerns are echoed in many of the reports, as officers told of poor liaison and 
suggested that further training in this area was essential. Liaison should not have been 
such an issue since 11 Corps had made it a priority during the first phase of training by 
setting up liaison schools in each village. 36 
The American mishaps were also noted by the opposing German troops. In a report dated 
3 September, the commander of the 8hGerman Infantry Division, Major General 
Hamann, remarked: 'Withdrawal of our line confronted the American troops with a task 
, 37 th to which they were by no means equal . When the 27 Division moved out of 
its quiet 
sector to pursue the Germans, Hamann wrote: *The inexperienced troops do not yet know 
how to utilise the terrain in movement, work their way forward during an attack. or 
choose the correct formation in the event the enemy opens artillery fire. ' 38 His comments 
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were similar to those of a soldier from the 93 rd Regiment, ýý ho ýý as captured and 
interrogated days before by the 27 th Division. 
-, rd Hamann, however, incorrectly believed the ýN, ithdrawal of the 5.3 Brigade from the line 
on 2 September was the result of exhaustion. In actuality, it was intended for the brigade 
to withdraw on that date, as reflected in the relief orders sent on 31 August by the 41 st 
British Division, to take effect 2 September. 39 After the war. Hamann was more 
complimentary toward the New Yorkers. O'Ryan had written him to gather information 
for The Story of the 2 7", and the German officer responded, saying 'reports reaching me 
from all sources, particularly from our artillery observation posts, were that your infantry 
was unusually energetic in their attack. ý40 
Such energy that Hamann witnessed was almost certainly the result of experiencing 
combat for the first time. Lieutenant Gow of the 107 th Infantry recognised this and had 
even greater respect for the British after the fighting commenced. 'I can understand now 
why the men who had been instructors could not describe an attack if they were asked 
about it. ' he wrote his family. 'The thing is so tremendous that one's mind simply cannot 
grasp it. It just can't be done. ' 
41 
Enlisted men also had plenty to say about the Ypres-Lys Operation, but their comments 
are not recorded among the official reports. Rather. they are found amongst letters sent 
home, and in personal diaries and memoirs. Like Gow, most men reflected on being at 
the front. The sound of battle created a lasting memory for many soldiers, and one from 
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Tennessee described the constant firing of machine guns as though it xý ere 'popcorn 
popping. 542 Another wrote how it seemed to him that the Germans kneý\ the location of 
every trench, since they harassed the Americans during the day with artillerý fire. At 
night, their planes bombed the front and rear. and the 'artificial camouflage provided 
what little deception was practised upon the enemy. 43 
The hi storian of Company K, II 7th Infantry, wrote: *The night of the big barrage on I 
Kemmel Hill was a night of discomfort and nervousness" among the men in his unit. 
Nerves were frayed, and Private Stewart recalled how a sergeant in his company 
advanced cautiously with his rifle toward a noise in the rear that he insisted was caused 
by German soldiers conducting a raid. Moments later, he learned it was a trench rat 
44 
retreating to its hole . Once the men of Company K actually participated in combat, 
they 'were happier than we had been for many months, for the first battle experiences had 
been met with all the credit that was to have been expected, and we had not quailed at the 
smell of gunpowder. ' 
45 
The bravery of the American soldiers was also applauded by the British. Before the 27 th 
Division returned to New York, Gen. Sir Herbert Plumer told O'Ryan: 'The wonderful 
spirit that animated all ranks and the gallantry displayed in the minor engagements they 
took part in with us foreshadowed the successes they would achieve later. ý 46 
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Training 
Now in the rear again, the 27'1' and 3 Oth returned to training. This meant drilling m ice a 
47 day, and attacking imaginary enemy strongpoints. such as machine-(-Yun nests . The 
current period of training should have been Period C. but with approval from the British. 
Read had sent a memo to the AEF G-5 on 9 August, recommending no further structured 
training. At the time, this made sense, for two reasons. First, the corps was in the 
process of losing three divisions. Second, the two remaining divisions xýere about to 
enter the line. G-5 approved the recommendation and reminded Read that further 
training 'will strongly emphasize the attack - to which should be devoted the greater part 
of all exercises, from those for the platoon to the division. . 48 
Besides training, there was time for recreation. In St. Pol, civilians treated the doughboys 
warmly, prompting one soldier in the 30thDivision to describe the town as 'the most 
beautiful and comfortable area in which his regiment was ever billeted . 
49 The southern 
National Guardsmen reciprocated the hospitality by spending freely on beer and wine in 
the local caf6s . 
50 At Beauquesne, the Scottish comedian and singer Harry Lauder visited 
the New Yorkers. He lunched with O'Ryan and his staff. and later in the day. sat down at 
a small portable piano and entertained members of the division. Lauder ended his 
performance on a sombre note, telling the audience about the death of his son. an officer 
in the British Army killed on the Somme, and how much he hated the Germans and the 
\ý ay they conducted the \\ ar. 51 
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Trainina with Tanks 
During the middle of September, the Americans xý ere introduced to the tactic of 
advancing the infantry with support from tanks. The 33 rd American Division. no%ý Coone. 
had received rudimentary training in this technique before the Hamel operation. At 
Hamel, however, tanks played an auxiliary role. German defences were weak. ýN ith little 
wire, so it was unnecessary for tanks to lead the assau It. 
52 For the 27thand 3 Oth , tank 
training was new. The British conducted the training at their tank centre near St. Pol and 
distributed the most recent training manual, Tanks and Their Employment in Cooperation 
with Other Arms (SS 214). Published in August, it superseded two other manuals. 
incorporating lessons from the Somme, Cambrai, and even Hamel. 53 Although the future 
Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, who was then serving as chief of staff of the Tank Corps, thought 
the author of SS 214 an 'ignoramus, ' recent analysis concludes it to be a balanced and 
objective work. The manual's chief claim was that infantry constituted the only arm that 
could seize and hold a position, and tanks had to assist the infantry . 
5' This was a fair 
assessment since the tank had not yet developed to the point where it could be used 
without infantry support. " One historian has calculated that infantry casualties were 
much lighter when men fought with the advantage of properly mounted tank attacks. 56 
The effectiveness of tanks and infantry cooperating depended upon how well ground 
troops had trained, and other factors, such as terrain and weather. Cambrai is an example 
of the tank's capabilities. Corporal Dillon of the Tank Corps remembered hoN\ 'the tanks 
cleared tile \\ire for the crossing of large numbers of people by driving into it t\\ o rn 
07 
abreast. ' The result was to 'drag the enormous barbed-wire fences into balls of xN ire 
about 20 feet high, and when they cleared the ground, it was clean as a \N histle. ý57 
Although some British officers continued to question its usefulness. even after Hamel. the 
tank was now an integral part of BEF doctrine and would remain so for the rest of the 
war. Rawlinson's Fourth Army used tanks successfully, particularly during the attack on 
Amiens, where 324 heavy tanks and 96 Whippets took part . 
58 The downside was that this 
attack overstretched the Tank Corps, and at home, production could not keep up NNIth 
demand. 
Why the British were now anxious to train the Americans with tanks was hinted at by 
their staff officers. O'Ryan revealed in his history of the 27 th Division how it was 
'intimated that in the near future, the division might be called upon to carry out a mission 
of great importance, which would require its use of what was popularly known as a 
"shock division . 
"'59 The mission involving the Americans was going to be against the 
Hindenburg Line; the operation, in the early stages of planning, would include a 
significant number of tanks. An American tank battalion, the 301't, had been training in 
Stanford, England under British direction since early July with Mark Vs, and it would 
support the 27 th Division . 
60 The 30"' Division would be supported by a British tank unit 
(4 th Tank Brigade). 'Although not appreciated at the time, ' as the historian of the II 9th 
Infantry wrote, the training with tanks 'proved of inestimable value in the subsequent 
operations of the regiment. "" 
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The British Front 
While the men of 11 American Corps had their first exposure to combat near Ypres, the 
BEF attacked on three parts of the front. Lt. Gen. Sir Julian Byng's Third Armý ýý as 
fighting to the north, between Arras and the old Somme battlefield. There it droN e the 
enemy 4,000 yards on a front of nine miles between Moyenneville and Beaucourt. On 
the 22 August, the Fourth Arrny, with only III Corps and the Australian Corps, captured 
Albert. Eager to keep momentum going, Haig ordered the Third and Fourth Armies to 
attack on a 33-mile front the next day. 62 On the night of 25 August. both made steady 
progress between Lihons and Mercatel. Led by the Australians, the Fourth Army was on 
the north-south section of the Somme by 29 August, and on the same day, the New 
Zealand Division, attached to Byng's army. took Bapaume. During this phase of what 
became the Hundred Days campaign, army commanders had little say in the planning of 
battles. Rather, division and brigade commanders improvised as necessary. 63 By this 
time in the war, the corps commanders exercised little supervision over divisions during 
attacks and only intervened if a coordinated operation was necessary. 64 
Meanwhile, Haig ordered Gen. Sir Henry Horne's First Army to attack on 26 August 
against the Drocourt-Qudant line south of the Scarpe, with the intent to secure a front and 
flank on the Bourlon Wood. He hoped Home would catch the enemy retreating from the 
65 Canal du Nord . As 
in the past, Home gave the task to Sir Arthur Currie's Canadian 
Corps. Like Amiens, the attack. at first. was a surprise, and significant gains x\ere made 
by the 2 nd and 3 rd Canadian Divisions. But also like Amiens, German resistance 
stiffened. and the assault stalled two days later. The Canadian divisions did not reach 
,. )Og 
their objective, even though they took 3,300 prisoners, and a significant amount of 
artillery pieces and machine guns. 66 
A marked achievement of this offensive was the capture of Mont St. Quentin on I 
September by the 2 nd Australian Division, which led to the fall of P6ronne the next day. 
On 2 September, the Canadian Corps breeched the Drocourt-Qu6ant position southeast of 
Arras. The Germans were left with only one option - retire to the Hindenburg Line - and 
this took until II September to complete. As Rawlinson's biographers point out, it was 
the superior British artillery, along with skilful use of fire by the infantry that suppressed 
German artillery and machine guns. 67 
The BEF continued to press the enemy, with Byng launching an attack against 
Havrincourt to secure two spurs running parallel to his front. His objective was to breach 
the outer German defences. Three divisions of the Third Army moved forward on 12 
September, and by that evening, one division, the 62 nd , had reached Havrincourt. The 
outcome, according to historians Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, had 'no dramatic 
operational or strategic result. ' 68 But it was a forward move. 
The Next Operation 
On 8 September, Haig asked his army commanders for recommendations on future 
operations. Although his query was vague, he wanted to know hoxv their forces could 
contribute to a general Allied attack against the Hindenburg Line. General Foch had 
conceived the idea of a large-scale operation in July. and the plan presented to the Allied 
210 
commanders on the 24 th of that month sought to reduce the German salient created by the 
spring and summer offensives. He hoped to relieve the threats to the important Paris- 
Nancy and Paris-Amiens railway communications. 
The Hindenburg Line, called the Siegfried Line or Sieg(riedstellung by the Germans, %\ as 
conceived in the winter of 1916-17, shortly after Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and 
First Quartermaster-General Eric Ludendorff took command of the OHL. 69 It ýý as bLiilt 
by the forced labour of prisoners of war and conscripted French citizens. and consisted of 
three trench systems protected by strongly built, heavy barbed-wire entanglements. To 
strengthen their trench systems, the Germans constructed concrete machine-gun 
emplacements, concrete observation posts with concrete shelters, and many dugouts that. 
in some cases, were wired for electric lights. 70 The high command of the German Army 
believed it impregnable, and that it would keep the enemy from Germany's borders. 71 
Byng responded to Haig the following day by suggesting an immediate attack against the 
German defences before they had a chance to rebuild their forces. Awaiting reports from 
Horne and Rawlinson, Haig travelled on II September to London for a meeting at the 
War Office 'to explain how greatly the situation in the field had changed to the advantage 
of the Allies. ' During an interview with Lord Milner, he stressed that in the last month, 
his army had taken 77,000 prisoners and 800 guns. He argued that the German Army 
was near collapse, and suffering from morale and disciplinary problems in maný of its 
division S. 72 What Haig sought from Milner were men to exploit this favourable 
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condition. He requested home defence and reserve troops from England, as NNell as 
aeroplanes and more ammunition for his arm), in France. 
The Secretary of State for War agreed, and promised to try and hel P. 73 But Milner 
apparently was less enthusiastic about Haig's request than he admitted. T,, \o \\eeks after 
his conversation with the BEF commander. Sir Henry Wilson told Milner that he thought 
Haig 'ridiculously optimistic, and I am afraid that he may embark on another 
Passchendaele. ' 74 
When Haig returned from London, he heard from his First and Fourth Army 
commanders. Home wanted to cooperate with the Third Army by driving toward 
Cambrai and crossing the Canal du Nord. Rawlinson's plan was more ambitious. He 
wanted to seize the outer defences of the Hindenburg Line. 75 He was anxious to attack 
this position as soon as possible because his intelligence staff reported that only three of 
the nine German divisions opposing the Fourth Army were highly rated. and the other six 
rated average. 76 The three top-rated divisions had served in defensive positions for most 
of 1918, the other divisions were just as Haig had reported to Milner - under-strength 
with low morale. Fourth Army intelligence estimated that six more divisions were within 
a 72-hour march of reinforcing the lines. 77 Rawlinson"s chief of staff calculated an attack 
that 'if carried out at an early date would deny the enemy any opportunity of reorganising 
his troops, improving his defences, or becoming familiar with the scheme of his 
defences. ' 78 The ground on \\ hich Ra\\ linson wanted to attack included the old British 
trench lines. no\\ used by the Germans as a forward defence. 79 
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Rawlinson's proposal had an important advantage. At his disposal ýýas a defence plan 
captured from a German headquarters on 8 August. It re-vealed the extensive features of 
the Hindenburg Line, detailing lines between the Oise River and Bellicourt. It provided 
every battery position, barrage line and observation post, as well as infantr% and artiller% 
80 headquarters. 
The Americans 
The two American divisions serving with the British lay at the very centre of the Fourth 
Army's plan for an attack on the Hindenburg Line. With a clear understanding of how 
the line was composed, Rawlinson said that the purpose of the operation was to complete 
the demoralisation of the enemy by destruction of his defences, including vv ire and 
dugouts. The objective was to break through the Hindenburg Line in the Nauroy-Gouy 
sector, and cross the St. Quentin Canal. To meet this objective, Rawlinson needed fresh 
troops, and the 27thand 3 01h Divisions fitted perfectly into this plan. 
Rawlinson ordered Lieutenant General Monash to submit a proposal for a joint operation 
with his corps and the American divisions under tactical command of the Fourth Army. 
The Australian commander was pleased to have the Americans: *My experience of the 
quality of the American troops. both at the battle of Hamel and on the Chipilly Spur, had 
been eminently satisfactory. It was true that this new American Corps had no previous 
battle service, but measures were possible to supply them with any technical guidance 
,8 Ih , Oth that they might lack. 1 He ignored the fact that a brigade from both the 27 and -) 
Divisions had recently spent three weeks in Belgium and engaged the enemý during a 
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three-day operation. But that operation was far from the scale and complexit,, of ý\ hat he 
was planning for this attack. The Australian official historian. C. E. W. Bean, was correct 
when he noted that 'the task thus allotted to the Americans by Monash was at least as 
great as any that he had ever set for Australian divisions, if not greater. . 82 
Monash was also happy to provide relief for the tired Australian divisions that had been 
in the line since 8 August. The constant fighting had driven two of his battalions to 
mutiny. On 14 September, the 590' Battalion. with only a short rest, was ordered back 
into the line after a week of continuous fighting. The men refused to move to the front. 
and it took the coaxing of officers to get them to obey. 83 A week later. a similar incident 
occurred when 119 men from the I" Battalion refused to carry out an order and go 
forward. The men were tried and all but one found guilty, but instead of being charged 
with mutiny, they were charged with desertion. Two months later. the war ended, 
preventing enforcement of the sentences. Normally mutiny meant the death penalty, but it 
84 
was not introduced in the AIF. 
The Battle Plan 
It was not until 19 September when a telephone message sent from Lt. Col. W. G. S. 
Dobbie of the Operations Section, General Staff, British G. H. Q. to the 11 American Corps 
headquarters alerted Read that something was in the planning stages, and that the 27'hand 
3 Oth Divisions were being transferred to the Fourth Army. Later in the daý. Colonel 
Bacon paid a visit to Read and confirmed what he already suspected - his troops would 
play a major role in the upcoming operation. Read then visited Fourth Arm,, 
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headquarters the following day and learned the current details of the operation. Ready or 
not, his troops were going to enter their first major battle. 85 
As in previous operations, Monash's plan for the Hindenburg Line operation considered 
almost every conceivable scenario. He reasoned that because the line consisted of 
prepared defences, a canal crossing would be risky. Instead, Monash proposed piercing t7 
the line only at the tunnel sector, where tanks could be used. To soften the defences. he 
wanted a heavy preliminary bombardment, lasting two days. 
The crux of the operation was for the Fourth Army, supported on its right by the First 
French Army, to attack the Hindenburg defences on the southern end of the line between 
St. Quentin and Vendhuile. This portion of the attack was to occur on two fronts - the A 
British Corps on the south, and the Australians and Americans on the north. III British 
Corps was assigned to the left, but would not take part in the assault. It was to secure the 
left flank of the Australians and Americans, and mop up the ground west of the canal 
once the first objective had been achieved. Air support would play a part before and 
during the operation. It was to be provided by the 5 th RAF Brigade, which included 17 
squadrons, or 337 aeroplanes, to supply crucial reconnaissance and observation. 86 
The American jump-off line faced the outer defences of the Hindenburg system west of 
the Bellicourt tunnel entrance. Terrain sloped toward the east, rising at Bony. There was 
very little natural cover. as any trees and hedges had been destroyed during the course of 
the war. The main defensive structure \\as the St. Quentin-Cambrai Tunnel. built by 
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Napoleon between 1802 and 1810. It was this extraordinar% tunnel that the Germans 
utilised as an elaborate, near impregnable, position. Its length is about 6.000 Nards. and 
its depth below the surface is between 15 and 20 yards. The top of the tunnel is 10 yards 
wide, and 18 yards wide at the water level. The Germans used the blocks in the centre 
and at each end as machine-gun emplacements. Inside the tunnel, the Germans placed 
numerous barges for quartering troops. In addition to the north and south entrances to the 
tunnel, there were numerous underground passages that connected xN ith all parts of the 
main Hindenburg Line. Water flowed in a north to south direction. 87 
Three American regiments from both divisions were to be used. Each objective ý\ as 
identified by colour on the operation maps. The outpost line was blue, the main trench 
system at the tunnel was green, and the Beaurevoir Line was red. On the right of the line, 
the 3 Oth Division, with the 60'hBrigade (I I gth and 120th Infantries). was to move ahead 
4,500 yards on a frontage of 3,000 yards towards Bellicourt. Two battalions from each 
regiment would advance 750 yards, while the other two battalions were to follow in 
support for mopping up duties. The 59thBrigade, xvith the 118 th Infantry in the lead, 
would form the south defensive flank. It was to proceed 2,000 yards east of the tunnel, 
and, at this point, the 5 th Australian Division would pass through and beyond the 
Americans to secure the final objective, the Beaurevoir Line. 88 The II 7th lnfantrý 
Regiment was to follow the 120 th Infantry across the tunnel, then deploy, facing south. at 
the conclusion of the barrage. Afterward, the 117 th x\ould continue south\\ ard to protect 
the flanks of the 5 
th Australian Division. One company of the 120th Infantry Regiment, 
Supported by a section of machine guns, xN as given the task of seizing and holding the 
216 
southern exit of the tunnel at Riqueval. From this point, the Oth Division xwuld pause 
and consolidate, then continue to the next objective, a strongpoint that stretched from 
89 Cabaret Farm to the north to Nauroy to the south . 
On the left of the line, two battalions from the 107 th and 108 
th Infantries of the 27 
th 
Division were to advance toward Le Catelet, with two other battalions following to 
support and mop up. One battalion of the 106th Infantry would follow in the rear of the 
attacking line of the 107 th Infantry and assist in mopping up the tunnel and exits. Then 
the 105 th Infantry was to follow in rear of the 106 th . cross the tunnel, change direction to 
the left, then deploy and halt in rear of the 107 th - After halting on the Green Line, the 
107 th and 108 
th 
would be leapfrogged by the 3 rd Australian Division, follow, ing through 
the 27 th Division sector. The Australians would then exploit the situation and attack east 
to the Red Line. 
At the same time, the 105 th Infantry, supported by three batteries of British field artillery 
and one company of tanks, was to advance north beyond the dotted Green Line to its 
objective, the Red Line. The regiment was to consolidate on this line and establish 
contact with the 3 rd Australian Division on its right and the 18'hBritish Division on its 
left at the canal. Monash calculated that the Green Line would be reached by 10 A. M., 
and the Green and Red lines by 2 P. M. 90 
On 18 September. Monash submitted this plan to Rawlinson, who approved it \ýith some 
modifications at a Fourth Army conference the follow-ing day. The first da\'s objectke, 
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which Monash thought would be the Beaurevoir Line, ý, vas to be attacked only if there 
was success in penetrating the main Hindenburg Line and its support line (Le Catelet). 
The most significant change Rawlinson made was the addition of the 46hBritish 
Division,, which was now attached to IX Corps. He also increased the heavy tanks to 
162, and added Whippets and armoured cars. Monash was in full agreement \\ ith the 
latter addition. He later said it was a 'modification I could readily concur. . But. he \\as 
opposed to including IX Corps in the operation plan because it would broaden the area of 
attack. Rawlinson overruled him. 91 
Lt. Gen. Sir Walter Braithwaite, the IX Corps commander. had offered the 460' Division 
to Rawlinson for the difficult task of crossing the canal at Bellenglise, south of Bellicourt. 
He and his staff devised an elaborate scheme to cross the canal, where the xuter was at 
some places 6 feet deep. The plan was to use 3.000 lifebelts, along with light rafts, 
ladders, collapsible boats and heaving lines. A few days before the attack, Braithwaite 
rehearsed his men on the banks of the Somme to acquaint them with the difficulties of the 
upcoming task. 
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The final plan of operation was forwarded to Haig, who signed off with the realisation 
that it had both political and military implications. Sir Henry Wilson had warned him 
about 'Incurring heavy losses in attacks on the Hindenburg Line, as opposed to losses 
from drivini,, the enemy back to that line. ' He made sure Haig understood that 'the War 
Cabinet \\ould become anxious if we received heavy punishment. " q-, Haig lamented in 
his diary: 'The Cabinet is ready to meddle and interfere in my plans in an underhanded 
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way, but does not dare openly say that it means to take the responsibilitý for aný failure. 
though it is ready to take credit for every success. If rný attack is successful, I ý\ III 
, 94 remain on as C. in C. If we fail, or our losses are excessive, I can hope for no mercý . 
The Fourth Army operation, set for 29 September. was part of a more general Allied 
attack. The AEF First Army was to attack on 26 September with the French hem een the 
Meuse River and Verdun, in the general direction of Sedan and M&i&es. The follox\ ing) 
day, the First and Third British Armies would attack on the Cambrai front in the direction 
of Valenciennes and Maubeuge. On 28 September, the Second British Army. the Belgian 
Army, and the French in Flanders were to attack on the Ypres front towards Ghent. 95 
Plans for the PreliminaEy Attack 
For the attack on the Hindenburg Line to be a success, the Fourth Army would first have 
to occupy the outer German defences, including the Knoll, and Guillemont and 
Quennemont Farms. The two farms and the Knoll, a crop-laden crest named Sappenberg 
by the Germans, were heavily fortified with field guns, machine guns, anti-tank rifles and zg 
infantry. 96 If this objective was taken, it would become the jump-off point for the main 
attack by the Americans. As Rawlinson's chief of staff recognised, if the Germans held 
the three defensive points, *it would be very difficult to move our artillery sufficiently far 
forward for it to be able to support our attacking troops NN ith an efficient barrage behind 
the main Hindenburg Line. 97 
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Artillery support, in the form of a creeping barrage! xý as by now an important element to 
the BEF doctrine. It was designed to protect advancing infantr'y ýýhile neutralising enemy 
defences. The origins of creeping barrage date back to late 1915, with the introduction of 
the lifting barrage, which evolved into the creeping barrage that was used durin-g some of 
the attacks on I July 1916, the first day of the Somme. 98 With a few exceptions, it ýýas 
incorporated into all battle plans in 1918. Under cover of a pre-assault bombardment that 
was intended to clemoralise the German troops while suppressing their artillery and 
disrupting the defensive system, the plan thus called for limited advances to capture the 
high ground adjacent to the German line, so that ajump-off point could be established. 
Once this objective was accomplished, field guns and remaining infantry woLlId move 
forward for the main assault. 99 
The crucial role of the artillery in this operation cannot be overstated. The barrage for 
this attack was to fall on two lines. At the start of thejump-off, it would fall 200 yards in 
front of the infantry start line for four minutes, then lift at 100-yard increments. On the 
first line, field pieces would be used to fire H. E. (High Explosive) shells with 
instantaneous fuse, and shrapnel. On the second line, heavier artillery would concentrate 
on the mouth of the tunnel, the villages connecting the line, and other positions suspected 
of having high concentrations of enemy forces. This would include communication 
systems, machine-gun posts and command centres. 100 In addition to the artillery. the 
flanks of the attack were to be protected by a smoke screen provided by one field artillerý, 
brigade on each flank. This was to occur after the artillery barrage and the infantry 
attained its first objective. 'O' 
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As Rawlinson's biographers acknowledge, the British artillerymen had the advantage of 
not only the size of the bombardment. butTrom their positions on the ridge. they enjoyed 
the best observation over any major German defensive yet attacked during, the course of 
the war. ' 102 Yet, as the Fourth Army and its attached units ýNould soon learn, the portion 
of the Hindenburg Line facing them was more formidable than realised. and even the 
heaviest and most concentrated artillery was not enough. 
Advance Toward the Hindenbura Line, 18-24 September 1918 
On 18 September, British artillery erupted against the German outpost line; a fex\ hours 
later, the infantry advanced. This preliminary operation, led bv 111, IV and IX British 
Corps, encountered strong defences, including a link of villages and trenches x\ell 
fortified with dugouts. In the III Corps sector, the attack was made against a fresh 
German division that had entered the line the previous evening, and by the end of the day, 
the attack had made few gains. Rawlinson was initially optimistic about the operation, as 
reflected in his diary entries for the l8th: 'IX Corps got on well. but had hard fighting. 
Very important success as we can now take the Hindenburg Line. ' He remained 
optimistic the next day: 'All looks hopeful. III Corps made some progress, but IV Corps 
did not get on. " 03 (Map after page 221). 
His optimism diminished when his army stalled, and on 21 September, Rawlinson 
ordered another attack bý Ill Corps (12th 18 th . 58 
th and 74thBritish Divisions) to capture 
the outpost I ine \\ ith assistance from the I" Australian Division on the right. The 74t" 
Division objective \\as Quennemont Farm, Quennet Copse and Gillemont Farm, \\hile 
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the 18 th Division was ordered to seize the Knoll. The 12thDivision ýý as to strike at 
Braeton Post and Little Priel Farm. and the 58 th Division was tasked with takin(-, the 
trench system north of there. 104 Providing support were II tanks from the 2 nd British 
Tank Battalion. This attack started at 5: 40 A. M., with the divisions advancing under a 
creeping barrage. Elements of the 74"' Division in the north went as far as Quennemont 
and Guillemont Farms, but the Germans were waiting for them. The enemy laid dox\ na 
protective barrage on its front lines, but, miraculously. the British and Australians x\ent 
on until several belts of wire stopped them cold. Men bunched up and sought protection 
in shell-holes. Forward troops were isolated; support companies were caught in the 
crossfire of machine guns. Several attempts to advance were made, but they were 
unsuccessful and casualties mounted. 
The 18 th Division advanced from the south with one battalion from the I" Australian 
Division and made it as far as Duncan and Doleful Posts, but could not make it to the 
Knoll. Ivor Maxse's old division hung on to its position until relief from the Americans 
came on 26 September. ' 05 At this point in the war, the 18 th was a very different division 
to the one Maxse had commanded. It was now composed mostlY of conscripts, and the 
average company strength was down to about 70 men. Although the 18 th Division had 
fought well thus far in the Hundred Days campaign, it was worn out and depleted. 106 The 
division's historian correctly called the results of this latest attack *a tragic business. ' 107 
Both the] 2 th and 58 th Divisions were also prevented from reaching their objectives as the 
fighting continued all day and into 22 September. The next two days sa\N, sporadic 
1 
counterattacks, but the III Corps front remained unchanged \, ý hen it ýý as taken over b\ the 
Americans on 24 September. 
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Rawlinson's diary for the 21 st reflected despair: *They (111 Corps) were pushed back by 
the counterattack and did not hold on well. They are very tired. "09 He had little 
confidence in the corps from the ouset, and his frustration was directed mostlý at the 
corps commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard Butler. He had been unhappy with Butler for 
some time, and a few days after the Amiens attack, Rawlinson placed him on sick leave 
because of recurring insomnia. He returned to duty on 12 September. but Rawlinson was 
still unsure about his abilities after a visit to III Corps headquarters four days later. His 
diary for 16 September indicates such apprehension: *1 am pretty sure the Australian and 
IX Corps will do theirjobs, but am not so confident about the III Corps, ' he wrote. I10 
Rawlinson also predicted that there might be trouble with Butler's portion of the outpost 
line attack because he had little control over his division commanders. He 'has not the 
practical experience to make decisions, ' Rawlinson claimed, and he planned 'to talk 
seriously with Butler, for it will be his fault. "" 
This begs the question of why he was even brought back to command III Corps. If 
Rawlinson had truly lost confidence in Butler's abilities. he certainly could have found a 
competent division commander to replace him. " 2 Despite the problems with III Corps, 
there were two bright spots in the preliminary operation. In the centre, the Australian 
Corps overran German positions on the ridge, which included three former British lines. 
By the end of the daN. it overlooked the Hindenburo Line from the canal south of 
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Bellenglise to the tunnel north of Bellicourt. To the south, the I't and 6thBritish 
Divisions of IX Corps encountered heavy machine-gun fire, preventing the infantrý from 
coordinating its operations with the French. Yet they still secured a reasonably good 
jump-off position for the main attack. ' 13 
The Americans Move Forward 
On 20 September, the 27 th and 3 oth Divisions transferred to the Fourth Arnný to operate 
with the Australian Corps in the proposed operation. ' 14 The two divisions moved to the 
area of Tincourt by British bus and truck (lorry), and it took about seven hours to reach 
their new station. Only days before, Tincourt had been in German possession. Upon 
arrival, the cloughboys found 'there were no shelters of any kind available, but everyone 
was so tired, they simply laid down under some trees, wrapped blankets about 
themselves, and went to sleep. , 11 5 
Tincourt was so close to the front, according to one of the 117 th Infantry historians, that 
the men could see 'the flash of guns are at no great distance, * and *x\e all realised that our 
days in the rest area were over for the time being. "' 6 With the operation just days away, 
the past two weeks in the rest areas must have seemed a lifetime ago. Pvt. Harry T. 
Mitchell from the 107 th Infantry recalled that -resting" did not mean all the word 
implieV although 'as hard as we worked, we thoroughly enjoyed our stay in Beauqesne. ' 
His unit had entrained at Tincourt on the 233 rd . and afterward 
hiked to a valleý near Haut 
Allains x\ here camp was set Up. 
117 There the 107 th spent the next six daý s preparing for 
an operation over 300 officers and men \\oLild not survive. 
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A few days later, Mitchell and the rest of the 27hDivision relieved the 18'h and 74ýh 
British Divisions in the sector southwest of Guoy. while at the same time, the 3 O'h 
Division relieved the I't Australian Division in the Nauroy sector directlý \\est of 
Bellicourt. Both divisions entered the line with far below the full AEF established 
strength of 28,000 per division. Neither had received replacements since arriving in 
France. The 27 th reported strength at 16,136, and the 30thwas a little better vN ith 
19,059.118 There were three main reasons why the 11 Corps divisions \ý ere belox\ 
strength. First, they did not have their field artillery regiments and ammunition trains, 
which comprised about 7,000 officers and men. Second, casualties as a result of training 
and operations had thinned the ranks; and third. illness from the first wave of the 
influenza outbreak that hit the Western Front around 15 September left the divisions 
depleted. "9 
Still another factor affected the divisions. Many officers missed the operation because of 
the AEF G. H. Q. 's decision to commence an officers' school at Langres on 27 September. 
The 27 th Division was ordered to send 29 officers, while the 3 Oth Division was in worse 
shape, with more than 100 of its officers detailed to either the corps or gas schools. ' 20 
Such thoughtlessness by Pershing's staff also affected the AEF First Army divisions 
about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne Operation. However. even though they ýN, ere 
under-strength, the two American divisions were still more than twice the size of the 
British and Australian divisions. and four times the strength of the German divisions 
opposing them. 
121 
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225 
For the Hindenburg Line operation, Read turned over tactical command to Monash. 
moved his headquarters close to him, and allowed the Australian commander full access 
to 27'h and 30th Division staff. This was logical as neither Read, nor aný of his staff, 
obviously had experience directing a large-scale operation. Monash could not have been 
happier with the agreement. 'I am bound to say that the arrangement caused me no 
anxiety or difficulty, ' recalled the Australian commander. "General Read and his staff 
most readily adapted themselves to the situation. ý 122 Although the orders and reports 
generated by Read's staff indicated that 11 Corps was 'affiliated' with the Australian 
Corps, in reality, the Americans were serving under the Australians. 123 
Before relinquishing command to Monash, Read met his two division commanders. 
O'Ryan, who had suspected that his division was training for a major operation. ýý as now 
convinced 'from the intensive character of the special training of the officers and men 
that the division was to take some important role of an offensive nature. ' 124 His 
suspicions were realised on 23 September, when Read outlined the upcoming operation 
to O'Ryan and Lewis. Read told them the most difficult part of the operation was going 
to be on the northern end of the tunnel because the British were having trouble with the 
enemy outpost line in this sector. He asked O'Ryan and Lewis their views as to xýhich 
division should be assigned to this sector, and both said they had no preference. For no 
apparent reason, Read made the decision to select the 27 th Division. and O'Ryan claimed 
that it Nvas because of 'its training and experience. ' This comment is odd since Lewis' 
division had the same amount of experience as the New Yorkers... as \ýell as more men. 
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O'Ryan then told his troops they might have to undertake a preliminar\ operation to gain 
a more suitable jump-off point, since the III British Corps attacks were not going ýN e 1,. 
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Unlike Hamel, where General Pershing displayed petty interference, 11 Corps noxN 
received no instructions from AEF headquarters for the upcoming attack. Because the 
attack on the Hindenburg Line was part of a large Allied effort between the Meuse and 
Yser Rivers, Pershing was occupied with planning and organising his phase of the 
operation, and seemed to have overlooked the divisions serving with the British. Ten 
days before the First American Army attacked the St. Mihiel salient, on 12 September. 
seven American and two French divisions pushed the withdrawing Germans from the 
salient, at a high cost for both sides. American casualties numbered 7,000. and the 
Germans lost 2,300 killed and wounded, 15,000 prisoners and 460 guns. ' 27 From here, 
the AEF First Army had the difficult task of shifting divisions to the northwest to the 
Meuse-Argonne. 
Pershing was certainly aware of the 11 Corps situation because Bacon had been sent to his 
headquarters on 22 September by Haig 'to find out how the latter's arrangements were 
getting on, and to acquaint him with what I am proposing to do with the two American 
divisions still with the British Army. ' 
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PreLlarations for the 012eration 
There xN, as concern xN ithin II American Corps about hoNN well the officers xý ould perform. 
As the after-action reports for the Ypres-Lys Operation shm\ ed, many officers ran into 
'27 
difficulty during combat. Major General Lewis expressed his personal apprehension in a 
memorandum to his 59th Brigade commander. Trom numerous observations. ' he told 
Tyson. 'I am convinced that the organisations of the command are not receix.,, ing the 
maximum and desirable amount of observation, and inspection by the commanders of the 
higher units. While, of course, I do not intend to dictate specifically how, you and the 
members of your staff shall employ your time, I do desire to make the following remarks 
for your consideration. ' 
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Lewis also indicated that he had 'seldom seen a regimental commander supervising 
instruction, and too often, the battalion commanders are content to stand around ýN ithout 
actively engaging in the instruction, or correcting things that are obvious to a x., erý 
cursory observation. ' He then told Tyson to *have frequent conferences with your field 
officers for the purpose of instructing them in these matters, and to learn what corrective 
steps are being taken by them. " 30 His comments seem to have helped Tyson's brigade, 
since it fought well during the forthcoming operation, and the next at the Selle River. 
To assist the Americans with operational planning. Monash created an Australian 
Mission under the direction of Maj. Gen. Ewen George Sinclair-MacLagan. Eighty-three 
officers and 127 non-commissioned officers from the I" and 4 th Australian Divisions 
scrved as advisors to the 27 th and 3 Oth Divisions. Each was carefully selected to 'ensure 
that the best experience of the Australian Corps was made available to the Americans in 
France. ' Sinclair-MacLagan, a career British officer, had served in Australia. At the 
outbreak of \\ar, he received command of the 3 rd Brigade of the I't Australian Division. 
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and, in 1917, commanded the 4h Australian Division. which fought N\ ell at Third Ypres, 
Villers-Bretonneux and Hamel, which gave Sinclair-Macl-agan great authorit. v to advise 
the Americans. ' 31 
Brig. Gen. C. H. Brand was assigned as liaison officer to the 27ý' Division, and Brip. Gen. ltý 
I. G. Mace served in a similar capacity with the 3 Oth . They worked ýk ith their American 
counterparts as far down as the battalion level to familiarise them NN-ith technical terms 
and matters regarding supplies, equipment and tactics. 132 Monash related in his memoirs 
that 'it was only because of the creation of this Australian Mission to the Americans, and 
Sinclair-MacLagan's tact, industry and judgement controlling it, that the combined action 
of the two corps in the great battle of the closing days of September proved as successful 
as it did. ' 
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Monash organised meetings at his headquarters to further familiarise the Americans with 
the operation. The first was on 25 September, Read, his division commanders and their 
staffs, and the Australian Mission were in attendance. As usual, Monash was well 
prepared, having set out the key points in preceding days. Besides detailing the order of 
events for the attack, he outlined seven key points, from A to G: Teamwork, Strict 
Limitation to Prescribed Objectives, Orders. Attention to Details. Send Back Information 
(positive and negative), Keeping Men Fit. and Thinking Ahead. 134 He used maps, 
diagrams and a blackboard to stress teamwork: 'One job for each man, ' he told his 
audience. 1 35 Regiments should attack %N ith two battalions, using one battalion to mop up. 
Monash carefully stressed the latter point, mentioning his own experience of ý\ itnessing 
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attack troops pass over Germans hidden in dugouts, who then came up aftenýards and 
fired into the backs of the advancing troops. 136 
When the meeting ended, Monash returned to his headquarters exhausted. It had lasted 
three hours, and, according to him, he spent most of the time explaining intricacies of the 
attack and responding to a 'rain of questions. ' But, he had *no doubt that the American 
generals became fully informed as to the tasks and duties allotted to them, and fullý 
understood them. ' 
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O'Ryan's recollection of events differed significantly. 'There were no more than five or 
six questions asked in all by the American officers present. 'General Monash's 
conversation and explanations were so lengthy and detailed that there did not seem to be 
necessity to ask many questions. ' 138 O'Ryan was concerned with the complexiv,, of the 
preliminary and main attacks. For the first, he had been asked by Monash during the 
meeting to assign one of his regiments for a possible preliminary attack. O'Ryan selected 
the 106'h Infantry. Now the 27 th Division commander asked why the regiment would 
have to attack on a front of 4,000 yards without support from other regiments. Monash 
replied that he wanted to keep the rest of the division out of the preliminary operation so 
it would be fresh for the main attack. As a compromise, the 105 th Infantry could be used 
in limited support. 
139 
Puzzling to O'Ryan was the main attack battle plan, which called for the 105'h Infantry. 
after followino the 108 th Infantry, to manoeuvre and change direction to the left and 
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attack. From there, it would pass north through Vendhuile to relieve pressure on the 
British units attacking on that front. He wanted to know if this was practical. Monash's 
response was short: 'The plan will be carried out in this manner. ' 140 Questions such as 
these might have been an indication that the plans for the operation were too complicated 
for the Americans. Regardless of how long the meeting lasted, or how many questions 
were raised, a set-piece battle of this calibre was new to the Americans. and they needed 
Monash's guidance every step of the way. 
The preliminary attack was now necessary, and this caused concern to 11 American 
Corps. Simonds met Monash to express concern over III Corps's failure to capture the 
outpost line in the northern sector. Monash tried to appease Simonds and told him *there 
will be a little operation tonight and we will take it over. ' However, the following day. 
Simonds was told: 'Sorry, but III Corps did not get there last night, and I think the 27 th 
Division will have to have a preliminary operation. ' 
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All this was an uneasy beginning to sending 11 American Corps into a major battle, and 
O'Ryan's 27 th Division would find itself in the centre of it. Monash, one must conclude, 
had not measured the situation with his usual care. The corps commander of the splendid 
Australian divisions often attempted too much, as the near mutiny of men in two 
battalions had shown. He had too much to do, and a three-hour lecture to Americans ýý as 
indeed a poor idea, particularly since O'Ryan's resulting concerns were, one can 
conclude, ignored. The preparation for what, as O'Rvan well kne-ý, v. would be a Iv 
complicated. probabb, too complicated, battle was foreboding in its lack of clarity at the 
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top, under Monash's direction. It remained to be seen ýkhat the Americans. in particular 
O'Ryan's division, would make of it. 
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Chapter 6: 'The Air was a Torturing Sound of Hell' 
The two American divisions, the 27 th and 3 Oth , had had their baptism of fire. and noNý. in 
the last days of September 1918, were to enter into the most important experience of their 
association with British forces on the Western Front. They were to spearhead an attack 
that, if successful, might bring an end to the war. Here in the British sector, led by an 
Australian general, in the midst of Australian units, the divisions xN ere equal in strength to 
four British or Dominion divisions, and would lead the way against a strong German 
position. But despite its strength in numbers, the 11 American Corps ýN as deficient in 
tactical experience and would pay a heavy price as a result. 
The Americans Enter the Line 
The 27 th Division took over the line on the night of 24-25 September from the 18 th and 
74 th British Divisions in the Gouy sector, and the previous night. the 30th Division 
relieved the I't Australian Division in the Nauroy sector. Hostile shelling had slowed 
relief in the 3 oth Division sector, and it was not completed until 2 A. M. on the 25 
th. On 
the way to the front, the Americans passed through the heart of the Somme Valley - what 
Brigadier General Tyson called that 'terrible battlefield that is the abomination of 
desolation. 'I They were then crowded into the trenches constructed to accommodate 
Australian and British units. An average Australian or British battalion now numbered 
around 500 officers and men. The American equivalent, a regiment, ýýas more than twice 
2 
that strength . 
239 
In a trench held by Company F of the 118 th Infantry. the Germans %\ elcomed the new 
occupants with a raid, but the Americans managed to foil it, ýý ith small losses to both 
3 
sides . One of the Germans captured that morning confessed how air reconnaissance had 
observed the relief the night before, but his unit was not aware that Americans had taken 
over. 4 During the next two days, the Germans continued to harass the American line xN ith 
additional raids and aircraft patrols, which were followed by intense H. E. shelling x\ Ith 
77S. 5 The Germans now knew that the 27 th and 3 Oth ýý ere in the I ine. but x\ hether or not 
6 they expected a major attack is a matter of conjecture. British and Australian planes 
patrolled the German lines and took reconnaissance photographs. x0iich did not reveal 
new defensive earthworks. 7 However, some German POWs interrogated by American 
intelligence officers indicated they expected an attack, while others said their forces were 
caught by surprise. 
Germans captured by the 120th Infantry professed to know an attack was imminent 
'because they had shot down a British airplane carrying the plan of attack. ' As a result,, 
the German regiment *received a fresh draft' on 28 September. 8 However, a German 
soldier captured by the 107'h Infantry on 29 September admitted *the attack was a 
complete surprise. ' He also claimed to 'not know who was on the line when the attack 
began. '9 Further proof that the Germans were likely surprised by the attack comes from 
Sgt. E. G. Graham of the 118 th Infantry. During burial detail on I October, Graham found 
a dead German under an Armv straýN, tick, and all he was wearing was his underwear and 
socks. 10 He had evidentl\ not had time to dress. 
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Plans for a Preliminan, Operation 
Because the British were unable to entirely secure the outpost line. the two American 
divisions were now charged with carrying out this task on 26-27 September. On the 
north end of the line, the 27 th Division was assigned the more difficultjob, using the 106 th 
Infantry to advance 1,000 yards on a long front of 4,000 to secure ajump-off line for the 
main attack. In the 30thDivision sector, the II 8th Infantry had an easier undertaking 
Because the portion of the outpost line opposite the division had alreadN been taken bN 
the British, except in a few places, the regiment was to make a much shorter advance on a 
1,200-yard front to straighten the line in preparation for the main attack. The flanks of 
the attackers were to be protected by a smoke screen fired from one field artillery brigade 
on each side. Maps used for the preliminary operation identified the start line in brown 
and the objective lines in green. Tanks from the 4 th British Tank Battalion were to 
support the 106 th Infantry, while the I" British Tank Battalion was to advance \ý ith the 
118th Infantry. Both regiments would advance from a taped line and receive assistance 
from a creeping barrage. The 106 th was formed on the left of the jump-off line, and on its 
right was the 118 
th 
.II 
Since the element of surprise no longer existed. preceding the preliminary operation 
would be an intense bombardment of 750,000 shells fired at the German defences by 
British and Australian artillery units. The unique aspect was detonation of BB. the 
British designation for mustard gas. for eight hours. This was the first use of this 
particular type of gas by the British, although the Germans had introduced first used gas 
at Second Ypres on 2222 April 1915, and the 
British had speedilý follm\ed suit. The 
214 1 
British had more than 26,000 18-pounders and 6,200 6-inch mustard hoxý itzer rounds in 
their arsenal. Rawlinson ordered the BB to start at 10 A. M. on 26 September and to 
continue until 6 P. M., with the German artillery and centres of communication as 
targets. 
12 
To manage the expected high casualties, medical units readied themselves for the 
operation. Like the infantry and machine-gun units they were to support, the mo sanitar, \ 
trains (102 nd and 105 th) , each comprising two field ambulance companies and tx\o field 
hospitals, had no large-scale operational experience. During the Ypres-Lys operation, the 
27 th and 3 Oth Divisions relied heavily on British ambulances and field hospitals for 
assistance. For the Hindenburg Line, British and Australian medical units would again 
cooperate with the Americans. This included providing dressing stations. ambulance- 
collecting posts, and rest stations for the slightly wounded doughboys. 13 
Besides medical personnel, and of course artillery. the two American divisions also had 
to rely on the British and Australians for auxiliary labour and administration units. 14 But 
one crucial area, traffic control and road clearance, would be undertaken by the 11 Corps 
MiI itary Pol ice Company. Formed on 10 September from detachments of 70 non- 
commissioned officers and men transferred from the 27 th and 3 Oth Divisions, it was 
primarily tasked with rounding up stragglers. Also, when the villages, such as Bellicourt 
and Bony, were captured, the military police were responsible for assisting refugees and 
other inhabitants. ' 5 Each division still had a military police unit to maintain order in its 
10, ) nd sector. The - Military 
Police of the 27hDivision appeared to have the most 
2 42 
experienced commander, Maj. Harry T. Shanton. Before joining the Army. he had at one 
time been the transportation manager of Buffalo Bill's Wild \Vest Shoxý - 
16 
Lt. Gen. Sir John Monash, the Australian Corps commander. held a conference on 26 
September with the American division and brigade commanders, the Australian division 
commanders and staffs, with officers from supporting units in attendance. As the 
artillery bombardment could be heard in the background, Monash ýýeiit over the 
operation plan and answered last-minute questions from the eager Americans. The 
conference lasted over two and a half hours, and, according to Monash, -No one present 
will soon forget the tense interest and confident expectancy that characterised that 
meeting. ' 17 Sir Douglas Haig arrived before the conference ended, and Monash 
persuaded him to greet the senior officers and say a few words of encouragement. 18 
There was not much he could say to them that they didn't already know. So Haig also 
confidently predicted a positive outcome and told the assembled officers that *the biggest 
battle of the war started this morning, and the enemy will be attacked by 100 divisions in 
the next three days. '19 
For an unknown reason, General Read not did attend. Although he had relinquished 
tactical command to Monash, he was still very active in organising his corps for its first 
major operation. Bet\veen 21 and 24 September. he issued three detailed field orders. 
20 
Each surnmarised the movements and reproduced battle plans as prepared bý Monash's 
staff. The third. # 16, \\as the most detailed. It provided the general plan for the 
preliminary operations and main attack, and instructed unit commanders on hoxN to deal 
24.3 
with liaison, how to assemble, and what to expect of road conditions . 
21 Once the fighting, 
commenced, the field orders would be of limited use since conditions would change 
rapidly. For now, Read was doing his best to prepare the corps. but it would be up to the 
division and brigade commanders to conduct the battle at the front. 
The Preliminary Operation Commences 
The 118 th Infantry commenced the preliminary operation at 9: 30 P. M. on 26 September. 
It started out well, and by 10: 55, the regiment's I" and 3 rd Battalions had established a 
new line 500 yards in advance of the jump-off, halting north of La Haute Bru,,, &re. 22 The 
straightening of the line would continue the next day in conjunction ýýith the prelirnillarý 
attack of the 27 th Division. (Map after page 244) 
At 3: 30 A. M. on 27 September, the 106 th Infantry headed towards the starting line výhile 
shells fell all around. Because the troops would have to move rapidly against heavy 
German machine-gun fire, each man was ordered to leave his overcoat, blanket and field 
kit at company headquarters, and instead carried a raincoat and rations, along with 
fighting equipment and five grenades. 23 Twelve tanks supported the 106th Infantry, 
while two companies (K and M) of the 105'h Infantry were on its left flank. The officers 
and men were well aware of the complexity of the attack. In previous days, Major 
General O'Ryan had lectured the company commanders about their task, and his words 
of wisdom were passed on to the lower ranks. In particular. he emphasized that they 
NN ere not to be taken prisoner, but 'fight to the finish. 924 In the event that a soldier N\ as 
captured, he \\as to give only the follo\\ ing information: 
I left mN billet in a rear area two or three days ago. at which time I heard that the 
rest of the division was going south. How far south I do not kno%%, but believe 
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the move was made by rail. Since that time, I have seen no other unit of the division in this area, only British troops. " 
The 106'h Infantry jumped off at 5: 30 A. M. and. at first, moved forward unimpeded 
towards the objective line, with protection by a creeping barrage, and coverage from the 
105 Ih and 106 Ih Machine-Gun Battalions, and the tanks. 26 A short time later. signal flares 
and wounded men returning from the front indicated that some of the regiment had 
reached the outpost line. But the good news was premature. 2' As planned, Company M 
of the 105 th advanced to the outpost line to mop up. There, it found the situation far from 
at hand. Instead of mopping up, the unit became engaged in a heavy fight. In the 
process, it lost two of its lieutenants. One of them, Lieutenant Rudin, was - in the van of 
his men and pointing the way with an uplifted arm' when hit by machine-gun fire. 28 
Other officers were wounded, and as the morning progressed, all order broke down. 
Messages from the front were sent to 53 rd Brigade headquarters. but they were conflicting 
as to what was happening. This, in turn, meant that the brigade had little information to 
convey to O'Ryan. One of the early telephone messages sent to him vaguely summed up 
the chaos: 'Situation around the Knoll very obscure. ' 29 
As elements of the 105 th and 106th Infantry tried to advance, the enemy filtered down 
through ravines and communication trenches into deep dugouts that were still intact, even 
after days of artillery fire. When the Americans passed over the dugouts, the German 
troops came above ground and fired at them, inflicting heavy casualties. 
30 The resistance 
encountered by the doughboys at the German outpost line x\ as at least as intense as w-hat 
had earlier prevented III British Corps from taking this same position. 
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Further confirmation that all was not going well came at 1: 25 P. M. from the 106'h 
Infantry, saying that its right battalion had been attacked, and 'the situation is not clear., 
At the same time, an Australian air patrol reported that fighting \ýas still goiiig) on around 
the Knoll, but couldn't give an accurate assessment due to poor visibilitý. HoNNever, an 
American officer who reported to O'Ryan's headquarters five hours later contradicted the 
information. He had come from the front shortly before and was sure the Knoll and the 
two farms 'were in our hands, with only pockets of the enemy remaining to be mopped 
Up.. )32 It would become evident a short time later that this officer was wrong. 
While elements of the 27 th Division were in the midst of a difficult fight. also on the 
th th 
morning of the 27 , the 118 Infantry renewed the attempt to adjust its line. Early 
reports from the 3 rd Battalion indicated that it had gained all objectives by 10: 15 A. M., 
and the I't Battalion was in the process of extending the divisional line to include 
Malakoff Wood, but had to withdraw. after the German machine-gun fire became too 
heavy, at a cost of many casualties. The fire came from Quennemont Farm on the left, 
-, Oth where the 106'h Infantry was in trouble, thus preventing the troops of the -) 
Division 
from advancing further. 33 As the II 8thwas fighting to consolidate its line, a message 
came at 6 P. M. the 106 th Infantry headquarters, stating what was alreadý, obvious: 'The 
w, hole front is practically the same as the jumping-off point this AM. ' 34 The message had 
actually been sent much earlier, but transmission had been a problem throughout the daý. 
The commander of the I" Battalion, 106 th Infantry reported: Wl our communications are 
down, and we can't use anvthin(,, but runners. ' He blamed the problem on shelling that 
severed the N\ ires. 
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As night fell on 27 September, the 105th and 106 th withdreýN to a line that \\as onlý a short 
distance in front of where they had jumped off that morning. But most disturbing \\ as 
that an unknown number of troops from both regiments were still holding their forNvard 
positions around the Knoll and the farms, and this would have a major impact on the 
main operation. Despite the heavy losses, the gains were minimal. Casualties from the 
two days of fighting were 17 officers and 300 men killed, ý, vith more than tx\ ice those 
numbers wounded and missing. 36 Most were from the 106 th Regiment. Nearly all 
company officers were killed or wounded. 
The way in which the Germans cut down the New York soldiers during this operation 
reminded one historian of 'Pickett's charge' at Gettysburg, when advancing Confederates 
were struck down by Union artillery fire. 37 A Second German Army report provides an 
unflattering portrayal of the American attack. Its 84th Schleswig-Holstein Infantry 
Regiment had encountered some Americans near Lempire, who were initially 'in 
assembled formation, but then took to flight, streaming to the rear in the fire of our 
artillery. ' 38 Furthermore, the Germans boasted how their troops 'victoriously repulsed all 
enemy attacks, and executed against its right and centre. The main line of resistance is 
everywhere in our possession unchanged. 939 
The commander of the 53 rd Brigade gave his account of what went wrong with the 
preliminary operation in the 27thDivision sector. He placed the blame for much of the 
day's failure on the *very great shortage of officers. ' Even more detrimental to the 
attack, Brigadier General Blandin-('), pointed out, was that the officers available had little 
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time to study and disseminate their orders. maps. and serial photographs of the ground on 
which they were to advance. He also recognised that the much-anticipated use of tanks 
was a disappointment. His brigade had minimal training with the machines in eark 
September, and this became evident during the fighting. They had no effect on German 
machine guns and artillery. 40 
Meanwhile, the Germans were expecting the 118 th Infantry to continue its advance on 28 
September. With reconnaissance from their planes, they placed artillery fire and 
increased machine-gun fire on positions that contained concentrations of AmericanS. 41 
But the H8 th did not advance that day. Instead, it waited for relief from the units of the 
60th Brigade. For the regiment, the fighting was over, and it would be placed in reserve 
for the next day's main operation. During its period in the line, the 118 th suffered 10 
ki I led and more than 100 wounded. 42 
Preparations for the Main Operation 
That night and into the early morning of 28 September, the 54hBrigade (107 th and 108th 
Infantries) relieved the 105'hand 106 th Infantries. Patrols from the 2 nd Battalion, 108 th 
Infantry were sent forward to gain contact with missing troops. During the afternoon of 
th th the 28 the patrols found one officer and seven men of the 106 Infantry, along with 
several strong points held by the Germans. The British artillery was sent the coordinates, 
and its ouns shelled the area, but did minimal damage because the Germans still managed L- 
to hold on to most of the outpost line. 
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It remained unclear how many soldiers from the 27 th Division were still at the outpost 
line and what part, if any, of the ground was in American possession. Australian aircraft 
flew patrols over the front and 'verified some American troops on the desired line. but 
could get no flares to answer signals. ' German machine guns fired at the airmen. offering I 
43 further proof that the ground was not under Allied control . Major General Read Nýas 
especially uneasy about the situation, and therefore a conference at 54t" Brigade 
headquarters was convened that day, with representatives of the 27 th Division and 
Australian Corps in attendance to discuss this difficult situation. 
The main topic was the idea of adjusting the artillery fire to a line closer to the Americans 
in order that troops might advance under its protection from the start. But after 
consulting with Brig. Gen. K. K. Knapp, in command of the artillery supporting 11 Corps, 
the conference participants learned that, due to a lack of time, it would be impractical to 
change the barrage table by bringing it further back, which would put Americans near the 
Knoll and the farms at risk. 44 Knapp was well liked and trusted by the 11 Corps officers, 
and they felt he 'made every effort to give our men all possible advantage of artillery 
protection. 45 The idea of postponing the operation was also suggested to Monash, and, 
according to one of his biographers, he thought it was the better solution. However, 
Ra\klinson overruled him. The Fourth Army commander felt that a delay would mean 
46 
changing the arrangements on other fronts where troops were set to attack the next da) . 
The decision x\ as important. It no\\ meant that the lead regiments of the 27 th Division ltý 
\\ould form up as close as possible to the barrage line for the attack an hour earlier. then 
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try to fight their way forward by the original start time, ýN ithout artillery support .4- This 
was a difficult decision for all parties involved. made even more difficult bý the fact that 
it was British artillery supporting American ground troops. If the 27thDiý, Ision had its 
own artillery, then the decision might have been much simpler. O'Ryan laterjustified the 
resolution: 
The 53" Brigade, which was gallantly holding its gains, was entitled to eN, ery 
consideration, even though some sacrifice was involved. To voluntarily assume 
the risk of destroying those because of a decision to increase the security of the 
54 th Brigade, no matter how logical it might be in the tactical sense, would be 
repulsive to the mass of the officers and men of the division, and destructive of 
morale. " 
To reassure Read about the operation, Haig paid him a visit at his headquarters and found 
the If Corps commander 'very anxious. ' Haig referred to him as 'a good honest fellow, ' 
and told Read not to worry about the next day's events because 'the reality was much 
simpler than his imagination pictured it to his mind. ' It is doubtful that Haig really 
believed this, but his words must have been some comfort. 
41) 
Rawlinson was also optimistic that the next day's attack would be successful. His diary 
entry for the 28 th reads: 'I feel pretty happy about the prospects as a whole, for even if the 
Americans are inexperienced, they are keen as mustard and splendid men. ' 50 Monash did 
not share such optimism. He had little faith in the 27 th and 300' Divisions, according to 
C. E. W. Bean. As the official correspondent with the AIF, Bean was on a first-name basis 
w-ith the Australian Corps commander, and visited his headquarters the night of the 28 th 
'He [Monash] \vas very insistent on the fact that he doubted whether the Americans 
would succeed in carrN ino out their objectives. ' Monash's attitude that evening left Bean 
250 
with the feeling that 'John was hedging against a possible defeat, in ýNhich case he Nvould 
be able to throw the blame onto the Americans. . 51 
Main Operation, 29 September 1918 
With the attack set to start on schedule. the units in the line from the preliminarý attack 
were ordered into reserve and replaced by the fresh regiments. This meant that in the 27 th 
Division sector, the 54 th Brigade, with the 108 th Infantry Regiment on the right and the 
107 th Infantry Regiment on the left, took over the line from the 105"' and 106th Infantries 
of the 53 rd Brigade. In the 3 Oth Division sector, the 60'h Brigade, with the I 20th Infantry 
on the right and the II 9th Infantry on the left, relieved the 117 
th 
and 118 
th Infantries of the 
5 9th Brigade. That night, the engineer units laid thejump-off lines. Two men and an 
officer from each company crawled out of the trenches and moved forward ý\, ith rolls of 
white tape, which was laid on the ground, parallel to the trenches. The engineers also 
made road and water reconnaissance, and searched for enemy traps and mines while 
under the constant threat of machine-gun and shrapnel fire. At the same time, the tanks 
ttimed on their engines and rumbled forward under the cover of aircraft flying over the 
line to drown out the noise. 52 (Map after page 25 1). 
It \\, as going to be a Sunday morning that the doughboys of 11 American Corps would not 
soon forget. To ease theirjittery nerves, a soldier in the 27hDivision remembered how 
'the British had given us a big half tumbler of rum before the charge, and Thank God for 
that. ' 53 Paul Maze. a French artist serving as an interpreter on Ra\\ linson's staff, 
\\andered through the 27 th Division line during its preparation for the assault, and to his 
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surprise, the men seemed relaxed and 'settled down to their job with great spirit. ' 54 
Sergeant Melvin remembered being in the trenches in front of Bellicourt on 28 
September when he was told by an officer that his unit would go over the top the next 
morning at 5: 54 A. M. They would know it was time to start when a big shell ýNas fired 
way back behind the line. 'We had to lie there all night and worry about that. ' Mel-vin 
later wrote. 'it is impossible to describe the feelings a man has \ý ith that in front of him. 
always said I knew how a man felt who was condemned to die, for we all thought it was 
our last night. We thought of our families and the ones we loved. . 55 After the jump-off, 
another doughboy recalled that 'the trip over the top was terrifying. yet exhilarating, but I 
believe most of the boys were in a trance. I know I was. I had gone to confession and 
communion. 956 
The soldiers of both divisions were certainly well equipped for the operation. Every man 
carried 220 rounds of ammunition and two Mills grenades. Each regiment had 600 
smoke bombs and 2,500 red ground flares for distribution as needed. 57 The night before 
thejump-off, a hot food ration was served to the troops on the firing lines. This included 
fresh meat, which was a rarity for the men and something that could not be enjoyed as a 
field ration because it was too hard to eat on the battlefield. 58 
The New Yorkers were the first to jump off and started their attack at 4: 50 A. M.. ýýith the 
107'h Infantry heading towards Gillemont Farm. On its left. the 108 th Infantry advanced 
in the direction of Quennemont Farm. Fog and alight \ýind N\ith I imited vI sibi I itý \ý as 
the forecast for 29 September, and the BEF meteorologist ý\ ho made this prediction \\as 
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correct. The attack started on schedule that morning, with visibility almost nonexistent. 
But the poor conditions actually gave the attackers an advantage. While the fog and 
smoke clouds 'hindered the maintenance of order and cohesion, * as the 30'hDivision 
historians recognise, 'they were of tremendous assistance in blinding the enem)'s 
machine guns and field artillery. ' 60 First reports received at division headquarters 
indicated that the attack was 'going well. ' At 8: 10, the 108 th ý\ as reported to have 
crossed the Hindenburg Line and was on its way to the tunnel. An hour later. the 
situation had changed drastically. Regimental messages stated that its 3 rd Battalion had 
suffered heavy casualties from machine-gun fire at Gillemont Farm, but still continued to 
advance. At 10: 05. ) reports came from the 107 
th Infantry that casualties, especially 
officers, were heavy, with one battalion failing back. 
Almost two years after the Hindenburg Line operation, the U. S. Army chief of staff 
requested that O'Ryan provide a detailed observation of his division's battlefield 
performance. His report provides insight into the 107 th Infantry's tactics during this 
phase of the battle. The Germans had counterattacked against the 107 th Infantry in an 
attempt to demoralise the regiment by inflicting heavy casualties. The Germans massed 
troops that attacked over the open ground, while protected by artillery and Minenwerfer 
fire. They took advantage of cover that was afforded by the rolling character of the 
terrain and the artificial features of the ground. However. the 107 th ýý as able to counter 
the attacks *Nvith disciplined resolution and expertness in the use of the rifle. ' But, due to 
heavy losses, the Americans were forced to take cover in trenches and shell holes. 
2 
-5 
3 
The Germans then changed tactics and emploý ed expert bombers who bombed their ýN a) 
down the approach trenches. These bombers were supplied by specially trained men who 
passed bombs along to them. Each group was supported at a distance of several hundred 
yards by a group of rifle grenadiers, similarly supplied with rifle grenades, and light 
Minenwerfer groups. The advance of these parties was also supported b\ field artillery. 
The effectiveness of the supporting fire was made possible because each bombing group 
carried red rag on a stick that was kept in sight at a prescribed distance behind the 
bombers. To counter such tactics, O'Ryan thought, a unit's men should enter a battle 
without any fixed idea that it was to be a 'set piece' action or open warfare. or ý\ lth their 
minds committed to any classification of combat, but rather with the knoýN ledge that their 
training had supplied them with a military team capable of successfully meeting any 
phase of combat. 
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Meanwhile, throughout the 27 th Division sector, the tanks that were supposed to support 
the infantry were once again of little use. Because of the fog and smoke from the 
artillery, they could not see the infantry, and many lost their way almost immediately 
after leaving the tape. 62 Seven tanks did come within 100 yards of Gillemont Farm. but 
were destroyed by anti-tank guns once they became visible through the MiSt. 
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Despite setbacks, it appeared that O'Ryan's troops had reached their objectives, but -%ý ere 
taking heavy losses \\,, hile mopping up. Patrols sent forward were subject to sniper and 
machine-gun fire. 'It \\as a slaughter; we ran into a trap, ' remembered Cpl. Norman 
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Stone. * It was the saddest thing I ever encountered. The machine-gun fire \ý as thicker 
than flies in summer. ' 
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As the Australians came up to what was left of the 108 th Infantry, to leapfrog the 
Americans, they found battalions leaderless. On the right flank, the 2 nd Battalion Nýas 
mopping up Quennemont Farm. The 3 rd Battalion had parts of two companies in the 
Hindenburg Line south of Bony, but its left flank was held up at Gillemont Farm. 
Meanwhile, the 3 rd Battalion of the 107th Infantry, along with a combined battalion of the 
106 th Infantry, was holding a position on the western edge of Gillemont Farm in Willow 
Trench. Mixed organisations of the 106thand 107 th Infantries intermingled and held 
trenches around the Knoll and the rear of this position. 
A few hours after the jump-off, much of the two brigades of the 27 th Division vvere 
depleted on account of heavy casualties. 65 Many Americans lay dead or wounded 
throughout the battlefield. To one New York soldier, 'they'd just become figures going 
down, like pins in a bowling alley. ' 66 The Germans were also taking significant 
casualties, and the Second German Army issued orders to ý\ ithdraw from the front to the 
rear of the canal . 
67 The 107t" Infantry was in the thick of the fight. and, although it could 
not break through the line. the regiment was able to hold on until joined by the 3 rd 
Australian Division, following closely behind. The Australians had jumped off four 
hours later to give the Americans time to capture Le Catelet line, where it would leapfrog 
over them and continue the advance. But upon approaching the start line, the Australians 
immediately encountered heavy fire, as well as many dead Americans, in front of them. 
68 
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The large numbers of Germans who survived the artiller,, bombardment had no intention 
of surrendering and were overwhelming the Americans, and noN\ the Australians. 
Reports from the 3 rd Australian Division indicated that 'many Americans \ý ere leaderless 
near Gillemont Trench and Willow Trench. 
69 Still 
, the Allies counterattacked and 
captured Quennemont Farm. In the midst of the battle. the Australians proý ided great 
assistance to the inexperienced Americans. Lt. Col. Harry Murray. commanding the 4ý' 
Australian Machine-Gun Battalion, accompanied officers of the three machine-gun 
battalions in the 27 th Division sector. 'Mad Harry I carried out liaison dut), and helped the 
inexperienced Americans when the Germans counterattacked. For his great service. 
O'Ryan recommended him for the Distinguished Service Medal, which he received mo 
weeks after the Armistice. 
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At 27'1' Division headquarters, O'Ryan had difficulty keeping abreast of the fighting. As 
was the case in the preliminary operation, he received a flow of messages that 
contradicted each other. Those sent early from the brigade headquarters indicated 
success in reaching the objective. but only a few minutes later. word came that the lead 
regiments were under machine-gun fire and bogged down. Aircraft observed the 
situation, but poor visibility obscured reporting. At 10 A. M., O'Ryan received a 
firsthand account from a wounded officer of the 107 th Infantry Regiment that the 
bcasualties, especially the officers, were heavy. ' 
71 One officer recalled \\hat it felt I ike to 
be shot. 'There is a sharp pain when you are hit, and a shock that leaves you faint. This 
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lasts about 15 minutes, then the pain is gone. but a raging thirst sets in. I guess I smoked 
at least a dozen cigarettes in about 20 minutes. -72 
At IIA. M., the leading brigades of the P Australian Division moved forward to 
eventually pass through the Americans. At noon, the Australians reached the line of the 
108'h Infantry, near Gillemont Farm. As the afternoon progressed, the Australians 
extended their lines further west to overlap the 107 th Infantry. Neither this American 
regiment nor the Australians could advance any farther because of enfilading and cross- 
fire from Bony, Gillemont Farm, and the hill slopes east of the canal and north of Gouy. 
On the extreme left, the 105 th Infantry was, according to the plan of operations. required 
to cross the tunnel and turn to the north along the east bank of the canal to seize Le Zg 
Catelet and Gouy. Here it was to be leapfrogged by the 3 rd Australian Division, which 
was following behind the 107 th . But when the latter failed to advance because of heavy 
th ,d fire at the Knoll, the 105 had to take up a defensive position, as ordered by the 5_) 
Brigade commander, and hold it against counterattacks. With the 18 th British Division, it 
captured the Knoll and Macquincourt Trench. The 105 th commander. Col. James M. 
Andrews, blamed the failure to proceed beyond the Knoll on 'the smoke barrage laid 
down by the Allied artillery, which proved very confusing to our troops; the direction of 
the march was hard to maintain. and due to some as yet unexplained phenomena, our 
marching compasses \\ere so unstable as to be practically useless. ' 13 
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The commander of the Australian division, Maj. Gen. Sir John Gellibrand, sent \Ionash a 
steady stream of messages throughout the day. At 2: 20 in the afternoon, he sent back a 
report from an Australian liaison officer with the 1050' Infantry. indicating that its 
.1 
headquarters was at Duncan Post, to the rear of Gillemont Farm. All of the regiment's 
battalions had been committed,, 'but headquarters does not know xNhere they are. 74 TxN o 
hours later, Gellibrand presented Monash with a much clearer picture of the situation: *As 
soon as troops advanced, ' he wrote, 'the enemy opened fire at close range xkith machine 
guns and artillery. The centre battalion is now trying to reach Gillemont Farm, and the 
left battalion is pushing forward, but the enemy is in strength opposite them \\ ith good 
observation. ' 
75 
Also on the extreme left at the Knoll, the 180' British Division connected ýN ith the 
Americans there, but was driven back to Tombois Road. The Germans attempted to 
counterattack at Vendhuile and up Macquincourt Valley, but were stymied by machine- 
gun and artillery fire. At 2 P. M., the few American officers available were ordered to 
organise and command detachments that had been pushed back to the left regimental 
sector. Three hours later, O'Ryan issued an order to the commanding generals of his two 
brigades 'to secure the left flank of our advances and prepare a defensive line of support 
for the Australian Division now attacking on the general line. Organise all stragglers and 
available men, and connect with the 18 th British Division in the north and the 3 rd 
Australian Division in the sout - 
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At this time, O'Ryan ordered his division commanders to organise all stragglers and 
available men of the 27 th Division in Knoll Trench and Willow Trench. and form a 
defensive line in support of the Australians attacking near the Knoll, Bony and Gillemont 
Farm. The commander of the 54thBrigade was to take command of the left regimental 
sector, and the commander of the 53 rd Brigade was ordered to do the same in the right 
regimental sector. With no other infantry to send forward, O'Ryan ordered three 
companies of the 102 nd Engineers to occupy a reserve position north of Ronssoy. He 
notified the 53 rd Brigade commander that it is 'not the idea that you should put them in 
the line, but they are to be used as reserve and kept in a secure place, where they may be 
available for such use,, in case of necessity. 77 
In the early morning of I October, the 27t" Division withdrew and marched in the 
direction of Peronne for a much-needed rest. The operation was over for the NexN 
Yorkers. In two days of hard fighting, the division lost 26 of its officers and 648 men 
78 th killed. The 107 Infantry had the greatest number of losses, with 349 officers and men 
killed. It was the highest number of casualties for an American unit on a single day in the 
whole war . 
79 Among them was Cpl. Alexander Kim of Company L, one of the feý\ 
Chinese-Americans serving with the AEF. He was shot through the head in front of 
Gillemont Farm. 80 A survivor of the battle, Pvt. John Bowman of the 108'h Infantry. 
which also took its share of casualties, summed up the operation when he said, *we*Ne 
had our real touch of war. and it has been awful. 18l 
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Burial parties were sent out to collect the dead, or mark their temporarý graves. Also. 
Lieutenant Colonel Murray, in command of the 4 Ih Australian Machine-Gun Battalion. 
made a reconnaissance of the battlefield east and northeast of Duncan Post on 30 
September, and witnessed the carnage resulting from heavy machine-gun fire directed at 
the 27 th Division as it left the trenches the previous day. Despite not having met all of 
their objectives, Murray was impressed by the fact that all of the dead New Yorkers he 
encountered were facing forward, an indication that none of the Americans retreated 
when the fire grew intense. This touched him enough to write O'Ryan: *1 am convinced 
that the officers and men of the 27 th Division did all that was humanly possible for brave 
men to do, and their gallantry in this action must stand out through all time in American 
history. ' 82 O'Ryan may have been in no mood to receive accolades from the Australian. 
It had been reported to him that 'the bodies of our dead were looted, with money. 
valuables, and letters and diaries taken, ' he wrote in his official report. 'in one case, the 
ring finger of a soldier was cut off. It was believed to have been done by the Australian 
troops, but couldn't be proven. 83 There was no investigation of this matter by the 
Americans or Australians, and it did not go any further than O'Ryan mentioning this in 
his report to Read. 
Besides killed and wounded, one officer and 33 men were taken prisoner. Among the 
American POWs was Pvt. James F. Walker of the 106t" Infantry, who was captured along 
with three other soldiers from his company as they hid from machine-gun fire in a shell 
hole. At first, their captors treated the prisoners like *civilised human beings, ' but once 
behind the lines, it was a different story. The Americans were -cuffed and shoved about, ' 
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fed only a slice of sour black bread 'as thick as tissue paper. ' and given a boý\ I of coffee 
made from burnt barley. While the fighting continued, the Germans kept the PO\Vs in a 
cage, then took them across the border to Belgium. and finall\ to Germany. There. 
Walker was held with other Americans until after the Armistice. 84 
German prisoners were a common sight behind the American lines. and the surrendered 
enemy men and officers were handled in an efficient manner. Those captured by the 27 th 
Division were sent to a POW cage operated by the 102 nd Military Police at Ronnsoy. 
Mounted men from the unit were charged with taking the prisoners from the infantry and 
escorting them to the cage. Guards were posted at all times to ensure that prisoners ýNere 
not interfered with, or robbed of their possessions. 
As previously mentioned, the military police were also responsible for collecting 
stragglers, and 150 men were recorded as having been separated from their units. But 
traffic problems were the main issue faced by the MPs, and these reached a climax as the 
infantry and support units headed towards thejump-off line. 'Every available man 
worked night and day' to keep the lines moving, claimed a private in the 102 nd. 'So great 
was the demand for help. ' Pvt. Charles L. Campbell recalled, that 'mechanics. wagoner's. 
horses-shoers and cooks were used. ' 'Splintered vehicles and dead horses that blocked 
the way' complicated theirjob. Such work was also dangerous. One soldier was killed, 
85 
while directing traffic, by a bomb dropped by a German aeroplane. 
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Attack in the 30th Division Sector 
To the south, in the 3 Oth Division sector, the advance had more success. The attack 
started at 5: 30 A. M. under a screen of mist and IoN, ý clouds. Mixed ý\ ith smoke from the 
barrage, the visibility immediately hampered the assault. The division's commanding 
officer, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Lewis, recalled vividly that 'four minutes after the starting 
signal, the air was a hell of torturing sound... the scream of bursting shrapnel, the x\ h Istle 
of bullets, the splintering explosions of grenades, the staccato bark of countless machine 
guns... that all helped to build up a direful symphony of battle. ' 86 
Men from the two lead regiments mingled while heading in the direction of the defending 
Germans, who could barely see what was coming towards them. On the right of the line, 
the 120th Infantry crossed the canal and continued eastward until IIA. M.. when it met 
severe resistance and could not advance further. Yet, it had captured Nauroy and 
occupied the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line. Elements of the regiment had gone beyond 
Nauroy, eastward, but could not make contact with the II 9h Infantry on their left and had 
to pu II back. A battalion of the II 7thwas then ordered to advance through Bellicourt to 
support the II gth on its left. 
As a result, the II 9th Infantry now encountered less resistance, and a field message 
received at 30'hDivision headquarters said that it broke through the Hindenburg Line at 
7: 30 A. M. The I 19th5S success may have been influenced by an informal order from its 
tough-talking colonel. \\ ho instructed his men 'to break that line, or not a one of us comes 
back. . 87 The I" battalion of the regiment took the north portion of Bellicourt, and 
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companies advanced as far as Nauroy. 88 However. five hours later, Lewis received 
reports that the II gth had run into trouble northeast of Bellicourt. He responded by 
ordering the H7 th regimental commander to 'rush' his reserve battalion to join the attack. 
At 12: 55 P. M., Lewis stressed the severitY of the situation to his 59t" Brigade 
commander, Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Tyson: 
The trouble seems to be around Bellicourt. Have that battalion (reserve) go over 
there and go through it, and help in the attack that is developing. The 46 th Division 
may want to ask assistance of the II 7thto go down a little further than their 
boundary if necessary... the definite task of that battalion to is to mop up Bellicourt 
and go through it, and assist in the attack to northeast. The information ýýe have is 
that machine guns are firing from Bellicourt and along the ridge to the southeast. " 
Lewis then notified the II gth Infantry commander of his order to send the reserve 
battalion of the I 17'h to his assistance, and that 'the best information we have from some 
of our units and the Australians is that parties of the enemy have been shifting in from the 
north on the 27 th Division front. ' A half hour later, it was reported to Le\ý is that 
'Bellicourt is now mopped up. '90 Lewis attempted to assist the 27 th Division by ordering 
one battalion of the 118 th and the regimental machine-glun company to protect the left 
flank of the 27 
th Division. 91 
To the east of the 3 Oth Division, the 46 th British Division attack across the canal near 
Bellinglise went well and would turn out to be the success story of the day. It was led by 
the 137th Brigade. men who, in some cases, crossed in light portable belts, life-belts, or 
on planks when bridges were unavailable. The 1/6th North Staffords captured Riqueval 
Bridge before the Germans had a chance to destroy it with demolition charges. A 
considerable artillery fire aided the attack. and again the fog caught the German sector bN 
surprise. Casualties for the 46 th \\ere I ight. \\ ith the exception of the I 'i 8 th Brigade, 
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which took heavy fire from the German positions to the west, ýý here the Americans and 
Australians were having trouble. 92 
During the early afternoon, the 8 th Brigade of the 5'hAustralian Division passed through 
the 120th Infantry and, after mopping up in and around Bellicourt, continued attacking 
towards the east. The 120 th was ordered into support positions. but some of its men lost 
contact with the regiment and remained fighting with the Australians. One of the 
Australian liaison officers, Brig. Gen. H. A. Goodard, said the Americans 'ýýere like lost 
sheep, not knowing where to go or when to go. ' 93 By late afternoon, mixed American 
and Australian units were unable to make any significant advances, so the two brigades 
from the 3 Oth Division reinforced the flanks and dug in for the night. FolloNNing the 120th 
was the 117 th Infantry (less one battalion that was held in reserve and sent to assist the 
II 9th Infantry), which proceeded across the canal tunnel, changed direction. and attacked 
to the south and southwest to protect the 3 Oth Division right flank. By noon, the right 
flank of the II 7thhad contact with the 46th British Division, and its left flank came in 
contact with the advance line of the 120 th Infantry near Nauroy. 94 
Command of the forward area passed to the 5 th Australian Division at 1: 05 A. M. on 30 
September. The division, with Americans still intermingled, had attacked the previous 
day at 6 A. M. with the 3 rd Australian Division, which had leapfrogged the 27 th Division 
on the left. By noon of that day. the fighting had died down, and the I Oth Division units 
retired from the line. 95 In the late morning of 30 September, Leýý is issued a stem order to 
his brigade commanders: * It is absolutely essential that the division be organised today 
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and fed tonight. ' He warned that this *can only be done through personal 
reconnaissance... waiting for tardy reports and map references is a ýýaste of time. 
Checking on the ground is the only satisfactory way. ' 96 
Providing much-needed assistance to the 30thDivision in consolidating its lines for a 
withdrawal was Maj. Gen. Sir I. G. MacKay, on the staff of the Australian mission during 
the planning of the operation. He had written a series of instructions for Lewis on the 
reorganising and controlling of units, and employing staffs. Then he went forward to the 
5 9th and 60th Brigade headquarters to provide commanding officers with these 
-, Oth instructions. Later, he assisted Lewis in the withdrawal of the _3 
Division from the line 
on the night of 1-2 October. 
97 
After almost two days of heavy fighting, the 3 Oth Division advanced 31,000 yards on a 
98 
front of 3,750 yards, and took 47 German officers and 1,432 men as prisoners. The 
accomplishment had been achieved at a high cost. More than 500 men had died after 
three days of fighting, and another 2,000 were wounded. Despite taking heavy casualties 
and losing order in some instances, the attack in this sector can be considered successful. 
Much of the success of the 30d' American Division came from the work of the British 
artillery on the day before the attack and continued until thejump-off. With trench 
bombardment, counter-battery fire, and a barrage that cut the wire, the artillery caught the 
Germans in their dugouts and caused numerous casualties among their units. German 
prisoners captured by units of the 30'hDivision substantiated this fact by telling their 
interrogators that the barrage caused heavy casualties. "99 
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News of the Operation 
On the home front, families in the Carolinas, Tennessee and New York were unaNý are 
that their sons were entering into a dangerous operation. Strict censorship of letters 
prevented soldiers from discussing battles. But, news of the operation to break the 
Hindenburg Line and its outcome was swiftly reported by Philip Gibbs. He ýN as a ýeteran 
British reporter, who was hired as a special correspondent for The Neiv York Times to 
cover the British sector. His stories were syndicated and picked up by newspapers in 
New York, Knoxville, Raleigh and Columbia. He was especially fond of the American 
soldiers, and his coverage of their operations was more than fair. 100 Also closely 
following the recent fighting was Col. Robert Bacon, who was still the American liaison 
officer at British headquarters. He wrote in his diary on 2 October 1918 how he was *so 
brimful of the events of the last three days of glorious contact with our 27 Ih and 30'h 
Divisions. ' Yet, he also noted how difficult it was to speak of the recent fighting 
'without great sobs in my heart and in my voice, for many are the homes that are already 
desolate. America is paying the great price. ' 101 
Elsewhere on the British Front 
On 27 September, while the Americans were struggling to gain ajump-off position for 
the main attack, the First and Third British Armies struck west of Cambrai. Leading the 
First Army attack was the Canadian Corps, facing the Canal du Nord. It crossed the 
canal on a front of 2.500 yards and. despite heavy casualties, captured Bourlon village 
and the adjacent w-ood. Then, xN ith help from the I It" British Division, the village of 
Marquion was taken. On 28 September, the Third ArmV captured Marcoing and secured 
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the crossings of Escaut Canal between that village and the outskirts of Cambrai. To the 
north, the Belgian Army and the Second British Armv attacked in the Ypres area the 
same day and captured Passchendaele Ridge. Plumer's troops took back Messines Ridge 
the next day, and progressed even further until the combination of German reserves and 
the familiar rains of Flanders bogged down the offensive. 102 
Assessment of American Performance 
Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson was one of the chief critics of the 11 American Corps' 
battlefield performance. At Fourth Army headquarters, he had read the field messages on 
29 September, and he reluctantly concluded that 11 Corps was in trouble. 'The Americans 
appear to be in a state of hopeless confusion and will not, I fear. be able to function as a 
corps, so I am contemplating replacing them... I fear their casualties have been heavy, 
but it is their own fault. ' 103 Yet Rawlinson was failing to recognise that even though not 
all of the objectives had been met, the Germans facing the Fourth Army were soundly 
defeated. He also overlooked the evidence that his battle plan was faulty in that he was 
asking too much of the inexperienced American divisions in such a difficult operation. 
Rawlinson was also quick to place blame on the Americans for not accomplishing their 
objectives on the first day. He recorded in his diary: *My heaviest losses in this battle 
have been the American Corps. They were too keen to get on, as gallant new troops 
aINN, ays are, and did not pay enough attention to mopping up, with the result that the 
Germans came Out of the dugouts, after they had passed. and cut them off. ""-' A more 
recent analysis of the Hindenburg Line operation is sensitive to chaos on the battlefield 
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and suggests that the Americans had 'fallen prey to the German tactic of leaving gaps in 
the wire to entice inexperienced troops into the fields of concentration there. ""*ý 
Also extremely critical of the Americans was the Australian Corps commander. In his 
post-war memoirs, Monash defined mopping up to mean "killing or disarming of all 
enemy found in hiding, the picketing of the entrances and exits of all dugouts. and la. -,. ing 
siege to them until their occupants surrendered. ' 106 He surmised that 'American Infantry 
had either not been sufficiently tutored in this important matter, or the need of it had not 
penetrated their understanding. ' 107 But he was overreacting. Examination of the message 
logs sent by the 107 th Infantry shows the Americans were indeed mopping up, but the 
enemy was too great in number, and counterattacked with the skill and determination of 
an experienced army. 
The consensus of Monash's biographers is that this operation was far from his best effort. 
One suggests that in preparing for this offensive, *Monash was not at his best... his plan 
for capturing the Hindenburg Line was deeply flawed. ' 108 It can be argued that only the 
sheer determination of the American and Australian troops prevented disaster. Monash 
should not have used the Americans to spearhead an operation of this nature, especially 
after the fai lure of III Corps to secure the jump-off line in the 27 th Division sector. 
Instead, Rawlinson should have ordered Monash to use 11 Corps as a reserve, but he 
tailed to do so, and the Americans were cast into an operation that had little chance for 
success. The mere fact that Monash had to convene several meetinos. some of tý 
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considerable duration, as well as form a mission to assist the Americans. demonstrated 
the complexity of the battle plan. 
Despite his disappointment with the outcome of the operation, Sir John Monash did offer 
words of praise that the Americans 'showed a fine spirit, a keen desire to learn, 
magnificent individual bravery, and splendid comradeship. '109 Bean also supported the 
Americans in a lecture he gave in 1940. He stressed the strong relations between the two 
Allies and made it clear that 'if Australian or other divisions had been faced Ný ith the 
same task at the same stage of their training, they probably would have failed just as 
completely. " 10 
Some of Monash's officers offered their own assessments of the American performance. 
'As individuals, the Americans were not to be blamed, ' recalled one Australian who 
observed the doughboys. 'But their behaviour under fire showed clearly that in modern 
warfare, it was of little avail to launch an attack with men untrained in war, even though 
the bravery of the individual may not be questioned. " 11 Maj. Gen. C. H. Brand, one of the 
Australian advisors to the 27 th Division, thought the task undertaken by the Americans 
kwould have sorely tried any veteran division. " 12 
More recently, the American battlefield performance has undergone a reassessment. 
Leading this revision are historians Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, ýNho xN rite in their 
biography of Rawlinson that the usual critical account of the Americans *should be 
disregarded. The 270' Division and the heav\ casualties suffered by it were the 
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consequences of an attempt to advance against strongllý defended positions ýý ithout 
artillery protection. ' Prior and Wilson argue persuasive],,,, that *there Nýere anv number of 
precedents in this war for failure under such circumstances, and on this occasion. the 
originators of the fiasco were not the hapless American troops or their commanders. but 
Rawlinson and Monash. ' 
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The Americans Evaluate Their Performance 
As already noted, the heaviest criticism of the American performance x\ as failure of the 
two divisions to mop up the German pockets that survived the initial attacks. Most of the 
criticism is directed at the 27 th Division and, in particular, its 108"' Infantry. The farmers 
and horsemen from upstate New York followed the other regiments on the morning of the 
29th with orders to clear pockets of resistance, but were unable to accomplish the mission. 
O'Ryan wrote in the history of the 27 th Division that -very careful consideration had been 
given to this regiment (108"') regarding the problem of adequate mopping up. 114 
Furthermore: 
The personnel of the regiment were highly trained, well disciplined and intelligent. 
They thoroughly understood the importance of mopping up. The difficulties and 
importance of the task had been impressed upon then by the experience of the 106" 
Infantry two days before. Nevertheless, so complex vas the enemy's defensive 
system, and so resourceful and deten-nined were the enemy machine gunners that 
had been placed at isolated posts, that a number of these machine-gunners 
succeeded in evading detection and destruction during the earliest phases of the 
attack. '' 5 
O'Ryan also made the same argument 10 years later to the American Battle Monuments 
Commission (ABMC), \vhich queried him during the writing of the 2 71'11 Division 
Suniinaiy qf Operations in the World War. An earlý draft of the monograph claimed that 
on 27 September, 'all assaulting units had failed to mop up and round themselves under 
270 
fire from the rear as well as the front. ' He took umbrage to such comments in a fiN e-page 
letter, claiming that even though the 106t" Infantry was fired on from the rear in the 
progress of their advance, 'it was not due to anx., general failure to mop up. ' He then 
explained that the units of his division had been 'warned of the importance of thorougli 
mopping up. ' But, the enemy had prepared a defensive system ýNith a 'vieýý to 
concealing combat detachments until after the attackers' mopping-up parties believed 
their work to be completed. . 3116 
His comments are supported by at least two sources. An Australian artillery officer 
assigned as liaison officer to the 105 th Infantry recalled that 'most of the enemy machine 
gunners appeared well sheltered behind the tall weeds east of the canal, which afforded 
them excellent cover. They could not be noticed unless moving about. "' 7 Providing I 
further evidence was an inspection of the tunnel by three 11 Corps engineers in December 
1918. The engineers found conclusive evidence that the preliminary barrage of 26 
September was only moderately effective, particularly in the 27t" Division sector. After 
examining the northern entrance to the St. Quentin Canal and surrounding dugouts, the 
engineers discovered only one machine-gun post destroyed along the Hindenburg Line 
from Bony to Bellicourt. All others were still intact. " 8 This conclusion is substantiated 
in the report of artillery for the Fourth Army: Trovided he was with secure shell cover. 
the enemy's losses in killed from the bombardment were probably not great. 
" 19 
Another American investigation of the tunnel at Bellicourt revealed that the Germans had 
also used graveyards as dugouts., ha,., -ing blo\\n open the graves and tossed the bodies 
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aside. 120 Even Rawlinson, who inspected German defences around Gillemont Farm on 5 
October, remarked in his diary that it was a 'most interesting defence... and it is clear 
why it gave so much trouble. ' 
121 
As in the Ypres-Lys operation, communications were a problem. Signal xN ires Nvere 
under shell fire and cut by the tanks, and the two field signal battalions suffered heavý 
casualties. Another predicament was the number of troops assigned to units. Because so 
much equipment was carried onto the battlefield, large parties were needed, and they 
became easy targets for German artillery. 122 Pigeons, used elsewhere on the Western 
Front, were not delivered until the night of 19 September, too late for use in this 
operation. 
123 
As previously noted, the largest disappointment was the tanks, which failed in their 
mission to support the infantry. This was especially true in the 27 th Division sector. 
where 23 tanks were assigned to sustain the attack on its front. British mines, left over 
from previous operations, destroyed two of the tanks, and 16 were lost to artillery fire. 
The tanks often outran the infantry they were supposed to support. A brigade 
commander in the 30 1" American Tank Battalion recognised this fact in the Iessons and 
suggestions' portion of his report. 'There was a marked tendency on the part of some 
tank commanders to get too far ahead of the infantry and, consequently. lose touch, ' 
according to I"Lieutenant Reynell. He stressed that 'if infantry cannot get forward 
owing to opposition, the first duty of the tank is to overcome the opposition. To do this. 
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it will often be necessary for tanks to come back to their infantry and lead them forward 
again. ' 124 
Of the 23 tanks that began the operation in the 27 th Division sector. only one was still 
operable at the end of the day and actually made it across the tunnel. 125 Mechanical 
defects plagued some of the tanks during the fighting, and they had to be abandoned iii 
enemy territory. On at least one occasion, the machine guns were removed from the tank, 
and its crews went forward on foot with the weapons. The greatest casualties to tanks 
were caused by direct hits from artillery fire. Several tank commanders in the 27 th 
Division sector reported evidence that German infantry machine gunners had devised a 
signalling system to point to the artillery where tanks were located. 126 On the other hand, 
tanks supporting the 3 Oth Division did much better. Eight tanks of the I't British Tank 
Battalion reached the Hindenburg Line and were able to crush wire and take out machine- 
gun nests east of Bellicourt and north of Nauroy. Their success was no doubt the result 
of battlefield experience. Unlike the men of the 301" Tank Battalion, the I" British Tank 
Battalion had been engaged in previous heavy combat before the Hindenburg Line 
operation, especially in March and April at Villers-Bretonneux. 127 
Even though the 27hDivision receives the most attention in this operation, it was not 
alone in its mistakes. Despite having achieved its objective on 29 September, the 30'h 
Division exhibited errors. One of its biggest critics was the division's G-3 (Operations). 
Maj. W. F. L. Hartigan, who wrote a report three days after the battle that outlined the 
troops' deficiencies. He \\as disturbed by the Aoss of direction' of men who became 
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confused in the mist and smoke barrage, left leaderless by, NCOs who failed to caM- 
compasses and 'assume charge of stragglers. ' Company officers and \COs. accordin(i to 
Hartigan, 'were not sufficiently informed of the general plan, and of their oýý n objecti \e 
and mission, in particular. ' He concluded: -As long as they are allowed to hold rank 
without performing the duties, we will have NCOs incapable of initiative or the exercise 
of command. ' 128 The historian of the 18 th British Division echoed Hartigan's analý sis. 
'The men of the 3 Oth American Division were magnificent, ' he thought, *but their staffs 
were lacking in experience. ' 
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In his report of 27-29 September, 1918, Read agreed with the Australians and British on 
the 11 Corps' performance. He pointed out that the American Aack of experience was the 
chief failing of the regimental and higher command. While the staffs, as a rule, 
functioned efficiently and handled the tactical situations with skill, there was a tendencý' 
for them to lose the remarkably close touch with the combatant units that all British 
headquarters maintained. ' The men 'learned along the lines from the experience with the 
British, and a remarkable improvement was noticeable toward the close of the 
operations. " 
30 
Epilogue 
The fighting produced many instances of heroic acts. Chaplain A. 1. Foster of the II 7h 
Infantry, while aiding wounded comrades, 'found a large number of men who had been 
lost in the fog. He promptly took charge, as there was no other officer available. led his 
men through severe shel I fire to the objective. captured it. and held it for mo daN s. ' It 
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was reported that 'Foster captured 14 German prisoners single-handed ly. and a small 
grey pony. 5131 Despite his gallant efforts. Chaplain Foster's name \ýas absent from lists 
--s Oth of Medal of Honour and Distinguished Service Cross recipients. TNý elve men of the 
Division did receive the Medal of Honour, the largest number from aný American 
division serving in World War 1. Six men of the 27thDivision also received this 
award. 
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The attack on the Hindenburg Line was the greatest challenge so far for the 27 h and 3 O'h 
Divisions since they had begun training with the British in June. Although the operation 
did not go entirely as planned, and casualties were high, the 11 American Corps displayed 
much courage and a willingness to fight as equals among the British and Australian 
forces. The battle was too complex, as Monash himself discovered. Still, the officers 
and men of the two divisions were now battle-hardened veterans, and as disciplined as 
any of the AEF units in France. As the next operation would prove, they were also quick 
learners, and the mistakes made on 29 September were largely corrected. 
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Chapter 7: Back to the Front 
There was only a brief respite of five days before 11 Corps moved back to the front as part 
of the Fourth British Army. This gave brigade commanders little time to draNý lessons 
from the recent Hindenburg Line attack, so it was questionable hwx the Americans ý\ould 
perform during the next attack. The 27 th and 30 th Divisions had taken heavN casualties in 
the fighting of 29-30 September and were below strength, with no possibility of receivitio 
replacements, but still larger than depleted British divisions. ' The Australian Corps. still 
attached to the Fourth Army, had been continuously in line since 8 August and was in 
dire need of a rest. The Americans were to replace it. 
What the Americans and their Allies did not realise was that the new attack, earlý in 
October, was to mark the beginning of the end of the war. At that time, the main 
American force to the south was mired in the Meuse-Argonne, not getting far, despite 
two general attacks on 4 and 14 October. But, on the British front. the drive of former 
weeks continued, the line was moving, and German forces, under pressure everywhere, 
simply could not sustain the impact of repeated attacks. 
The BEF Continues the Offensive 
After breaching the Hindenburg Line on 29 September. the Fourth Army continued to 
push forward. The Beaurevoir Line had not been taken, and Rawlinson \\as adamant that 
his army must complete the destruction of the final prepared German defences just to his 
east. Once this N\as accomplished, he \\ould push the Germans back across open country. 
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On 30 September, the next operation commenced in heavy rain. Although the ý\ eather 
was a hindrance to the aerial artillery spotting, the I" and 32 nd British Divisions of IX 
Corps managed some progress that day and the next. The divisions conducted mostly 
small-scale and uncoordinated attacks, and, on I October, penetrated the Beaurevoir Line 
between Wiancourt and Sequehart. However, a German counterattack regained the line 
that night. Also on the 3 Oth ,a coordinated attack to the north was more successful. 
Monash's tired corps pushed past the Bellicourt Tunnel entrance and took the 
Hindenburg support line at Le Catelet. This area had been loosely secured by mixed 
American and Australian troops on the night of 29 September. but was now firmly in 
Allied hands. 2 
To break the Beaurevoir Line, Rawlinson recognised that a full-scale assault was 
necessary. On 2 October, five divisions (I't, 32 
nd 46 th and 5 oth British, and the 2 
nd 
Australian), with support from eight brigades of artillery and 22 tanks, were ordered to 
assault the last German prepared defence the next day. At 6: 30 A. M., the attacking 
divisions advanced 2,000 yards on a front of 10,000 and opened up part of the Beaurevoir 
Line until the Second and Eighteenth German Armies recaptured the villages of 
Beaurevoir and Montbrehain by the end of the day. It took three more days of fighting 
b), 
the 25 th and 50'hBritish Divisions and the 2 nd Australian Division to retake the villageS. 
3 
The Australian division was actually preparing to withdraw when Rawlinson ordered 
Monash to keep his troops at the front a day longer. The 4 October assault on 
Montbrehain was led by the 6thAustralian Brigade. Inadequate tank support slo%\ed the 
2 83 
attack when the machines joined the fight late. By then, the infantrý \ý as encountering 
German reinforcements, including fresh artillery. 
Montbrehain was eventually taken at the cost of 300 Australian men and 40 officers. 
The loss was deemed unnecessary by the Australian official historian, who argued that 
Rawlinson should have included the attack as part of his larger objective. 5 Ho\\ e\ er, 
Monash and his division commanders considered the attack worth making and did not 
question Rawlinson's orders, so it is unfair to blame the consequences entirel\ on the 
Fourth Army commander. 6 
With the Beaurevoir Line in Allied possession, the Fourth Army had an excellent vantage 
point from which it could launch further attacks against the retreating German forces. In 
his victory dispatch of 6 October, Haig expressed pleasure at the success: *The effect of 
the victory upon the subsequent course of the campaign was decisive. The threat to the 
enemy's communications was direct and instant. for nothing but the natural obstacles of a 
wooded and well-watered countryside lay between our armies and Maubeuge. ' 
Americans Re-Enter the Line 
Now that Monbrehain was no longer contested. Rawlinson ordered Monash's troops 
withdrawn from the line, and half of the 11 American Corps undertook relief of the 
Australian Corps during the night of 5-6 October. Only the 30'hDivision ýý as ordered to 
the front, and both brigades of the 27 th Division were in corps reserve. The Australian 
artillery remained to support the Americans. Rations Nvere to be issued b\ the British 
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because the Americans would be too far from the supply lines. The doughboý s ýN ere fed 
staples, such as bacon, oatmeal and potatoes, and unlike the initial experience \\ ith 
British food, there were no reported complaints from the hungry soldiers. 
The 5 9th Brigade was placed on a front of 4,000 yards, with its 118 th Infantrv on the right 
and the 117 
th Infantry on the left, 1,200 yards to the rear. The 60th Brigade was in 
reserve, between Bellicourt and Villeret. 9 Prior to the 30'h Division arriving at the front, 
Major General Read sent a request to AEF headquarters for all officers of the 270' and 
30th Divisions currently at schools to return immediately to their units. 'Considerable 
casualties and the fewness of replacements furnished, ' he wrote, 'have reduced the 
number of officers for duty, with combatant units below what is considered prudent to 
lead into battle. "O This was a desperate, but necessary, appeal, since so many of his line 
officers had become casualties during the Hindenburg Line attack, and the platoons and 
companies were short of commanders. Pershing's staff did not send a formal response to 
Read, but the division strength reports for October indicate that the officers had returned 
to their units. 
A Minor Operation 
With the German Army now forced into open country, the Fourth Army continued the 
pUrsuit, and the Americans would spearhead most of the attacks. Because the 117 th 
occupied a sector too far behind the I 18th, it had to straighten its line before the next 
attack. A minor action was planned for 7 October to make this correction. It Nýas similar 
in scope to the preliminary operation conducted by the brigade before the main 
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Hindenburg Line attack. " At 5: 15 A. M., a rolling barrage commenced the attack, but the 
artillery covered only a portion of the front. As a result. the 25hand 5 Oth British 
Divisions, protecting the American flanks, could not advance. This caused the 'I'd 
Battalion of the 117 th to run into stiff opposition. Companý L took the brunt of casualties 
when machine-gun and shell fire poured in from the vicinity of Geneve, Bois de la Palette 
and Ponchaux. It lost a captain and I't lieutenant. 'At the time the barrage lifted, the 
company commander recalled, 'we were within 50 yards of the enemy's lines, at ýýhich 
point we were held up for 10 minutes by heavy machine-gun fire. "' 
Four hours after the jump-off, Major General Lewis halted the attack ýý hen the centre 
companies of the 3 rd Battalion established liaison with the H8 th and stopped near 
Mannions. Although the battalion had advanced only 500 yards and took heavy 
casualties, it captured 150 prisoners of the 20th German Division. Lewis blamed the 
losses on failure of the barrage and a lack of preparation time. His division had been in 
line less than a day, and it appeared that not all officers knew the battle plan. This 
problem would continue to haunt the 3 Oth Division until it was withdrawn. Such issues 
were not exhibited by the British Army at this point in the war. since its commanders and 
staffs at divisional and brigade level were now vastly more experienced. But there was a 
more serious reason for the high casualties. During the fighting, Companies G and H of 
the II 7thwere falsely told that the 3 rd Battalion of their regiment had been annihilated 
Nvhen the Germans counterattacked. They were rushed forward to repel what turned out 
to be a nonexistent attack, and suffered from intense shell fire moving in and out of the 
line. " 
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When word of this mishap reached corps headquarters, Read instructed LexN, is to publish 
a Fourth Army telegram that warned British troops about listening to rumours: 'There are 
indications that the attention of officers and men is in danger of being diverted bY 
insidious rumours from their single task of defeating the enerny. ' it cautioned. Raxý linson 
had issued it to alert his troops against believing stories about alleged peace talks. ltx\as 
a universal message and made clear that an 'army will concentrate its entire energy on 
bringing the operations in the field to a successful and decisive conclusion. ' 14 There 
were no further incidences of rumours affecting the next series of operations. 
The Advance Continues 
On the afternoon of 7 October, the Fourth Army issued an order for the 3 oth Division to 
commence another attack the next day. The II 8thwould spearhead the assault, with one 
battalion of the 117 th in support. It first required an advance of 3,000 yards on a line 
running northwest from Brancoucourt. After securing this line, the barrage would halt 
for 30 minutes, and then the support battalion would pass through and exploit the second 
objective, requiring a push of 3,000 yards to the northeast toward the village of Premont. 
Instructions were issued for mopping-up parties to help secure the village. The 
Americans were supported on their right by the 6 th British Division and on the left by the 
25 th and 66thBritish Divisions. This attack was more complex than straightening the line, 
-, Oth 
and even more difficult because Read's staff did not distribute orders to _3 
Division 
headquarters until late evenino. Again, Lewis did not have time to instruct brigade 
commanders before the attack \\as due to start. 
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In the hours preceding the jump-off. the Fourth Army arti I lery pounded the Germans ýNith 
350,000shells. On 8 October at 5: 10 A. M.. the infantry moved forward under a barraýge. 
as well as support from a battalion of heavy tanks and two companies of Whippets. 
Machine-gun fire from the numerous emplacements around the \ýest of Brancourt-le- 
Grand raked the lead elements, preventing progress. Elements of the 6thDivision xýere 
held up and could not protect the American flanks. Fortunately, two hours later. 
resistance lightened when the Germans retreated, fighting a rear-guard action. On the 
right flank, Company C of the 120th Infantry was pulled from reserve, and was able to 
advance enough to fill a gap that developed between the 118 th Infantry and the 6 th 
Division. By 7: 50 A. M., the 2 nd Battalion of the 118 th reached its first objective at 
Brancourt, and by 1: 30 P. M., the regimentis Ist Battalion entered the village. There the 
elements of the 118 th mopped up and then consolidated a line and dug in for the night. 
On this day, the action of three men of the 3 oth Division earned the Medal of Honour. In 
one instance, Sgt. Gary Evans Foster accompanied an officer to attack a machine-gun 
nest in a sunken road near Montbrehain. When the officer was wounded, Foster single- 
handedly killed several of the Germans with hand grenades and his pistol, and then 
brought 18 back as prisoners. 15 
-, Oth That evening, Read again notified the _3 Division that 
it had no time for rest, but would 
resume attacking at 5: 20 A. M. the next morning in the direction of St. Souplet. This 
time, to prevent any confusion about the attack, a conference was convened at 60th 
Brigade headquarters to ensure that all subordinate commanders received and understood 
the latest orders. Officers were told that the first objective was a line running north from 
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Bohain to west of Busigny. It required an advance of 4,000-5,000 ý ards by elements of 
the 59th Brigade. The second object was to be taken by the 60th Brigade, after passing 
through the 5 9th and advancing 2,000 yards farther to the northeast. 
The eventual object was to secure the Selle River and the high ground from St. Benin to 
Molain. Such an attack, the American officers were told. would not be easy as it 
necessitated advancing a great distance through several villages, farms, and woods that 
probably contained enemy units. Despite Read's best efforts to see that his men xvere 
prepared for the next attack, the orders again arrived late at the II 9th regimental 
headquarters, around 3: 30 A. M. on 9 October. Then, the runner sent to deliver the orders 
from this command post to the battalion commanders and front line troops did not reach 
them until 4: 30 A. M. The barrage had been ordered to commence a half hour later. but 
was changed to 5: 30 A. M. As the 119"' Infantry historian suggests, the difference of 30 
minutes 'might have caused disastrous results. ' 16 
A similar situation occurred within the II 7h Infantry sector. The regiment was ordered 
to assault Busigny with the 2 nd Battalion in the lead, the I" Battalion in support, and the 
3 rd Battalion in reserve. But it received the instructions late, and when they finally 
arrived, it was recognised that they were incomplete and inaccurate. The regimental 
commander found that an error had been made in defining boundaries, most importantly 
the line of departure. It was believed to be three miles away, but the exact location ýNas 
unknown. An attempt \\as made to reach 2 nd Battalion headquarters to warn of the 
situation, but a message sent by wire failed. Therefore, when the attack start time 
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arrived, it was realised that the lead battalion was not in place. The I st Battalion 
commander took the initiative and commenced with two battalions moving fonNard. Asa 
result, the II 7th was forced to form a defensive flank to the right, while its left moved 
forward to join the II 9th Infantry. The regiment managed to reach the western bank of 
the Selle River, but could not cross on account of heavy fire on the right flank-" 
Eventually the German fire of machine guns died down, and the 1190' Infantry advanced 
4,000 yards on the left of the sector and captured St. Benin, St. Souplet and Escaufort. 
On the right, the 120'h Infantry met strong resistance and suffered heavy casualties from 
fire coming from the direction of Vaux Andigny, and also the high ground to the south 
and southeast. Most of it came from the right where the 25 th British Division had been 
held up and were some distance to the rear. By the day's end, the Americans liberated 
three villages and more than 700 French civilians. Also, a large number of machine guns, 
field pieces and ammunition was taken. ' 8 
News of the 30 th Division advances reached Col. Robert Bacon, still the American liaison 
at Montreuil, prompting him to write of 'the wonderful events of the last few days that 
are almost too much to comprehend. '19 His enthusiasm was well grounded, but there was 
much fight left in the German forces, and the Americans at the front would learn this over 
the next several days. 
Following instructions from Rawlinson on the evening of 9 October. Read ordered the 
30th Division to advance the next morning to the line of Le Cateau-St. Souplet-Ancligný , 
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parallel to the Selle. The terrain surrounding the Selle formed an obstacle that the 
Germans used to great advantage. Although the river ýý as between 15 and 18 feet %ý ide. it 
was not more than 4 feet deep. The Germans had damned it at St. Souplet and St. Benin. 
and at the southern exit at Le Cateau. Only to the south of St. Souplet was it narrow and 
could be crossed without much difficulty. Otherwise a bridge ýý as needed . 
20 East of the 
Selle, as the Fourth Army historian describes it, "the slopes became more abrupt. small 
streams ran in the valleys, and there was large tracts of woodland. ' Because the pasture 
between these tracts was divided into many small enclosures bounded bý high, thick 
hedges, which, while constituting a serious obstacle to an infantry advance, at the same 
time afforded it excellent cover from view except at short ranges. . 21 
This next attack commenced at 5: 30 A. M. on 10 October, with the 60thBrigade objective 
being the river and the high ground beyond, from St Benin to Molain. The II 9th Infantry 
took the lead and the brigade captured St. Souplet and St. Benin, the latter -with the 
British, and established its line on the western bank of the Selle. The brigade was 
prevented from crossing the river by fire from the high ground to the east. On the right of 
the line, the 120th Infantry encountered heavy fire when taking Vaux-Andigny, and could 
not take its main objectives, the village of Molain and the Selle. Following was the 118 th 
Infantry, which had been in reserve. It covered the exposed right flank of the 120th. and 
then closed a gap that developed between the American regiments and the 25 th British 
Division. Despite making a determined stand, the Germans were clearly in retreat. as 
indicated by the congestion of their transports on the roads and railroads. The Americans 
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also witnessed the Gen-nans destroying their supply dumps -a good sign indeed. (Map 
after page 291). 
To keep up the pressure, Rawlinson again requested that the Americans continue the 
advance, and on the morning of II October, the 118 th was ordered to pass through the 
120th and attempt to reach the river. It was to be supported by the I 19'h Infantry. x\hich 
would attack from its position along the west side of the Selle. but not cross until the 
118 th reached its objective. 
The attack started with three battalions of the I 18'hand one from the 120t" advancing to 
the river and capturing La Haie Manneresse and Vaux-Andigny. But enemy resistance 
prevented the Americans on the right from advancing further because the 25 th British 
Division, which was covering their flank, was held up in the Bois de Riquerval. It now 
appeared obvious that the Germans were no longer in retreat, but prepared to make a 
stand east of the Selle. 
The 30 Ih is Withdrawn and the 27 
th Enters the Line 
With a lull in the fighting, Read ordered the 300' Division to retire for a much-needed rest 
and re-supplying. Despite the usual communication problems, the division had fought 
well. However, it did suffer a significant number of casualties, with more than 300 killed 
1 1) 
and about three times that many wounded. - During the evening of II October, the 27 th 
Division relieved the 3 Oth . The New, Yorkers were rested after the Hindenburg Line 
attack. and Nvere re-supplied with the fexý articles of clothing that remained in the depots. 
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Clothing was in great need, and the 11 Corps quartermaster had not received aný new 
shipments in weeks. As a result, some Americans were equipped ý\ ith British tunics and 
trousers. 23 
The two brigades of O'Ryan's division left the reserve area in Tincourt and marched east. 
with the 54 
th halting at Brancourt and the 53 rd at Bel liCoUrt. 
24 The 54th, plus the 2 nd 
Battalion of the 105 
th 
, replaced the 
60th Brigade on the night of II- 12 October. In reserve 
was the 53 rd Brigade at Busigny. The move to the front lacked secrecy. On the 13'h, the 
Germans shelled Busigny, striking the courtyard of the chateau where O'Ryan made his 
headquarters. Fragments struck Maj. Chester H. King, commander of the 104'hMachine- 
Gun Battalion, and forced his evacuation. Other shells seriously wounded several 
dispatch riders at the division message centre. The German shells also found their way to 
the 106 th Infantry regimental headquarters, almost killing several of its staff officers. 25 
On 14 October, the 27thwas ordered to reduce its front, to be replaced by the 6 th British 
Division on the southern end of the line, and the 50thBritish Division would take over a 
portion of the line to the north. The 27 th would still occupy a front of 4,200 yards. The 
reason for the reduction was to prepare for an upcoming attack. The day before, the 
British had captured a German map that showed the enemy intended to construct two 
temporary defences. They were noted as Hermann Stellung I and 11. The first line was to 
run east of the Selle River from St. Souplet to Le Cateau, while the other was to be 
constructed east of the Sambre and Oise Canal. British air reconnaissance on 14 October 
photographed the country as far as Maubeuge, but neither of the Hermann lines \ý as 
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revealed in the images. There were, however, newly dug trenches, between Vaux- 
Andigny and Le Cateau, that were protected by wire. as ý\ el I as a number of rifle pits in 
26 pairs on the high ground between the Selle and the Sambre and Oise Canal . 
Before the reduction in the 27 th Division sector was to take place, O'RN, an ordered a 
detachment from the 54thBrigade to conduct a raid in German territory. Hispurposeýýas 
not only to identify German units opposing the Americans, but to ascertain if any 
obstacles had been put in place between his front and the Selle. This xkas not going to be 
an ordinary trench raid. O'Ryan wanted to give the Germans the impression of a large- 
scale attack. He arranged for the Australian artillery to place a barrage on a front of 
1,500 yards that covered the German trenches opposing the 108 th Infantry at St. Souplet. 
The barrage would first cover the flanks, then rest for three minutes. Next, the barrage 
would cover the middle sector of about 200 yards in width, then fire continuously on the 
German front line trenches. After working out the details with Brig. Gen. William 
Pierce, 54 th Brigade commander, 21 men from the 108 th went forward at 4 P. M. in broad 
daylight. The raiding party waded across the Selle at a point that was 3 feet deep and 
captured two non-commissioned officers and 21 enlisted men, while only sustaining two 
i-nen slightly wounded. After interrogating the prisoners, it was determined they were 
from the 2040' German Division and had been instructed to hold the line at all CoStS. 
27 
This raid and others like it, along with air reconnaissance. provided the Allies NN, 'ith 
valuable information on the German units, regarding their front and defensive positions. 
Although not nearly as elaborate as the Hindenburg Line. their line had many trenches 
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and strong points. The line stretched from the eastern bank of the Selle as far south as St. 
Souplet, then it crossed to the west bank of the river and continued south throu2h the 
village of Molain. A high railway embankment paralleled the river a feý\ Yards east. 
from north of Le Cateau to a point east of St. Souplet. To the east of the river ý\ as a low 
ridge where the Germans positioned themselves, as well as another one 2,500 yards 
farther, which dominated Catillon and the valley of the Sambre and Oise Canal. 
The Last Offensive 
To dislodge the Germans, Rawlinson planned the largest attack since 29 September, to 
commence on 17 October. The day before, 16 October, the 3 oth Division re-entered the 
line between the 27 th Division and the IX British Corps. He tasked the 11 American 
Corps with crossing the headwaters of the Selle between Molain and St. Souplet. where 
they would capture the hamlet of Arbre Guernon, and the villages of Mazinghien and 
Ribeauville. 
In the 27 th Division sector, the plans called for its brigades to attack side by side on a 
2,000 yard front, and then expand to 2,800 yards at the objective line. The 53 rd Brigade 
was to attack on the right, with the 105 th Infantry in the lead and the 106th in support, and 
the 54 th Brigade was to attack on the left, with the 108th Infantry in the lead and the 107 th 
in support. In the first phase, one battalion each of the 105thand 108 th Infantries was to 
wade the Selle and advance up to 3,000 yards, overrunning the rail embankment and 
reaching the line of the Le Cateau-Arbre de Guise road. After pausing, the same lead 
battalions NNere to proceed to the second phase line 1,600 yards further, where theý NNould 
dig in and consolidate. One battalion from each regiment N\ould follow the lead battalion 
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to mop up bypassed German units and positions. One battalion from the I 05th Infantry 
would attack the villages of Arbre de Guise/Arbre Guernon and Advantage Farm near the 
second phase line. In the 53 rd Brigade sector, a third battalion of the 105 th Infantry ýýould 
push on to the third objective, 1,800 yards in advance. In the 54thBrigade, the 107 th 
Infantry was to pass through the 108'hand proceed to this line. Patrol elements were then 
to advance to the exploitation line another 1,800 yards, near the canal and the village of 
Catillon. 28 Artillery support for the 27 th American Division would come from the 4 th 
Australian Division. 29 
The 3 Oth Division would attack with its two brigades. Its 590' Brigade had the task of 
capturing the vilages of Molain and St. Martin Rivi&re, then advancing to the first 
objective, which was a line running northwest through the western outskirts of 
Ribeauville. There, it would halt for three hours, while the 60thBrigade was to pass 
through on to the second objective, a north-south line through La Haie Tonnoile Farm. 
After this second objective had been reached, patrols were to push out to the line of the 
Sambre and Oise Canal near Catillon. The 5'ý'Australian Division, with five brigades of 
light and one brigade of heavy artillery, was designated to support the 3 Oth American 
Division. 
To assist the infantry, 10 tanks were allotted to the 27thDivision and 12 to the 3 Oth from 
the 301" American Tank Battalion. Tanks were becoming scarce at this point in the N, \ar. 
and since 30 September. the -3301't 
had attempted to rebuild what it possessed after losing 
half of its 40 tanks during the Hindenburg Line attack. The commander of the 30 I't. Maj. 
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Ralph 1. Sasse, noted in his history of the unit that infantry troops his battalion was to 
support were sceptical in the use of tanks with infantry since so many of the machines 
had proved a failure during the attack on the St. Quentin Canal. Some of this scepticism 
may have been avoided if the tanks had been able to train with the infantrý prior to the 29 
September jump-off, but frantic efforts to move the infantry into line did not allow for 
such exercises. Only some elements of the 3 oth Division witnessed a tank exercise in 
mid-September. Instead, Sasse ordered his company and platoon commanders to x\ork 
with the infantry to ensure that the manoeuvres orders were understood, and this xý, as 
done to a small degree. 30 
Everything possible was used to assist the infantry. Two aero squadrons from the 
Australian Flying Corps, the 35 th and 3 rd Squadrons, would play a major role in the 
attack .31 The squadrons would not only fly contact patrols to verify the progress of the 
infantry, but a patrol from each squadron would watch for any counterattacks. If one was 
spotted, 'this plane will drop white parachute lights immediately over the counterattack 
troops. All troops should be warned to keep a sharp lookout for this signal. -)32 Aircraft 
were to drop phosphorus bombs throughout the attack until the advance element reached 
the second phase line in order to create an additional smoke screen and blind German 
observation posts on key high ground. Two other squadrons would also carry out a noise 
plan to conceal the movement of the tanks to the front on the morning of the attack -a 
tactic that had proved beneficial during the Hamel and Amiens operations. Also. one 
squadron of the 20'hBritish Hussars was assigned to both the 27 th and 3 Oth Divisions for 
patrol and messenger service. 
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The attack was scheduled for 17 October, ýý, ith the 30thDivision on the right of the line 
and the 27 th Division to the left. Rawlinson did not expect to advance beyond the first 
objective that day, but concerned that German resistance might collapse at aný time. he 
emphasised that every effort should be made to exploit success. He ordered a 
preliminary bombardment to commence at 8 A. M. on 16 October. The attack the 
following morning started poorly on the right of the 27 th Division sector. The 5-3 rd 
Brigade led the attack, with the I't Battalion of the 105 th Infantry and the 106 th in support. 
When the barrage opened at 5: 20 A. M., German artillery responded with a counter- 
barrage that struck the assembled troops, and the I" Battalion took heavy casualties, 
including a company commander, before it could advance. As had been the case with the 
Hindenburg Line attack, officers were among the early casualties. causing great 
confusion in the ranks. In the rear, the 2 nd Battalion lost two company commanders as it 
advanced to assist the Is' Battalion. 33 The 3 rd Battalion also could not offer much 
assistance since it had already suffered casualties and been disorganised from heavy 
shelling and gas concentration during the march to the assembly area. The 106 th Infantry 
also had to cross a trench system on the west side of the Selle, opposite Marsh Mill, 1,000 
yards south of St. Souplet. The system had been constructed early in the war by the 
Germans for training and contained a considerable amount of craters that became 
obstacles. 
34 
Also at 5: 20 A. M., the 107 th Infantry advanced from its jump-off west of St. Souplet in 
the direction of the Selle. In the van Ný as its Machine-Gun Company, attached to the I" 
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Battalion, with orders to maintain contact with the 15 Oth British Brigade on its left and 
also protect the flank if necessary. 35 This was no easy task since the company. like the 
entire regiment, was badly depleted after taking heavy losses in the attack against the 
Hindenburg Line two weeks before. The company commander reported an effective 
fighting strength on 15 October of 3 officers and 51 men - less than one-third its original 
size. 36 One of the three officers was Lt. Kenneth Gow. Shortly after the barrage 
commenced, he had gone ahead of his unit to scout for suitable roads to transport the 
machine-gun carts. Gow only made it a short distance when fragments from a German 
H. E. shell pierced his face and neck. He died instantl Y. 37 In one of his last letters home, 
he had advised his parents not to mourn in the event of his death, but accept that they had 
, 38 'given a son to a great cause. 
On the 27 th Division's left, the 108th Infantry also encountered problems. The I't 
Battalion led the attack, with the 3 rd Battalion in support to mop up. The initial assault hit 
resistance from machine-gun elements in front of the railway embankment, but the I" 
Battalion was able to overrun the line. Alas, it could not keep up with the creeping 
barrage. An attempt to reorganise the regiment at the railway after the battalions had 
become intermingled was difficult on account of the fog. The 108t" pushed on and by 
6: 30 A. M. had overrun Baudival Farm. 39 Support from the tanks again proved 
disappointing as they had difficulty crossing the river. and those that did became 
disabled. Le Cateau Station was taken b,,, the 66 th British Division this daý, along ýý ith 
400 prisoners . 
4" This same division had trained the 27 h Division back in June and Julý. 
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About midnight, the 27hDivision ordered its forward units to the ridýge 1,500 .\ ards 
to the 
east of their current positions. The division continued to patrol aggressk elý and support 
attempts by the 30'h Division to move forward on the right until it x\ as relieved on 20 
October .41 During the two-day battle, the 27 
th Division attacked and defeated most of the 
204 th German Infantry Division, advancing 5,500 yards through the German defences. It 
suffered more than 50 casualties. 
Among the units of the 27t" Division taking severe casualties were its engineer 
detachments. O'Ryan claimed they suffered from what he later deemed *The 
Psychological Effect of Certain Physical Features of Terrain. ' The engineers 
accompanied the leading waves of infantry with ropes and portable foot bridge. When 
encountering a sunken road that ran parallel to St. Souplet, several hundred yards from 
the start line, these detachments with their impediments stopped, instead of going beyond 
to the start line in the open. Because of the fog and uneven terrain. they could not tell 
how much further to advance. Hence, when the barrage fell, the engineers, having further 
to go than the distance prescribed for them, and encumbered as they were ýý, ith the bridge 
material, were delayed and caught by the enemy counter-barrage, with resulting 
casualties that otherwise would not have occurred. O'Ryan believed the men ýý ere 
psychologically paralyzed by the unusual terrain. Fifteen engineers were killed in action 
on 17 October, and more than three times that many were wounded. 42 1 
In the 3 oth Division sector, the attack commenced at 5: 20 A. M. on 17 October, ýý ith the 
5 9th Brigade in front and the 60'h in reserve. They held a front of 2,000 yards. each 
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regiment had a battalion in front, one in support, and a third in reserve. Machine-gun fire 
was provided by the 113 th and II 5thBattalions, which raked St. Martin-Rivi&re, Molain. 
and connecting roads. On their right were the 46 th and 6hBritish Divisions. Facing them 
th -, rd were three German divisions: the 15ý' Reserve, 24 Infantry, and the. ) Naval. The 
attackers jumped off in a thick fog, which made the situation difficult for even the most 
experienced British commanders. This was particularly true in the sector assigned to the 
British 139hBrigade of the 46 th Division. It attacked on a front Ný, ith one battalion, the 
8/Sherwood Foresters, in the lead. Although the battalion initially caught the Germans 
by surprise and took many prisoners, it suddenly lost direction in the mist and split apart. 
The left element of the battalion headed toward Andigny les Fermes, which created a gap 
at Regincourt on the high ground. When the mist cleared, German machine-gun fire 
opened up from this area, and to the northwest, inflicting heavy casualties. 
Along the river, the German defences were minimal, but still posed a threat. There were 
trenches and wire near Le Cateau, and as the 59thBrigade attempted to cross the Selle, it 
was held back by enemy fire and the fog that caused the lead battalion to lose its way. 
reminiscent of the attack of 29 September. Another reason the brigade did not reach the 
objective was because it fell behind the barrage. Lead troops of the brigade finally 
reached a road running southwest from Arbre de Guise and dug in. That night, the 60'h 
Brigade relieved the 59h, which passed into division reserve. 
The Americans had not expected stiff resistance from the Germans, or a heavl1v 
reinforced front. Prisoners taken by the 30t" Division troops indicated that this ýý as a 
'1101 
rear-guard action, but the intensity of fighting by the Germans indicated a more organised 
defensive stand. By the afternoon, the attack had died down and the troops dug in. 
The attack resumed early the next morning, with the 60th Brigade advancing only a feýN 
hundred yards before failing back to its original position along the road south of Arbre de 
Guise, where it remained throughout the day. After dusk, the lead regiment. the II 9t" 
Infantry, advanced and, this time, moved forward 2,000 yards to capture Ribeauville 
unopposed. The II 91h Infantry had attempted to take the village earlier, and found it 
abandoned by the Germans. 
One obstacle that delayed the American advance was the ridge overlooking Catillon. The 
village was one of the approaches to the Sambre and Oise Canal. The ridge had not been 
taken, mostly because of the failure of the 6 th British Division to support the right flank of 
the Americans; this did not go unnoticed at 3 Oth Division headquarters. Its chief of staff, 
Col. John K. Herr, recalled years later how he contacted the 6hDivision to coordinate the 
jump-off on 16 October. He was told by his counterpart that the 6 th would not jump off 
despite orders to do so. When Herr asked why, he was told, 'There is no use in 
concealing from you the truth; wejust can't do it. We can make a bluff at starting off and 
open up with artillery fire, but we simply cannot make a real attack .' 
43 Yet. the 16 
th 
and 
18 th British Brigades did get as far as it intermediate objective on 17 October. 
44 
Herr relayed this conversation to Lex\, -is. who informed 11 Corps headquarters that the 
right flank of his division was now going to be exposed. But Read took a passive 
approach to the situation and refused to take the matter up NN ith RaxN linson. The corps 
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commander referred to such matters as *soldier's talk' in his final report. Instead, he told 
Simonds to suggest that the 30th Division form a defensive flank on its right to make up 
for the loss of the 6 th British Division. Lewis recognised this solution as unacceptable 
since a flank would in no way protect against enfilade fire from the German artillerý and 
machine guns. The matter ended there, and the attack ensued with the iiie,, itable 
th -, Oth occurring. The 6 Division had been in line on the right flank of the -) Division since 8 
October, and on the gth I it failed to advance abreast of the 118 
th Infantry. thus exposing 
the regiment to German fire from Bohain. 45 
The following day, the 60th Brigade advanced at 5: 15 A. M., with support from two 
battalions of the 5 9th. With little trouble, the II 9th Infantry passed through Mazinghien 
and established a line on the eastern outskirts of the village. The 120th Infantry had a 
more difficult time, and it took several attempts before passing north of Mazinghien. All 
the while, casualties were mounting. One of them was Pvt. Judson W. Dennis, who was 
killed by machine-gun fire near Busigny on 17 October 1918. A letter to his family had 
arrived the same day with news that he survived the Hindenburg Line attack - one of the 
few times they had heard from him since he left for France that summer. 46 
That night, Rawlinson issued orders to relieve the 11 Corps. and its front ýNas taken over 
by the IV British Corps on the night of 20-21 October. The Pt British Division took over 
-, Oth th th the -) 
Division sector and the 6 British Division relieved the 27 . Although 
it ýý as not 
kno\\ n at the time, the war was over for 11 Corps. Its 27hDivision moved to Corbie. and 
-, oth 
11 
the 3 \\ent to Querrieu for training. One unit. the I't Battalion of the 105' Frigineers. 
remained in line at Montbrehain with the Fourth Armv until 4 November. There it 
assisted in repairing the light railways from this village to Bohain. 
Reflections on the Selle Operation 
For the hard-fighting Americans in 11 Corps, the war effectively was over. But they had 
made their contribution. During the Selle Campaign it was a good deal more than 
average. And, considering how the two divisions of the corps were essentially iie\\ to 
combat, compared with their British and Australian counterparts, the. N had done 
extraordinarily well. The American infantry and machine-gun units had received good 
instruction from the British and Dominion forces, and were able to apply what they had 
learned in this final operation. This was done against a German opponent that was far 
from collapsing. As one historian of the operation writes, the Germans 'fought hard and 
skilfully used defence in-depth doctrine. Their position and intervention units were well 
organised, and the position divisions were relatively strong in manpower. ' 47 This was 
true even when the Germans were surrendering at alarming rates. 
Even the American tanks proved more successful in this operation by knocking out some 
of the German machine-gun nests. But many also lost their way in the mist and smoke. 
In one instance, a lieutenant had the added difficulty of trying to operate with a broken 
compass, and. as a result, he crossed the Selle three times, believing he was crossing 
different stream S. 
48 
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As historians Paul Harris and Niall Barr recognise, the Battle of the Selle is largel% 
ignored when considering the final campaigns of the ýý ar. This is especial IN, true. (-Yi,. en 
the American participation in the battle and the Hundred Days campaign as a ýý hole. Sir 
Douglas Haig had recognised its importance and sent Read a congratulatory message on 
, oth 20 October. He told the American corps commander that 'all ranks of the 27"' and _3 
American Divisions under your command displayed an energy, courage. and t) 
determination in attack that proved irresistible... you have earned the lasting esteem and 
admiration of your British comrades in arms, whose successes you have so nobly 
shared. '49 He was mostly correct. The Americans had fought well. providing a valuable 
contribution to this phase of the Fourth Army attacks. The British had every reason to 
admire their doughboy comrades. 
The achievements of 11 American Corps are overshadowed by the large-scale Meuse- 
Argonne offensive. 50 In his My Experiences in the World War, Pershing has less than a 
page on the Battle of the Selle, and most of that is Haig's congratulatory message. 
" It is 
doubtful that Pershing had followed much of 11 Corps' progress in mid-October since he 
was busy reorganising the main body of the AEF. 
Retirement 
Out of line for the last time, the 27 th and 30 th resumed their training. With training came 
inspection by American and British officers, and subsequent reports. The first x\ as 
actually an ongoino by the 11 Corps acting inspector general, N\ho compiled his 
notes w-hile the divisions were still in combat at the Selle. Brig. Gen. George D. Moore 
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offered an analysis of the training from the first period in June to the Hindenbur(2 Line 
attack. His criticism of the men in 11 Corps, especially in battle, stated the obvious. 
Liaison was poor, staff work fau Ity. 
52 Lack of discipline ýýas also noted, and it \\as 
particularly taking its toll on the Americans, especially in the 27 th Division. Since its 
formation at Camp Wadsworth in 1917, there had been incidents and infractions. After 
arriving in France, the division became more disciplined. albeit having been in line: later, 
it began to show signs of wear. The men committed mostlY minor infractions. stragglin-gy 
and wearing uniforms incorrectly. While in the rear, the doughbo\ s explored the battered 
cities and villages that were no longer under German occupation. The citY of Amiens 
was of particular interest, and on 2 November 1918, members of the 300' Division 
attended a mass at its cathedral to remember the dead Americans, British and 
Austra ians. 
53 
Also during this period out of line, the two commanding generals in 11 Corps received a 
form letter of sorts from General Pershing about the state of the American Army in 
France, sent to each AEF division commander with his name typed in the salutation to 
give the document a personal touch. The observations were made while he was in 
command of the First Army. Pershing sent the letters, instead of publishing the message 
in orders, which 'are too often considered perfunctory. 54 
Copies sent to O'Ryan and Lexý is were, at this juncture, of little value. The II points 
addressed in the document covered everything from liaison and plans of attack to staff 
efficiency, straggling. and the personality of officers. Pershing encouraged commanders 
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to make sure older officers and their staffs were alert. and *%ýell toward the front to direct 
correct tactical dispositions and see that there is no hesitation, and that important ZgIrTound 
once taken is strongly held. ' Most importantly. he said that each *division commander 
should impress his own personality upon the division, and see his officers frequenfl\. '-; 'ý 
During the second week of November, the 27 th and 30thDivisions xNere visited by Brio 
Gen. W. J. Dugan, attached to Ivor Maxse's training branch, w-ho carefulk, observed the 
Americans over the course of three days. Although his comments \\ere of limited value 
to the divisional commanders because the Armistice was signed one day after he filed his 
report, they are insightful and worth noting. His main observation ýý, as that the 'sý'stem 
of training is indifferent, ' and that the 'officers and men don't strike one as being very 
keen on training. ' 56 He suggested that this was due to the fact training started too early, 
and too many hours were devoted to each subject. Dugan concluded that senior officers 
lacked imagination in preparing interesting training programs, and didn't think the staff 
work was running on smooth lines. 'The work of reconstruction is causing a good deal of 
floundering, chiefly due to want of experience and the absence of a sound working 
system throughout all units. ' 57 
The War Ends 
Of greater significance was the news of the Armistice. It was mostly anti-climactic for 
the two American divisions, which were not immediately aware that an armistice ý\as 
signed on the morning of II November. O'Ryan was alerted later that day bN mo 
Australian soldiers \\, -ho passed by him on the street outside his headquarters and asked. 
W7 
'Why in the hell don't you celebrate? ' The 27 th Division commander observed at that 
moment, among the Americans, there was 'not a ripple of excitement. Ber,, -thingx\ent v- 
on as usual. 558 But that night, the soldiers did celebrate, and they ý% ere al loý% ed to imbibe 
liquor, which O'Ryan normally forbad. A witness to the celebration said that soldiers 
were parading up and down the streets, yelling and hollering I ike a bunch of co\\ boý s just 
after a range drive. ' 59 In the 3 Oth Division rest area, there were no reports of \\ i Id 
celebrations. Rather, the men talked of going home. Some of Read's staff officers had a 
more festive attitude about the historic event and flocked to Amiens, where they were 
joined by their British, Canadian, Australian and French counterparts. The city Nýas 
packed with jubilant soldiers, and according to two American officers, *Tables in the 
Amiens restaurants and cafes were as hard to procure that night as on Broadxý av on New 
Year's Eve. ' 60 With such revelry, the war was effectively over for the 27 
th 
and 3 Oth 
Divisions. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: The B rothers-in -Arms 
One of the more interesting, and controversial, questions surrounding the emplo.,, ment of 
U. S. Army troops in France in 1917-18 during World War I was ýý hether the Americans 
should have organised an independent army on the Western Front. In this regard. the 
experience of the 27 th and 30t" American Divisions, which trained and served ý\ ith the 
British Army until the Armistice, provides a unique case study in which to examine this 
question. These two divisions illustrate what might have occurred if Gen. John J. 
Pershing had allowed his entire force of two million soldiers to amalgamate and serve 
under the command of British and French Army generals. 
The Coalition 
What are we to make of the coalition between the 11 American Corps and the British 
Army? It was at first fraught with acrimony, mostly as a result of the complicated 
negotiations between the two commanders-in-chief, As we look through the prism of 11 
Corps official records, its published regimental histories, and soldiers' letters and diaries, 
a clearer picture develops. 
There were several outright advantages of placing American divisions under British 
command, and the first, undoubtedly, involved supplying the divisions. Even though 
Pershing had established a comprehensive Service of Supply xý,, ith base sections 
throughout France, his First Army divisions at the front suffered from a lack of fresh food 
and replacement clothing. as \\ell as inadequate equipment. The American suppl\ lines. 
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nearly all by rail from the Bordeaux area on France's southwest coast ýý ere long. Their 
carrying capacity was limited. That fact forced Pershing to make a choice bemeen 
delivering food or ammunition during periods of heavy fighting. Ammunition, of course. 
had to take priority; the men sometimes had to go on iron rations. The 27hand 3 O'h 
Divisions also occasionally had problems distributing food, but when this occurred, the 
British came to their aid. They were better fed by the British than were their American 
counterparts, at St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne. In contrast, the British supply 
lines running between Amiens to the south and Hazebouck in the north had no trouble. 
Another advantage of being under British command was that despite being organised as a 
corps, 11 American Corps remained essentially a skeleton organisation, and, therefore, it 
was not necessary to take key officers from the two divisions and place them in corps 
staff positions. The British handled the higher command and much of the tactics that 
otherwise would have fallen to American staff officers, who were in short supply. But 
the main advantage was that American division commanders and their subordinates were 
dealing with experienced British staff officers, who were more than willing to share the 
lessons learned of the previous three years. 
When training the Americans, the British stressed aggressive trench fighting with 
bayonets and grenades. ' The British officers emphasized the role of chain of command 
in preventive measures. For example, officers were encouraged to check soldiers' feet for 
trench foot, as \\ell as ensuring they had proper clothing and equipment to prevent cold- 
weather related injuries, \\hich might keep soldiers out of line unnecessarily. 2 The 27 th 
and 3 Oth American Divisions were each about the size of a British corps. Pershing 
purposely organised large divisions for two specific reasons. First, there ýýas a shortage 
of trained officers that he could choose from to command his divisions, and, second, 
American military leaders were convinced that large divisions could continue in battle for 
3 longer periods, thus lessening the need for rotations. Both factors became significant for 
11 American Corps since its two divisions suffered high casualty rates and received no 
replacements while in line. 
The Issue of Amalgamation 
Essentially, the two divisions were amalgamated into the BEF, a situation that Pershing 
attempted to discourage early on, but did nothing to prevent after he organised the First 
Army. In the instance of the 27 th and 30 th Divisions, Haig won the battle with Pershing 
over the use of American troops. He had complete access to 50,000 eager, but 
inexperienced, doughboys to amalgamate with his Fourth Army. Haig was patient with 
Pershing and better understood the importance of the Anglo-American relations than his 
American counterpart. This was reflected in a congratulatory letter to the 27 th Division 
before it left France. He told the New Yorkers: 'In the greater knowledge and 
understanding borne of perils and hardships shared together, we have leamt, at last, to 
look beyond old jealousies and past quarrels to the essential qualities that unite the great 
English-speaking nations... I feel confident that the new era opened on the battlefields of 
the Old World will see the sympathy and friendship now established between our two 
nations constantly deepened and strengthened. 
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Pershing, on the other hand, refused to recognise the usefulness of the relationship. In his 
memoirs, he wrote: 'Except for the details of trench warfare. training under the French 
and British was of little value. ' 5 Perhaps the tense conferences xN ith Haig and Robertson 
still weighed heavily on his mind. What he failed to understand ý\as that bv alio\\incy the 
British to use the 27 th and 30that the front, he helped hasten the end of the war. Despite 
not reaching all of their objectives and suffering high casualties during the Hindenburg 
Line attack, the operation may have been scaled down if it were not for the use of fresh 
American troops. 
Despite tense moments over the amalgamation issue, Pershing and Haig enjoyed a warm 
relationship. The American ambassador in charge of Pershing's headquarters personnel, 
Lloyd C. Griscom, described the two leaders as 'of the same type - self-contained, direct, 
honest, and incapable of intrigue. They had great respect for each other, but when they 
met for a conference, the very similarity of their reserved characteristics prevented them 
from indulging in an open, free and frank discussion. ' 6 
Relations with the British 
It is quite clear that Pershing had little interest in the 27thand 3 Oth Divisions after they 
remained behind as the 11 American Corps. If he did have any concerns about the 
performance of the two divisions in the British sector, they were laid to rest by Lt. Gen. 
Claude William Jacob of 11 British Corps. 7 The divisions under his command had helped 
train cadres of the 27thand 30th \\, -hile they were at the Ypres front in late August. He told 
Pershing \\hen they, met on 22 November during a parade for the King and Queen of 
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Belgium: 'The Allies pushed the Germansiust to the crest of the hill. and it tookjust a 
little added push by the Americans to put them over. 18 Jacob. ho%ýever, did not mention 
that the Germans occupying Mt. Kernmel had mostly abandoned their position before the 
Americans took over the front. Still, the British general's encouraging words must have 
pleased Pershing since he made a special note of the conversation in his diary. 
Pershing also wanted to know what his division and brigade commanders thought of their 
experiences with the British and Australians and ordered his operations officer (G-3) to 
send questionnaires to them on 10 December 1918. Officers were to address three major 
issues: the part played by American units compared with that of the foreign unit, the 
efficiency of American troops as compared with those with whom they served. and any 
difficulties due to a difference in language. 9 All 10 divisions that had served at some 
point with the British, as well as those divisions serving with the French, were surveyed 
and given only 10 days to report back to the G-3. Each report was to be marked 'Strictly 
Confidential' and would have limited distribution. 10 The actual memorandum ordering 
the report was marked 'Secret. ' and it is doubtful that anyone outside of the AEF or War 
Department ever saw the reports. Unfortunately, Haig did not place a similar demand on 
his general officers, and, therefore, we have less input on the British relationship with the 
Americans. Only the diaries and letters already cited in this study hint at how some 
British officers and men regarded the doughboys. But we are fortunate to have the 
comments from the 11 American Corps general officers, which are revealing, but not 
altogether surprising. 
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Within the 27 th Division, O'Ryan saw the relationship as a valuable experience. * We 
trained about one month with the British, and the British officers assigned to each 
regiment helped us wonderfully in all the little things that we wanted to pick up on. ' he 
wrote. 'We were trained in field exercises and on a larger scale in war than ý\ e had ever 
been trained before, as the British had large training grounds about 20 miles south of 
Calais, as well as every sort and kind of school. "' O'Ryan did disclose one interesting 
fact: the men in his division had no particular affection for the British since many of the 
New Yorkers were of German-American and Irish-American blood. As a result, they 
would have preferred to serve with the French. The British officers and men recognised 
the hostility and made a special effort to be cordial to the Americans, and over time, a 
bond developed between the Allies. ' 2 
The comments from the 30thDivision commander were also encouraging. Lewis 
recognised that 'the fraternisation of Australians and Americans was more marked than 
that of the English and Australians, or the English and Americans. ' He further remarked 
that the 'relations of officers in this division were uniformly pleasant, even cordial, 
including those between the British and Australians. ' His 60'hBrigade commander, Brig. 
Gen. Samson L. Faison, had mixed reviews of the alliance. 
The relations that prevailed between troops of this brigade and the British 
infantry were good, while the relations with both the Scotch infantry and English 
artillery were the best. Yet, Tommy considered himself a superior soldier to the 
American and took no pains to conceal it. In fact, he took every opportunity to 
impress upon the mind of the American soldier that such was the case. Our 
soldiers resented any such attitude and denied that it ýN as based on fact. 
' 3 
17 
Another brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Tyson. in charge of the 5 9, h. 
thought the British were wonderful: 
Their officers are splendid and tireless, and uniformly courteous and helpful, and 
they seemed to have the greatest admiration for the Americans. and ýý e saýý no 
spirit ofjealousy or pettiness in our contact with them. They were thorough, verý 
fine, and I am glad, indeed, that we had the opportunity of serving xý ith them; it has 
been great for America. It would have been better, perhaps, if there had been more 
Americans to serve with them, which may have eradicated any feeling that maý 
have been in the hearts of the two nations against each other. " 
Beside the responses to the questionnaires, Maj. Gen. George W. Read's final report also 
sheds light on the relationship. 'From the time 11 Corps was assigned to the Fourth 
British Army until it was transferred to the Third British Army, after the signing of the 
Armistice, ' Read happily wrote, 'relations between the corps and army \ý ere akvaý-s 
excellent... The amalgamation was complete, and founded on a spirit of mutual esteem 
and profound good will.... all officers at both headquarters seemed determined that good 
feelings and cooperation should surmount every natural difficulty, and the relations, at no 
time, were other than most satisfactory. ' 15 Read is the only American officer in the AEF 
who actually uses the word amalgamation, further proof that Pershing really understood 
the relationship with the British. 
Read's chief of staff was less enthusiastic about serving with the British. This comes as 
no surprise since Col. George S. Simonds had wanted 11 Corps transferred from the 
British in August 1918. He had more to say about the coalition than did the other officers 
since he had been \\ orking \\ ith the British long before the first American divisions 
arrived in this sector. 'The problems \\ ith them [British] are far more numerous and 
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complex than to be expected, ' Simonds surmised. Wthough theý are of our language. 
race, and, to a considerable extent, our ideas and ideals, their methods of procedure are 
certainly different than ours. Furthermore, the general run of their enlisted men... is 
inferior in intelligence, initiative and adaptability to American soldiers. ,16 
Simonds also had plenty to say about the British officers he encountered. Overall, 'the 
type officer of this class is a man of character and always a gentleman, ' he observed. His 
word, once given, can always be relied upon. He is a man of positive opinions and wants 
to do things his way. He is sometimes hard to convince, and sometimes presents the 
attitude of not wanting to hear the other side. However, he does listen to reason, and he 
does make concessions. ' 
17 
When it came to specific British commanders, Simonds was less impressed ýý, ith Gen. Sir 
Herbert Plumer. He 'is a man of positive opinions, who wants to dominate things 
wherever he happens to be, ' Simonds opined. 'He gave me the impression that his 
judgement might sometimes go wrong. ' Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson was more to his 
liking. He 'has a nervous energy, more apparent than in most British officers. He is a 
man of considerable tactical ability. He keeps his finger on the pulse of his troops, clear 
down into the ranks, and knows at all times the state of their supplies. their casualty lists, 
health conditions, morale, etc. He always showed the utmost consideration to his 
subordinates, consulted his corps commanders freely, gave considerable weight to their 
opinions, and gave them great latitude in their operations. ' Rawlinson's chief of staff, 
Maj. Gen. Sir Archibald Montgomerý, impressed Simonds even more. *He is a student of 
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his profession - keen, alert, and of pleasing personality: and, he ýý as able to efficientlý 
coordinate the work of the staff. ' 
18 
Early on, Simonds carried the brunt of 11 American Corps until Read was appointed its 
commander, and one of his first concerns was the British supply system. It was 
organised to accommodate fewer men than an American division, and it was questionable 
how this would impact the 11 American Corps. This ultimately became the responsibility 
of Col. Edward S. Walton, 11 Corps quartermaster. He concluded that the supply question 
was worked out through trial and error and praised the British in their efforts to 
accommodate the Americans. 'Although we had our troubles, of course, ' Walton wrote, 
'none of them was caused by lack of cooperation. '19 Certainly 11 American Corps in no 
way had the previously mentioned logistical difficulties experienced by other AEF 
divisions. 
Lessons Learned 
In World War 11, the amalgamation issue, essentially that of Allied cooperation, arose 
again. To better understand how this situation was handled in the past, the War 
Department ordered a study of the American and British relationship of 1917-1918. The 
purpose was to assist Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's build-up of a coalition of armies for 
the eventual invasion of France. The 1942 study was based primarily upon the 
questionnaires ordered by Pershing, and the conclusions were to be expected. 
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In general, the American soldier considered the English enlisted man as difficult to make 
friends with, but a good fellow, and worth risking one's life for. ' the author of the suidý-, 
learned. 'He was inclined to be condescending toward his American cousins, but they 
were fully prepared to take this out of him by w, hatever means necessary. after ýýhich 
perfect harmony prevailed. 20 A common issue reported by the Americans in 1917-18 
was some difficulty in understanding the British. *A foreign language doesn't cause as 
much irritation as your own language spoken differently, . remarked one AEF officer. 21 
Contribution of 11 American Corps 
How do we gauge the operational effectiveness of 11 American Corps? After arriving in 
France on 31 May, 1918, the 27 th Division lost 1,829 officers and men killed in battle, 
with another 6,505 wounded. The 30" Division did not fare much better after arrival on 
24 May. It lost 1,641 officers and men killed. and sustained 6,774 wounded. Also, 229 
of the 27 th Division were taken prisoner, compared with 75 from the 30thDivision. 
However, the two divisions captured an extraordinary number of the enemy. The 27 th 
Division recorded 2,357 Germans passing through its POW cages, while the 3 oth Division 
claimed 3,848 prisoners. Such statistics are impressive, for the New York troops spent a 
mere 57 days at the front, and the southern soldiers only 12 more. 
The divisional statistics indicate a high casualty rate, common throughout the AEF. This 
was. of course, due partially to poor command from line officers, but inexperience NN ithin 
th 
all ranks xN, as the chief reason so many men did not return home. As the 27 and loth 
Divisions remained at the front for longer periods. casualties decreased, despite a 
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determined enemy that fought with skill to the very end. Both divisions can credit their 
later success on the battlefield to the tutoring received from the British. even though 
Pershing did not want the Americans to receive formal training from their allies. 'A fixed 
principle, ' General Read recalled, 'was that in this training, no British advisor or 
instructor could at any time take command of one of our units. '22 While the British 
officers never actually took command of the American regiments during training or 
operations, their influence was apparent in practically every facet of how the doughboys 
distributed food and clothing, cared for the sick and wounded, and operated during the 
Hindenburg Line and Selle River operations. 
Recent scholarship on the BEF during the last 100 days of the war clearly demonstrates 
that it evolved from the failures of 1914-16 to perhaps the most effective fighting force 
on the Western Front in 1918. Historians such as Paddy Griffith, Gary Sheffield and 
Peter Simkins, among others, applaud the innovations in artillery with the creeping 
barrage, and the combined arms of infantry advancing with tanks. 23 The Fourth Army 
artillery during the Hundred Days offensives, according one of Haig's biographers, 'was 
now so accurate and lethal, and called upon to do much less, that the weight of the shell 
provided more than enough to complete the task. 524 It was not perfect. though, as shown 
by the failed attack on the Knoll and the two farms in the northern sector of the 
Hindenburg Line by the 27hDivision. But the doughboys recovered and, undoubtedly. 11 
American Corps profited from the British learning curve, while the remainder of the AEF 
struggled during the Meuse-Argonne with ineffective artillery and logistical breakdowns. 
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The 27 th and 3 Oth Divisions were immune to the problems encountered by Pershing's First 
Army. His decision to commit 225,000 men to attack the St. Mihiel salient benefited 
from the fact that the German Army, with only 25,000 men, had already begun to 
withdraw from the area. Then, a mere two weeks later,, he shifted these same divisions 
50 miles toward the Meuse River, and ordered the tired officers and men to attack a 
position that the most experienced British and French units would have found difficult. 
This is not to say that 11 American Corps did not encounter similar difficulty. Despite the 
best efforts of the British, the first two operational experiences of the 27 th and 3 300' 
Divisions exposed a number of serious weaknesses that were also inherent to the other 
AEF divisions. Liaison was poor, and orders were not effectively transmitted to the unit 
commanders. This was, of course, due to the inexperience of officers at all levels, but 
this was mostly corrected during the Selle River campaign. 
The National Guard Issue 
A question of somewhat lesser importance is the effectiveness of National Guard troops. 
Throughout the history of the United States, there has been an ongoing debate over the 
so-called citizen soldier, and whether the nation should rely more heavily on this 
component, or on the professional soldier. In 1917-18, there was little debate. It was 
clear that the National Guard would have to carry a large part of the burden, along with 
conscripts, since the Regular Army had too few men and officers to form an effeak e 
expeditionary force. National Guard divisions had a mixed record in World War 1. In the 
United States, the National Guard had a poor reputation before the x\ar. and fex\ Regulars 
changed their opinions after the Armistice. It did not help that the commander of the 26 th 
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'Yankee' Division was relieved in mid-October 1918. and that the 35h *Kansas-. % fissoun' 
Division collapsed on the fifth day of the Meuse-Argonne. 25 Still. other National Guard 
divisions, like the 28 th 33 rd and 42 nd. fought in major operations and did quite Nýell. "" 
Certainly at the top of this list are the 27thand 3 Oth Divisions. Their experiences reflect 
what a National Guard division could and could not achieve. 
It cannot be overstated how unique these two divisions were among other National Guard 
units in the AEF. By the Armistice, the ranks of the 27'h were still composed largely of 
New Yorkers, while the rolls of the 3 Oth were filled primarily with men from North and 
South Carolina and Tennessee. The other National Guard divisions in France had lost 
much of their local composition through replacements. Despite prodding by Read, 
neither of the 11 American Corps divisions received any additional troops until after the 
fighting ceased-a further indication that Pershing placed little importance on this corps. 
He also left its officer corps intact, despite consistently relieving ineffective officers in 
other AEF corps. The 3 Oth Division, following command by five different generals. was 
led by Lewis, a Regular, for most of its service in France. Its counterpart, the 27 th 
Division. ) was under the 
fine leadership of O'Ryan. He had the distinction of being the 
only National Guard officer to command a division throughout the war. 
In Comparison 
A larger question is how did the 27 th and 300' Divisions compare to other AEF divisions, 
as N\ell as the Australian and British divisions with which they trained and served? As 
previously indicated the divisions of 11 Corps were largely left to their own devices and, 
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in many ways, operated under the British. Asa result, they ýý ere better fed and equipped 
than the remainder of the AEF because of the alliance with the BEF. Also, when it came 
to training, the 27th and 30th Divisions had a clear advantage over other AEF dk isions 
because of the British Army and its experienced instructors. 
On par with the 11 Corps divisions were two Regular Army divisions (Is' and 2nd ) and 
another National Guard division, the 26 th . They were the earliest combat organisations to 
arrive in France. While most of the AEF received the bulk of training in the United 
States, these three divisions mostly trained in France under the supervision of French 
instructors and ultimately. 27 Whether or not it was a direct influence of the French 
instructors, the Is', 2 nd and 26th served in all major operations and were considered the 
best of the First American Army. Regarding combat, the 27 th and 30 th Divisions suffered 
about the same percentage of casualties as the remainder of the AEF. and experienced 
difficulty in liaison during battle. Neither of the 11 Corps divisions received 
replacements, while the divisions of the First American Army were kept at full strength 
with drafted men. Discipline within the 27 th and 3 Oth was far superior to that of other 
American divisions. Both 11 Corps divisions had fewer court-martials and incidences of 
straggling then the rest of Pershing's cloughboys. 
In comparison to the Allied units to which they were attached, the 27 th and 3 Oth Divisions 
were, of course, National Guard troops, while the Australian and British armies of 1918 
were composed mostly of citizen soldiers. But the Americans actually resembled the 
British Army of 1914-15. Because of their inexperience, they made numerous tactical 
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errors and suffered unnecessary casualties in the same ýýay the BEF took tremendous 
losses during the first two years of the war. Certainly the reason II American Corps NN as 
well-disciplined directly correlates to its association with the British. American officers. 
such as O'Ryan, had visited the front in the British sector in 1917 to observe and ý\ ere 
impressed with the high level of obedience displayed by the Tommies. 
Australian troops, on the other hand, were less impressive to the Americans. Monash's 
troops had a reputation as undisciplined, and this was certainly true when comparing 
them to the British troops. The Americans often witnessed Australian soldiers failing to 
salute superior officers. Even more startling was the claim by some doughboys of seeinp, 
Australian soldiers rifling through the belongings of dead American troops. As at least 
one historian has argued, the problems of discipline were the result of overuse and a lack 
of replacements. 28 Similarity did exist on the battlefield. The Australians were good role 
models for the Americans in their tenacity to continue fighting despite being in line for 
long periods and not receiving replacements, as well as taking heavy casualties. In 
summary, it is difficult to make a direct comparison between the 11 American Corps and 
the larger body of the AEF, as well as the associated Australian and British units. Yet. it 
can be said that the 27 th and 30'hDivisions represented the U. S. Army well during its 
association with the BEF, and, indeed, it was the correct decision by Pershing to leave 
them xvith that army. 
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Epilop-ue 
In writing about the 27 th and 3 Oth Divisions, the author discovered that the sources for the 
27 th Division are far more detailed than those for its sister division. Almost m-o years 
after arriving home from France, Major General O'Ryan published The Stotý- qf the 2" 
Division. The book was a monumental achievement, comprising mo volumes and more 
than 1,000 pages. He sent the book to family members, friends, and fellow Army officers 
who inspired or assisted him during the writing. 
Pershing was among the first to receive The Ston, of the 27 th Division. O'Ryan respected 
his former commander- in -chief and wanted him to share in this accomplishment. The 
27 th Division commander also had an ulterior motive in sending Pershing the gift. He 
sheepishly asked the general of the armies to write a brief accolade that his publisher 
could use for publicity purposes. Pershing politely refused. In a letter written by an aide, 
he told the former division commander that he felt his history was one of the best 
personal accounts of the war. If he wrote a few words for O'Ryan's book, however, then 
there would be an obligation to do so for other officers writing books. 
Even though Persh i ng perhaps never read The Story of the 27 th Division, he was correct in 
saying O'Ryan's work was among the best. It is certainly the most complete account of 
the American units that served in the British sector, standing alone in a crowded field that 
includes narratives covering every regiment of the 27hand 30th Divisions. From 1919- 
1940. thirty unit histories associated with the two divisions xýere published, as xýell as a 
-, Oth single-volume history of the _3 
Division. The Thirtieth Division in the U Orld Har 
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lacked the depth and insight of O'Ryan's work since it xý as kNritten in the third person by 
two authors who had no direct affiliation ýNith the division. With the exception of 
O'Ryan's book, those written by veterans were mostly for one another. destined to 
become souvenirs of their shared experience. There is no evidence that an\ of the unit 
histories,, including O'Ryan's, were reviewed or excerpted in newspapers or periodicals. 
This is surprising in his case since he was considered a prominent Neýý Yorker before the 
war, and served afterward for a short period as city police commissioner. 
The homecoming celebrations for the 27 th and 3 Oth Divisions were quite similar. In New 
York City, the 27 th Division was greeted with the pomp and celebrity one would expect. 
After demobilising its units at Camp Dix, New Jersey and Camp Upton, New York, the 
division paraded up Fifth Avenue and banqueted with some of the city's best-known 
actors and actresses. In the south, the 3 01h arrived at Charleston harbour in February 1919 
for embarkation, followed by demobilisation at Camp Jackson, South Carolina or Fort 
Oglethorpe, Georgia. From there, the units went home for separate welcome home 
celebrations in cities and towns throughout Tennessee, and North and South Carolina. 
Southern hospitality was showered upon the men in Knoxville, Memphis, Chattanooga, 
Asheville and Columbia, where the citizens came out in droves to applaud their local 
heroes with food, entertainment and speeches. Local newspapers covered all of these 
events in detail and published special sections that touted the exploits of the two divisions 
on the Western Front. 
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In the years following the war, associations affiliated ýý ith both divisions held reunions. 
Which division actually first broke the Hindenburg Line. the 27hor 30t", xý as one of the 
issues debated when the veterans from New York gathered with those from the south. 
both wishing to claim this honour. A North Carolina newspaper reported: 'Tx\ enty-fli ve 
,, Oth thousand folders containing a facsimile of the official operations map of the -3 Division 
in France were put on sale by the Buncombe County Colonial Dames. The proceeds of 
the sale will be turned over to the association to help defray the expenses of its campaign 
combating that of the 27 th New York Division, claiming credit for breaking the 
Hindenburg Line. 29 The 27 th Division Association was the more active of the two 
organisations. During a four-week period in May and June 19-) 30, it sponsored a'Back to 
the Front' reunion voyage to France, where the veterans revisited the sacred battlefields in 
the British sector. 
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Official commemoration of both divisions was the responsibility of the Federal 
Government. The American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) dedicated the 
Somme American Cemetery and Memorial, near the village of Bony, in 1937. Named 
after the area near the Somme River where the two divisions fought, more than 1,800 
Americans are buried in the cemetery. The legacy of the 270' and 3 Oth is also 
commemorated three miles from the cemetery with a marker on the battlefield. also 
dedicated in 1937. The Bellicourt Monument stands atop of the St. Quentin Canal 
Tunnel. It contains a map of the operation to break the Hindenburg Line, along xN 1th an 
_. 
the direction of the attack. 'A further testament to the courage orientation table showin(I 3 
of tile 27 th and 3 Oth is the Kernmel Monument near Vierstraat, Belgium. It was erected b,. 
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the ABMC in 1929 and pays tribute to the first operation in ýý h ich the two dk isions 
participated. Thus, the contribution of the 11 American Corps durin-gy World War I is 
permanently enshrined on the former battlefields of the Western Front. 
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Appendix 1: Staff: 11 American Corps (29 September 1918) 
Command and Staff 
Maj. Gen. George W. Read-Corps Commander 
Col. George S. Simonds-Chief of Staff 
Lt. Col. Richard K. Hale-Assistant Chief of Staff, G- I 
Lt. Col. Kerr T. Riggs-Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 
Col. Fred E. Buchan -Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 
Lt. Col. John P. Terrell-Assistant Chief of Staff. G-4 
27 th American Division 
Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan, Division Commander 
Col. Stanley H. Ford, Chief of Staff 
Brig. Gen. Albert H. Blanding, 53 rd Infantry Brigade Commander 
Brig. Gen. Palmer E. Pierce, 54ýh Infantry Brigade Commander 
30 th American Division 
Maj. Gen. Edward M. Lewis, Division Commander 
Col. John K. Herr, Chief of Staff 
Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Tyson, 5 9th Infantry Brigade Commander 
Brig. Gen. Samuel L. Faison, 60th Infantry Brigade Commander 
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Appendix 11: Order of Battle: 27 
th 
and 30th American Divisions (10 
August-I September 1918) 
27'h American Division 
53 rd Infantry Brigade 
105ý' Infantry Regiment 
106'h Infantry Regiment 
105"' Machine-Gun Battalion 
54 th Infantry Brigade 
107t" Infantry Regiment 
108t" Infantry Regiment 
106th Machine-Gun Battalion 
Divisional Troops 
104'h Machine-Gun Battalion 
102 nd Engineer Regiment 
102 nd Field Signal Battalion 
Headquarters Troop 
Trains 
102 nd Train and Military Police 
102 nd Supply Train 
102 nd Engineer Train 
102 nd Sanitary Train (Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals, 10-5-108) 
30'h American Division 
59th Infantry Brigade 
117th Infantry Regiment 
11 8ý' Infantry Regiment 
1146'Machine-Gun Battalion 
600' Infantry Brigade 
I 19th Infantry Regiment 
1200' Infantry Regiment 
II 5thMachine-Gun Battalion 
Divisional Troops 
113ý'Machine-Gun Battalion 
105th Engineer Regiment 
105"' Field Signal Battalion 
Headquarters Troop 
Trains 
105th Train Headquarters and Military Police 
105th Supply Train 
105th Engineer Train 
105ý' Sanitary Train (Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals 117-120) 
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Appendix III: Order of Battle-29 September 1918 
Australian Corps 
2nd Australian Division 
5 th Australian Infantry Brigade 
17 th Battalion 
18 th Battalion 
I 9th Battalion 
20th Battalion 
6 th Australian Infantry Brigade 
21" Battalion 
22 nd Battalion 
23 rd Battalion 
24 th Battalion 
7 th Australian Infantry Brigade 
25 th Battalion 
26 th Battalion 
27 th Battalion 
28 th Battalion 
3 rd Australian Division 
9th Australian Infantry Brigade 
33 rd Battalion 
34 th Battalion 
35 th Battalion 
I Oth Australian Infantry Brigade 
37th Battalion 
38th Battalion 
3 9th Battalion 
40th Battalion 
II th Australian Infantry Brigade 
41 " Battalion 
42 nd Battalion 
43rd Battalion 
44 th Battalion 
5 th Australian Division 
8 th Australian Infantry Brigade 
29th Battalion 
3 Oth Battalion 
3 Is' Battalion 3 
_, 
2nd Battalion 
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14 th Australian Infantry Brigade 
53 rd Battalion 
54th Battalion 
55 th Battalion 
56th Battalion 
15 th Australian Infantry Brigade 
57 th Battalion 
58th Battalion 
Wh Battalion 
60th Battalion 
5 th Cavalry Brigade 
11 American Corps 
27 th American Division 
53 rd Infantry Brigade 
105 th Infantry Regiment 
I't Battalion 
2 nd Battalion 
3 rd Battalion 
106 th Infantry Regiment 
I't Battalion 
2 nd Battalion 
PBattalion 
105 th Machine Gun Battalion 
54 th Infantry Brigade 
107 th Infantry Regiment 
I't Battalion 
2 nd Battalion 
3 rd Battalion 
108 th Infantry Regiment 
I't Battalion 
2 nd Battalion 
3 rd Battalion 
106 th Machine Gun Battalion 
Divisional Troops 
104 th Machine Gun Battalion 
102 nd Engineers 
102 nd Field Artillery Battalion 
30l't Tank Battalion 
36 3' 
30'h Amerii-nn r";, -/, sion 
5 9th Infantry Brigade 
117 th Infantry Regiment 
I" Battalion 
2 nd Battalion 
3 rd Battalion 
118 th Infantry Regiment 
I't Battalion 
2 nd Battalion 
3 rd Battalion 
I 14thMachine Gun Battalion 
60th Infantry Brigade 
II 9th Infantry Regiment 
I" Battalion 
2 nd Battalion 
3 rd Battalion 
120th Infantry Regiment 
I't Battalion 
2 nd Battalion 
3 rd Battalion 
115 th Machine Gun Battalion 
Divisional Troops 
113 th Machine Gun Battalion 
105 th Engineers 
105 th Field Signal Battalion 
4th British Tank Brigade 
Australian and British Auxiliary Units Attached to 11 Corps 
3 rd Anti-Aircraft Search Light Section 
I" British Siege Company of Railway Engineers 
182 nd British Tunneling Company 
4 th Australian Field Artillery Brigade 
5 th Australian Field Artillery Brigade 
7 th Australian Field Artillery Brigade 
8 th Australian Field Artillery Brigade 
I Oth Australian Field Artillery Brigade 
12 th Australian Field Artillerý Brigade 
I -, th 3 Australian Field Artiller\ Brigade 
14 th Australian Field Artillerý Brigade 
6 th Army Brigade, Australian Field Artillery Brigade 
3 rd Squadron Australian Air Force 
. 364 
2 nd anti-aircraft batteries 
5 th Balloon Wing; 2 
20th Regiment Hussars 
See 'Fourth Army Order of Battle at Zero' for a more exhaustive listing of all units designated for the 
attack on 29 September 1918. Reproduced in War Department, US. Army in the World War, kfilitaiý- 
Operations, Volume 7. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 95. 
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Appendix IV: German Army (Second and Eighteenth Armies) 
Order of Battle, 29 September 1918 
North to South 
8 Ih Division 
153 rd Infantry Regiment 
5 th Division 
84th Infantry Regiment 
27 th Reserve Infantry Regiment 
goth Reserve Infantry Regiment 
121" Division 
7 th Reserve Infantry Regiment 
60th Infantry Regiment 
185 th Infantry Division 
ý37-lnfantry Regiment 
161't Infantry Regiment 
28 th Reserve Infantry Regiment 
75 th Reserve Division 
T5-0-'7R--eserve Infantry Regiment 
249th Reserve Infantry Regiment 
25 I't Reserve Infantry Regiment 
Corps Units 
65t" Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 
42 nd Foot Artillery Regiment 
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Appendix V: Comparative Strength of American and British Divisions, 
1918 
American Army' 
Division: 28,105 officers and men. It would contain two brigades of infantry and one 
brigade of artillery. It al contained engineer, machine gun, signal. medical and 
transportation units and a headquarters. 
Brigade: 8,324 combatants. 
Regiment: 3,770 combatants. 
Battalion: 1,027 officers and men. 
British Army 
Division: 12,000 to 15,000 infantry and staff. It would contain a pioneer (labour) unit and 
three brigades. 
Brigade: 3,000 to 5,000 infantry and staff 
Battalion: 1,000 to 1,600 infantry and staff 
' American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe (Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1938), 529-530. 
2 T. H. E. Travers, How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British A rmY on the Western 
Front, 1917-1918 (London: Routledge, 1992), 183. 
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